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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines some of the ways in which phenomenology might be applied to the 
representation of landscape experience within contemporary art practice.  In particular, 
the thesis examines how embodied landscape experience, informed by an understanding 
of phenomenology, might be articulated by contemporary art practice that uses the 
media of film and digital video.  The thesis also questions ways in which time might 
contribute to an understanding of such a representation of the landscape.  Based on a 
critical analysis of landscape experience and its representation in art practice, the thesis 
identifies critical omissions both within the aligned disciplines of cultural anthropology 
and art history, particularly in instances where art has been employed ineptly as a tool 
for critical enquiry.  Through a conceptual analysis of phenomenology, cultural 
archaeology, cultural anthropology, theories of technology, art history, critical film 
theory and art practice, this project makes a critical examination of new ways in which 
art can articulate phenomenological notions of landscape experience, both in the forms 
of a written exegesis and in examples of my own practice. 
 
To these ends, the writing of Christopher Tilley and Tim Ingold is examined in 
order to draw upon some of the ways in which cultural archaeology and cultural 
anthropology use Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and James Gibson’s 
ecological theory of visual perception to understand an embodied engagement with the 
landscape. Following an expanded phenomenological examination of landscape the 
thesis identifies ways in which cultural anthropology has used painting.  This 
examination is followed by an analysis of the work of Mike Michael and Don Ihde in 
order to determine the role played by technology within the mediation of experience and 
its representation in art.  The writing of Joyce Brodsky is examined to analyse the 
relationship between embodied experience and art practice and, using Sobchack’s 
analysis, the thesis describes ways in which Merleau-Ponty’s idea of reversibility can 
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explain moving imagery as the perception and expression of experience.  As part of the 
method of analysis, a case study is conducted into how phenomenological ideas that 
have been identified in association with landscape experience might be understood 
within Tacita Dean’s work Disappearance at Sea.   
 
An analysis of phenomenological notions of landscape experience within my 
own art practice has led to the generation of a body of practice that includes film and 
digital video media. Key examples of my art practice have been selected that can 
articulate this thesis.  Specifically, a 16mm film, Line, and a digital video, Length II 
provide evidence of contemporary art practice articulating an experience of the 
landscape from a phenomenological viewpoint. Within the production of moving 
imagery, there is a sequence of human actions and technological interventions that can 
be considered in phenomenological terms.  Through a reflection of my own embodied 
experience - extended by vehicles, cameras and their associated technology - Line and 
Length II pay specific attention to how the placement of a camera and its associated 
technology mediates the mobile character of an experience of the landscape.  Central to 
this enquiry has been the contention that through a rigorous application of 
phenomenology, a new mode of making moving imagery emerges, specifically one that 
gives particular emphasis to the placement of the camera and its associated technology 
in order to reveal the dynamic relationship between a perceiver and their environment in 
the twenty-first century. 
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Introduction and methodological forward 
 
This thesis examines the representation of landscape experience within visual art 
practice with specific reference to phenomenology, a discipline of philosophical enquiry 
that privileges the senses in the apprehension of knowledge.  
 
Over the last century – and particularly over the last twenty years or so - the 
status of landscape representation has been much contested within a variety of modes of 
art practice.1 Both art historians and archaeologists have discussed contentious topics 
connected to our experience of the world and its representation within art practice. 
Controversy, for example, has recently arisen over ways in which seeing and perceiving 
function in our understanding of the world. Art historian Jonathon Crary has examined 
developments and changes in vision and perception that are highly germane to this 
thesis.2  The nature of sensation and perception in the nineteenth century, says Crary, 
adopts features from psychology and physiology and leads to a way of thinking about 
vision that includes the idea of a separation between the perceiver and the perceived. 
Such an abstraction of vision is not only a precondition for modernist painting in the 
later nineteenth century but also, he argues, the basis for earlier visual mass culture. 3  
Likewise, archaeologist Colin Renfrew has drawn parallels between artists and 
archaeologists and proposes that the visual arts today have transformed themselves from 
their preoccupation with beauty and the representation of the world into a radical 
                                                 
1 Jonathon Crary, Techniques of the Observer (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: 
MIT press, 1990). 
Edward Casey, Earth-Mapping:  Artists Reshaping Landscape (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005); W. J. T. Mitchell, ed., Landscape and Power (Chicago, London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1994, 2002 ed.). 
Edward Casey, Representing Place:  Landscape Painting and Maps (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002). 
Colin Renfrew, Figuring It Out (London: Thames and Hudson, 2003). 
 
 
2 Crary, Techniques of the Observer. 
3 Ibid. 14. 
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engagement and interaction with the material world that can offer a fresh light on an 
understanding of the ‘human condition’.4  
 
This thesis, rather than viewing landscape as a fixed object for the purpose of 
contemplation - a paradigm of landscape representation common in western visual 
culture during the modern period and one that is inextricably bound up with processes of 
photographic representation - explores some of the ways a relationship between the 
whole body of a perceiver and their environment, or more succinctly ‘embodied 
experience’ of the landscape, can impact on modes of representation within visual art 
practice.  Embodied experience, as I go on to show, can be characterised by an 
engagement with the surrounding world where an encounter is based on the sensory 
perception of the human body. 
 
There are several writers whose projects are relevant to this research project that 
comment on the spatial representation of landscape.5  In his seminal work, Landscape 
and Power, art historian William Mitchell suggests that there is a level of indeterminacy 
involved when speaking of ‘looking at the landscape’.6  Rather than being looked at, 
suggests Mitchell, landscape is often the overlooked background and this leads to 
questions over what exactly ‘looking at the landscape’ entails. To look at a view, 
suggests Mitchell, reveals a separation between a spectator and the landscape; here, the 
viewer is disembodied and is cast in the role of an externalised observer of the view in 
which only the eye has influence.7  More recently, Mitchell has questioned the human 
subject and an immersive space in ‘Architecture as sculpture as drawing: Anthony 
                                                 
4 Renfrew, Figuring It Out. 7. 
5 Mitchell, ed., Landscape and Power. 
Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1971). 
Malcolm Andrews, Landscape and Western Art, vol. Oxford University Press (Oxford: 1999). 
Casey, Earth-Mapping:  Artists Reshaping Landscape. 
6 Mitchell, ed., Landscape and Power. vii. 
7 Ibid.   
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Gormley’s Paragone’.8  Here, he considers an association between the human body and 
the experience of a built environment from the standpoint of an active engagement 
towards architecture.9  Mitchell’s enquiry can thus be seen to embrace an embodied 
experience of landscape in connection with contemporary artwork. 
 
Similarly, historian Martin Jay, in his influential work, Downcast Eyes, also 
notes a separation between an observer and the landscape.10  Jay examines an 
ocularcentric approach to vision and considers ways in which disembodied looking has 
dominated theories surrounding visual experience.11 ‘An antiocularcentric discourse’, he 
says, ‘…has posed substantial and troubling questions about the status of visuality in the 
dominant cultural traditions of the West.’12 Key questions posed by an antiocularcentric 
discourse include: is it possible for thought to be separated from sensual intervention 
and can an eye be understood as a privileged organ through which to channel 
knowledge?13  Implicit within these questions is the influence of the sense of vision over 
hearing, touch or smell - a domination, as I go on to demonstrate, that is inverted by 
phenomenology. 
 
Jay also examines the notion of bodily experience and its relationship to visual 
perception in his work, Songs of Experience.14  Here, he identifies early ideas about the 
body and perception that can be compared with phenomenological notions of embodied 
experience.  Specifically, Jay examines the work of sixteenth century French aristocrat 
and essayist Michel de Montaigne and compares it to the writing of twentieth-century 
                                                 
8 W J T Mitchell, ‘Architecture as sculpture as drawing: Anthony Gormley’s Paragone’, Susan 
Stewart Anthony Vidler, W J T Mitchell, Anthony Gormley, Blind Light (London: Hayward 
Gallery Publishing, 2007). 
9 Ibid. 112. 
10 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 
1994). 54. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 589. 
13 Ibid. 591. 
14 Martin Jay, Songs of Experience (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press, 2006).  
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phenomenological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty.15  Montaigne’s attitude to the 
body, says Jay, ‘was that of someone who inhabited it fully as a lived reality, not that of 
an observer who could examine it from afar as an object in the world’.16 Moreover, 
Montaigne’s thoughts about experience, adds Jay, can be compared with the 
phenomenological ideas of Merleau-Ponty by demonstrating that self-understanding 
should not be the same thing as ‘an autopsy on a corpse’.17 Here, Jay is showing that the 
dynamic nature of a living subject needs to be considered when an examination of 
embodied experience is under scrutiny. 
 
The central research question posed by this thesis is how can a bodily 
association with the landscape be articulated by contemporary art practice? Secondary 
questions that are implicit within this first question include what is the role of time 
within an embodied experience of the landscape and how can writers, who have posited 
what might be termed a sensuous engagement with an environment, appropriate 
contemporary art practices that are concerned with embodied landscape experience? 
 
In order to provide an answer to these questions this thesis explores several 
ideas in connection with perception and art practice. In contrast to the tradition of visual 
representation that is primarily concerned with the static image and an ocularcentric 
manner of perception, this thesis considers an approach to landscape depiction that is 
informed by phenomenology.  Specifically, the thesis makes a critical examination of 
landscape experience, from the disciplines of cultural archaeology and cultural 
anthropology, that is concerned with strands of phenomenological theory that focus on 
embodied experience as well as notions of perception from the discipline of ecological 
psychology.   Phenomenological theories that inform such sensuous accounts of 
landscape experience include aspects of the work of Merleau-Ponty – specifically, his 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 27. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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works: Phenomenology of Perception,18 ‘Eye and Mind’ in The Primacy of Perception,19 
‘Cezanne’s Doubt’ in Sense and Non-sense20 and The Visible and the Invisible21 - about 
how we can understand our surroundings by an embodied relationship that is 
characterised by a fundamentally reversible relationship between the seer and the seen.22  
 
The accounts of landscape experience examined within this thesis are also 
informed by ecological psychologist James Gibson’s approach to visual perception that 
relies on a mutual relationship between an organism and its environment.23  Within these 
accounts, a reciprocal stance is taken that understands that just as there is no perceiver 
without an environment, so there can be no environment without a perceiver.24 It is 
worth noting that the term ‘landscape’ is used throughout this thesis to denote something 
that links bodies, movement and places into a unified whole whilst the word 
‘environment’ is employed to describe the surroundings that are relative to a perceiver.25  
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, and parallel modes of enquiry, that are used within 
what might be seen as a sensory engagement with the landscape, are especially pertinent 
to this thesis because the visual arts are seen to play an important role in articulating the 
corporal experience of an observer and their surroundings.  For instance, the works of 
British artist Tacita Dean and American artists Jackson Pollock and Nancy Spero have, 
                                                 
18 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge, 1962). 
19 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964). 
20 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense, trans. Hubert L Dreyfus and Patricia A Dreyfus 
(Illinois: Evanston, 1964). 
21 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1968). 
22 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception. 
23 James Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc., 1986). 
24 Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment:  Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill 
(London: Routledge, 2000). 20. 
25 Christopher Tilley, The Materiality of Stone:  Explorations in Landscape Phenomenology 
(Oxford, New York: Berg, 2004).24. 
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as I go on to show, been noted by critics for articulating notions of an embodied 
experience of an observer and their surroundings.26 
 
The thesis examines ways in which contemporary art can be informed by textual 
accounts of embodied landscape experience in order to create a new way of articulating 
landscape experience through visual art practice.  A literature search has been conducted 
that includes the work of Merleau-Ponty,27 Gibson,28 Tilley,29 cultural anthropologist 
Tim Ingold,30 cultural sociologist Mike Michael,31 technological philosopher Don Ihde,32 
art historian Joyce Brodsky33 and film theorist Vivian Sobchack34.  Each of these writers 
conducts an enquiry that examines experience from the standpoint of an embodied 
perceiver and each takes a position that considers an association between an active 
observer and their dynamic environment.  For example, Merleau-Ponty stresses the 
embodied nature of human consciousness and the ways in which space and time might 
be described in terms of lived experience, whilst Gibson considers an ecological model 
of perception based on a perceiver and environmental reciprocity.  Here, the senses are 
part of a relationship between the perceiver and the environment where, for example, to 
touch something can imply that something also touches in return.  Likewise, Tilley uses 
a method of enquiry in his archaeological analysis that includes his own embodied 
experience in association with his surroundings.  Ingold meanwhile considers a practical 
engagement between an active perceiver and their dynamic environment in order to 
                                                 
26 Maria Walsh, ‘Narrative Duration: Tacita Dean’s Disappearance at Sea’, Alan English and 
Rosalind Silvester, ed., Reading Images and Seeing Words (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 
2004). 57. 
Joyce Brodsky, "How to "See" with the Whole Body," Visual studies 17, no. 2 (2002). 99. 
27 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception. 
28 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. 
29 Tilley, The Materiality of Stone:  Explorations in Landscape Phenomenology. 
30 Ingold, The Perception of the Environment:  Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. 
31 Mike Michael, "These Boots Are Made for Walking.: Mundane Technology, the Body and 
Human-Environment Relations," Body and Society 6, no. 3-4 (2000). 
32 Don Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1990). 
33 Brodsky, "How to "See" with the Whole Body.". 
34 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1992). 
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establish his anthropological ideas.  Central to all of these concerns is the problem of 
how a human subject might perceive their environment through an active engagement 
with the constituents of their surroundings.  An important element of an embodied 
experience of a landscape and one that is of fundamental concern to this thesis is how 
such an association is mediated by technology.  For Michael, it is the ways in which 
simple technologies mediate an experience between a perceiver and their surroundings 
that is a prime concern, and for Ihde’s writing, the central issue is how the mediation of 
experience by technology might be understood in terms of a phenomenological 
association with an environment. Finally, Brodsky examines whole body experience in 
relation to art practice whilst Sobchack considers the embodied relationships that 
operate specifically within the experience of moving imagery. 
 
What is phenomenology?  Briefly, it is possible to characterise phenomenology 
as a method of understanding the world that emphasises a description of phenomena as 
whatever appears, in the way it emerges, as it is manifested to the consciousness of a 
perceiver.35 Edmund Husserl first established phenomenology in the early 1900s and the 
discipline broadly seeks to articulate the way things first arise in our immediate sensorial 
experience.36 Furthermore, by paying attention to the direct experience of a human 
subject, phenomenology attempts to describe the world as it becomes evident to a 
perceiver.  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is based specifically on the experience of a 
living being and it is particularly appropriate for this project as he gives primacy to 
vision as understood through bodily activity; a way of ‘seeing’ that involves the whole 
body of the organism.37 Also, within his theory of embodiment, Merleau-Ponty is 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 426. 
36 David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human 
World (New York: Vintage Books, 1997). 35. 
37 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception. 
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concerned with how the visible might ‘unfold’ through bodily experience and how that 
which we perceive might be concentrated by the body over time.38 Thus within his 
temporal theory, Merleau-Ponty focuses on how embodied experience intertwines past, 
present and future.  Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty’s theory focuses on the origins of 
perceptual knowledge arising from embodied activity.  Within the gathering of such 
knowledge, he makes a distinction between reflexive thought, which we are aware of, 
and pre-reflexive thought that is below the level of conscious awareness.39 Writing in 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty seeks to articulate experience that is 
immediate and not pre-meditated - what he terms ‘pre-reflective experience’ – which is 
based on an intertwining of sensory perceptions and the world.40 Within pre-reflective 
experience, argues Merleau-Ponty, seeing is understood as spontaneous, individual, and 
lived.41  
 
 Within his theory of embodiment, Merleau-Ponty writes of a fundamental 
reversibility between a subject and an object - an idea that has implications for the seer 
and the seen and thus also for the viewing of a landscape and for its representation in 
visual art.  Outlining this sense of reversibility, the viewed, suggests Merleau-Ponty, by 
directing the spectator’s stare, has as much power over the seer as the viewer has over 
what is being looked at.42 In this context, the viewed is not an inert entity that takes on 
meaning from the subject’s stare, but is rather an active part of the visual process that 
returns the look and directs the viewer in their ocular experience.  Writing in ‘Eye and 
Mind’ in 1960 Merleau-Ponty describes a situation that occurred to the painter Paul Klee 
                                                 
38 John Haworth, "Beyond Reason: Pre-Reflective Thought and Creativity in Art," Leonardo 30, 
no. 2 (1997). 2. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception. 
41 Olga Belova, "Feeling the Image: A Phenomenological Account of a Visual Experience," in 
Art of Management (Paris: 2004). No page nos. 
42 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Eye and Mind’, Galen A. Johnson, ed., The Merleau-Ponty 
Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1993). 125. 
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which describes the idea of an object taking on the active role of a subject. 43   Merleau-
Ponty writes: 
In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at the forest.  
Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me, were speaking to me…I was 
there, listening…I think that the painter must be penetrated by the universe and 
not want to penetrate it.44 
 
In this example we can see, from the looked-at object addressing the viewer, a 
breakdown of a subject-object dichotomy.  Perception then, for Merleau-Ponty, involves 
a reciprocal relationship between the body and the world and a continuing exchange 
between both of these elements. 
 
A key feature of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of reversibility is the idea that a 
bodily engagement with the world occurs on the boundaries between the body and its 
surroundings. This somewhat complex idea is termed flesh.45 For Merleau-Ponty, the 
idea of flesh arises from an overlap between a perceiver and their surroundings.  
Accordingly, the region of the overlap provides an area that comprises both subject and 
object.  A perceiver and the perceived can thus be seen to arise from a common source, 
and this contributes to the idea of a breakdown of a separation between the viewer and 
the viewed.46   
 
The notion of flesh is important for this thesis because it has been applied by a 
number of writers following in Merleau-Ponty’s wake, specifically by Tilley within his 
sensuous engagement with a landscape and Sobchack within her phenomenological 
analysis of moving imagery.47 Within an environmental enquiry flesh provides an idea of 
commonality between a body and its surroundings that is of value within a sensory 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 129. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. 127. 
46 Isis Brook, "Can Merleau-Ponty's Notion of 'Flesh' Inform or Even Transform Environmental 
Thinking?" Environmental Values, Nature and Continental Philosophy 14 (2005). 356. 
47 Tilley, The Materiality of Stone:  Explorations in Landscape Phenomenology. 19. 
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examination into landscape experience.48  Here, flesh helps to dissolve a separation 
between a perceiving subject and their environment.  Likewise, within her analysis of 
moving imagery, Sobchack uses the concept of flesh to explain a breakdown of a 
separation between a viewer and the moving imagery within the experience of film.49 
 
A sensory enquiry into landscape experience has also been addressed within the 
related disciplines of cultural archaeology and cultural anthropology.50  (Indeed, it is 
interesting to see that an issue central to contemporary representations of the landscape, 
also impacts on a wide range of parallel disciplines).  Both of these disciplines are 
underpinned by the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and by the perceptual ideas of 
Gibson.51  One difference between these two perceptual theories is that Gibson assumes 
that an environment is somehow ‘pre-prepared’, but for Merleau-Ponty the world 
emerges with its properties alongside the emergence of the perceiver.52  It is worth 
expanding on Gibson’s ecological model of perception at this point.  Gibson provides a 
‘direct’ approach to perception that, like Merleau-Ponty, relies on a reciprocal 
relationship between a perceiver and their environment.  However, for Gibson, emphasis 
is given to perceivers gathering information in a direct way from the light reflected from 
surfaces.  This light, says Gibson, can provide all the information a perceiver needs to 
understand both the physical character and the meaning within an environment.  In her 
research into visual perception of the designed object, Daniela Büchler proposes that 
Gibson provides a practical method of perceiving that suggests that it is not the object 
that is perceived but rather its potential for action. 53  Thus, when we encounter a chair, 
                                                 
48 Brook, "Can Merleau-Ponty's Notion of 'Flesh' Inform or Even Transform Environmental 
Thinking?"? 
49 Vivian Sobchack, Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image Culture (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2004). 293. 
50 Tilley, The Materiality of Stone:  Explorations in Landscape Phenomenology. 
Ingold, The Perception of the Environment:  Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. 
51 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. 
52 Ingold, The Perception of the Environment:  Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. 168. 
53 Daniela Buchler, "Visual Perception of the Designed Object" (Staffordshire University, 2007). 
49. 
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we do not see a collection of sticks and a seat, but rather we perceive the possibility of 
sitting.  
 
The thesis, then, sets out in part to examine how Tilley uses the work of 
Merleau-Ponty and Gibson to conduct an embodied analysis of a landscape.  Using 
Merleau-Ponty’s idea of reversibility between subject and object, Tilley examines ways 
in which a landscape might be understood in a phenomenological way.  Here, he reflects 
on the way in which objects in an environment might have the power to ‘touch’ or ‘see’ 
a perceiver.54 Likewise, Tilley’s account is informed by Gibson’s theory of direct 
perception:  he notes Gibson’s idea of perception as an ambient activity whereby 
surfaces are revealed as a perceiver moves through the landscape.55  Of particular 
interest is Tilley’s phenomenological method of enquiry.  By combining immediate, 
embodied experience with other forms of analysis, such as archival research and critical 
evaluation of the pre-existing literature pertinent to his field of study, Tilley provides a 
method of enquiry that might be termed an ‘expanded’ form of phenomenology. 
 
Similarly, an examination of the work of Ingold considers ways in which a 
perceiver might be situated within the context of an active engagement with the 
constituents of their surroundings.56  In particular, Ingold’s understanding of how time 
might operate within the context of an engagement between a perceiver and their 
surroundings is examined.  He uses Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to explain how 
participation between a perceiver and their environment might be understood as 
temporal because it happens through embodied experience that occurs over time.57  
                                                 
54 Tilley, The Materiality of Stone:  Explorations in Landscape Phenomenology. 17. 
55 Ibid. 26. 
56 Ingold, The Perception of the Environment:  Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. 
57 Ibid. 196. 
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Likewise, Gibson’s method of ‘direct’ perception is used by Ingold to explain the idea of 
surfaces unfolding as a perceiver moves through the landscape.58 
 
The project goes on to examine some of the ways in which cultural 
anthropologists, such as Ingold, have used landscape painting as a tool to comment on 
the representation of the experience of space.59 In particular, it examines a sixteenth 
century Flemish painting that has been used as a means of understanding experience.  
Writing in The perception of the environment, Ingold uses the example of Pieter Bruegel 
the Elder’s painting The Harvesters as a vehicle for illustrating his perceptual ideas 
about an environment.60  Even if we set aside the anachronism of a sixteenth century 
painting being subject to phenomenological interpretation - there are still a number of 
flaws in this approach. The medium of the artwork that Ingold has selected needs to be 
questioned in respect of its appropriate use in a phenomenological enquiry into 
landscape experience. Central to the idea of embodied experience are the notions of 
movement and sound. Ingold, however, has selected an artwork created from a static and 
silent medium.  Also absent from Ingold’s description of the landscape is the way in 
which technology mediates an experience of an environment.  A sixteenth century 
landscape is arguably able to provide evidence of technology for the era in which it was 
painted but inevitably fails to articulate ways in which technology might mediate within 
a contemporary twenty-first century environment.  An experience of landscape is not 
simply between a body and its immediate environment but usually involves other 
artefacts, or technologies.    
 
From an examination of Ingold’s enquiry it is apparent that an embodied 
engagement with the landscape needs to take into consideration ways in which 
technology mediates the dynamic relationship between a perceiver and their 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 226. 
59 Ibid. 202. 
60 Ibid. 204. 
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environment.  This topic is of particular interest to cultural sociologist Mike Michael.  
Michael argues that simple types of technology are frequently overlooked in a sensory 
understanding of an environment.61  For example, our clothing and footwear provide us 
with a more comfortable association with the physical landscape than would an 
engagement involving simply our naked body.  Michael also comments on ways in 
which simple, or mundane technologies might form chains that enable a human subject 
to engage more fully with their environment. A chain of mundane technologies might 
include a sequence such as socks, boots, laces and gaiters to provide the possibility of 
walking in wet or rough terrain.      
 
The way in which technology mediates our experience of an environment is also 
a concern within Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.  In Phenomenology of Perception, 
technology is considered as extending the body in an understanding of perception.62 The 
way in which technology might be explained by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is, in 
turn, central to the work of Ihde.  Ihde proposes that by expanding the limits and 
capabilities of the body, a technological artefact can be seen to change the ways in 
which we perceive our environment.63 Interestingly, within his phenomenological 
analysis of perceptual extension, Ihde considers the role of instruments, such as a 
microscope, that include a lens.64  This is highly significant for this study as lenses are 
also used within the technology associated with moving imagery.  As I go on to show, 
Ihde’s idea of perceptual extension using lens-based instruments might be applied to the 
way in which technology mediates relationships that are involved in moving imagery. 
Accordingly, the series of relationships between an artist using moving imagery and a 
viewer of the work can be explained in a phenomenological way. 
 
                                                 
61 Michael, "These Boots Are Made for Walking.: Mundane Technology, the Body and Human-
Environment Relations.". 
62 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception. 52. 
63 Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld. 4. 
64 Ibid. 72. 
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This takes us to the central research question in this thesis: how then might the 
discipline of phenomenology and parallel enquiries impact on our understanding of 
landscape representation within visual art?  As we have seen within a phenomenological 
understanding of landscape experience, primacy is typically given to the notion of a 
bodily relationship with the surrounding environment, rather than to the idea of a fixed 
gaze examining objects from a distance.  Understanding a corporal relationship between 
observers and their surroundings provides a foundation for comprehending some of the 
ways in which we experience an environment in an embodied manner, and how such a 
process might be articulated within contemporary art practice.  
 
Several art historians have used phenomenology as a critical tool to understand 
landscape painting.  Brodsky uses examples of Cézanne, Pollock and Spero’s painting, 
and other static forms of media, to describe phenomenological experience.65  Writing in 
‘How to see with the whole body’, Brodsky is concerned with the way in which the 
body is a conduit for the understanding of both the making and viewing of art.66 
However, by using instances of art practice constructed from static media, Brodsky fails 
to provide examples of art practice that demonstrate the element of movement that is 
crucial to the relationship between a perceiver and their environment.  Indeed, the 
element of movement and its role in a phenomenological relationship with the landscape 
and the impact that it has on its representation constitutes an important area for critical 
enquiry in this thesis. 
 
In short, then, both cultural anthropology and art history have used art ineptly as 
a tool to understand a sensory investigation into the landscape.  By asking the research 
question of what happens to art practice when an embodied engagement with landscape 
experience is taken into account brings about a cascade of other research questions of 
                                                 
65 Brodsky, "How to "See" with the Whole Body." 
66 Ibid. 
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secondary but nonetheless pressing importance.  One of these pressing issues is the need 
to consider ways in which technology mediates an experience of an environment when 
art is used to provide a phenomenological understanding of landscape.  Rather than 
focusing on notions of aesthetics – the act of making intuitive selections in the art 
making process based on sensory gratification - my own art practice reveals the 
mediating role of technology when a phenomenological relationship is considered, 
something overlooked by practitioners and theorists in the field. The role of movement 
is also revealed as a key feature of an embodied relationship.  Within my art practice, 
notions of movement are of prime concern.   Accordingly, this thesis sets out to make a 
critical examination of the dynamic and mediated nature of landscape experience and 
ways in which it might be applied to art practice. 
 
More specifically, this thesis examines ways in which a relationship between 
bodily experience and a dynamic environment can be used to understand how moving 
imagery might articulate a corporeal experience of landscape.  The making of films and 
digital videos involves a complexity of relationships between an artist, a set of 
technological interventions and a viewer that might be explained in a phenomenological 
way.  Phenomenological ideas about moving imagery are central to the work of 
Sobchack who uses Merleau-Ponty’s notions of embodied experience and Ihde’s 
interpretation of technological mediation to examine the series of relationships involved 
within the making and viewing of film.67   Using Sobchack’s analysis, the thesis 
examines ways in which Merleau-Ponty’s idea of reversibility can explain film as the 
perception and expression of experience;  likewise, Ihde’s phenomenological model of 
technological mediation using lens-based instruments is used to explain embodied 
experience extended by technology within the context of moving imagery.  
  
                                                 
67 Sobchack, The Address of the Eye. 
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Drawing on strands of phenomenology from Merleau-Ponty and from parallel 
enquiries, this thesis goes on to examine how film and digital video might be used to 
explore ways in which time operates as part of a bodily experience of landscape.  Again, 
these issues have been addressed in the field of phenomenology; but their critical 
examination in the field of art has yet to be done with thoroughgoing critical conviction.   
Clearly, temporality is significant within a sensory enquiry because an environment 
unfolds through the embodied actions of a perceiver over time.68 By taking 
phenomenological issues of time from cultural archaeology and cultural anthropology 
and applying them to artwork that uses moving imagery, this thesis makes a sustained 
critical examination of ways in which film and digital video can articulate temporal 
ideas. In addition, this thesis questions how representation of an embodied experience of 
landscape, using both 16mm film and digital imagery, can be used to construct a critique 
for cultural anthropology and its related disciplines that provide written accounts of a 
sensory engagement with an environment.  This issue is important because writers on 
the subject typically use examples of artwork to describe an embodied experience of an 
environment.69 
 
For the purpose of examining some of the ways in which phenomenology and 
moving art make a critical intersection, a case study using the work of Tacita Dean has 
been selected. This study examines how ideas of embodied landscape experience might 
be applied to pre-existing contemporary art practice. Dean’s use of moving imagery and 
technology, with an emphasis on time and experience, provides a useful artwork for a 
case study in order to examine some of the ideas of embodied experience that are of 
prime concern to this thesis. 
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69 Ingold, The Perception of the Environment:  Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. 201.  
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It is worth noting that Dean’s film has been made for exhibition within the space 
of an art gallery rather than that of the cinema.  Whilst in a cinema a viewer is in a fixed 
position within their seat, in an art gallery the experience of an observer might be 
considered as a more mobile engagement.  Using the example of Dean’s film, 
Disappearance at Sea, an analysis is made of how notions of embodiment from accounts 
of landscape experience can be understood in relation to contemporary art practice that 
uses moving imagery. Specifically, notions of experience and time that have been 
identified within written accounts of an embodied engagement with a landscape are 
examined in relation to Disappearance at Sea. 
 
Significantly for this project then, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ideas and 
the raft of critical enquiries that have followed in his wake over the last forty years can 
be applied to an understanding of both landscape experience and to the creation of visual 
art.70 Multi-sensory, bodily experience and a dynamic environment are elements 
involved in both the perception of a landscape and within the making and viewing of 
artwork. Also, the ways in which technology mediates our experience of an environment 
can be applied to both an embodied engagement with the landscape and to its 
representation in visual art.  This thesis explores omissions in the texts and works cited 
above to draw attention to a breach within what might be seen as a sensuous account of 
landscape experience whereby an artwork has been used as an inappropriate tool with 
which to articulate ideas of embodied experience.  The thesis goes on to argue a case 
and to cite examples of ways in which my own art practice might address these 
omissions. 
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A body of work has been has generated that makes a contribution to knowledge 
and understanding in the field by addressing the shortcomings of the use of art as a tool 
to understand an embodied experience of the landscape.  These shortcomings include the 
insufficient attention given to movement and its relation to the artistic media.  Within 
my art practice moving imagery demonstrates the importance of embodied experience 
by revealing movement over time of my bodily connection with an environment through 
the conduit of a camera, a lens, a film, a train and a monopod. By the strategic 
placement of cameras and the use of vehicles, Line and Length II set out to address the 
movement of both a perceiver and their surroundings. Another shortcoming that has 
been identified is a neglect of attention to the ways in which technology mediates our 
experience of the landscape.  Accordingly, within my own practice, a critical 
examination is made into the significance of the placement of cameras and their 
associated technologies.  Within Line and Length II, as I go on to indicate, we are able to 
identify that attention to the mediating technology is consequential because it has an 
impact on the resulting imagery and emphasises the way in which technology mediates 
our experience.  My own practice thus uses moving imagery to address the dynamic 
relationship between a perceiver and their environment and the mediation of experience 
by technology is a central concern.  
 
 This address has led to the generation of a body of work that includes film and 
digital video media.  Using the medium of 16mm film, I explore ways in which 
technology mediates our association of an environment using the experience of a train 
journey recorded with a mechanical movie camera.71  Another instance where I use 
moving imagery to address an embodied experience with the landscape is in a digital 
video,  Length II, where the experience of a motorway journey is captured with a digital 
                                                 
71 Bren Unwin, Line, 16 mm film, 2.5 minutes, 2007. 
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movie camera. 72  Through the use of moving imagery, embodied landscape experience, 
extended by technology, is a prime concern.  Accordingly, an analysis of these two 
works shows how phenomenologically driven analyses of an embodied association with 
a landscape might impact on contemporary art practice.  
 
The original contribution to knowledge of this thesis lies primarily within the 
ideas contained within Line and Length II.  Here, an examination of phenomenological 
principles that informs embodied accounts of landscape experience conducted in the 
opening section of the research project has been applied to the making of a film and a 
digital video.  In both instances, an examination of a cultural archaeological analysis of 
landscape experience has brought to light how an environment might be understood in a 
phenomenological way. By giving attention to ideas of embodiment, Line and Length II 
set out to articulate a phenomenological experience of landscape.  Thus the method used 
to make the two artworks reveals, I suggest, a phenomenological experience of the 
landscape.  Moreover, the method used to make these two artworks can be understood in 
terms of an expanded form of phenomenology.  Both immediate experience and actions 
based on the reflection of pre-existing sources of literature have contributed to the 
making of my film Line and digital video Length II.  An analysis of a sensuous 
engagement with an environment from the discipline of cultural anthropology revealed 
that movement and sound are both important issues within landscape experience.  The 
mediation of technology was also identified as a significant issue.  Within their imagery 
and viewing processes, Line and Length II both address issues of sound and movement 
and the mediating technology is a key feature within these two artworks.   Other issues 
have also arisen in the course of this project and have been addressed in Line and Length 
II.  From the discipline of art history, making and viewing practices from an embodied 
perspective were examined. These practices have been taken account of within the 
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construction and configuration of Line and Length II.  Also, ways in which film 
experience might be explained in a phenomenological way have been taken into account 
from the discipline of film theory and have also been addressed within an analysis of 
Line and Length II. Finally, a case study of Dean’s film Disappearance at Sea tested 
some of the ideas discussed in this dissertation and this also informs the creation of Line 
and Length II.  
 
The dissertation concludes with a critical examination of the work of other 
artists for whom this thesis is of potential consequence.  Points of conjecture are 
established between the practice of other contemporary artists and some of the ways in 
which phenomenology and parallel enquiries might be associated with landscape 
representation. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Embodied experience of landscape 
 
Introduction 
 
The first chapter examines an experience of the landscape that considers the interactivity 
of the whole body of a perceiver and their surroundings.  It is important that this issue is 
addressed at this stage of the thesis as an understanding of the embodied activity of a 
perceiver within a dynamic environment forms the basis for this research project.  
Notions of bodily experience underpin both the environmental and phenomenological 
agendas that inform this enquiry. These agendas are of consequence because it is ideas 
sourced from these disciplines that inform the visual art practice that, later in the thesis, 
will be analysed in order to establish ways in which artwork might articulate an 
embodied experience of the landscape. 
 
A crucial feature of the relationship that exists between a perceiving organism 
and the landscape is the interrelationship between the bodily actions of a perceiver and 
their dynamic environment.  This interrelationship is characterised by its mutual 
character.  Here, no perceiving organism can exist without an environment surrounding 
it and, likewise, an environment implies an organism to be surrounded.73  The dynamic 
environment comprises a complex of surfaces, edges, textures and, significantly, 
movement; whilst a perceiving organism might be considered as a living, active, multi-
sensual being where understanding arises from an interrelationship between the sense 
organs, the body and the brain.74  Also of significance for this thesis are ways in which 
notions of time might be part of this formulation.  Time, as I go on to show, is an 
inherent part of a relationship between an active perceiver and their surroundings. 
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 For the purpose of this enquiry several key texts have been selected from the 
disciplines of phenomenology75, ecological psychology76, cultural archaeology77 and 
cultural anthropology.78  From phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception provides us with a useful starting point for analysing an embodied 
involvement with the surrounding world.79 Within the discipline of ecological 
psychology, Gibson’s The ecological approach to visual perception offers an account of 
perception that emphasises the role of the environment as a source of sensory 
stimulation.80  A cultural archaeological account from Tilley, The Materiality of Stone, 
presents a phenomenological enquiry into how landscape may be understood in an 
embodied way81 and Ingold provides a cultural anthropological analysis, The perception 
of the environment, that offers an account that situates a human perceiver within the 
context of an active engagement with their environment.82  Each of these texts provides 
critical knowledge about bodily experience that contributes towards an examination of 
ways in which a perceiver might understand their environment.  For example, 
phenomenology essentially concerns itself with embodied and pre-reflective 
involvement with the surrounding world.  Ecological psychology, in turn, concerns itself 
with the communication of information between living systems and their environments. 
The discipline of cultural archaeology is concerned with how past elements of the 
landscape might be interpreted from a sensuous standpoint83 and similarly, the related 
field of cultural anthropology examines what it is for human beings to inhabit an 
environment.84   
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The first section of this chapter examines an analysis of the perceptual 
experience of a perceiver that relies on a direct method of gathering information about 
the structure and meaning of an environment.  Using the work of Gibson, an 
investigation is made into the ways in which an active perceiver might gather 
information from their surroundings. Gibson’s work is important to this thesis as his 
ideas of perception inform the writing of Tilley and Ingold. Central to Gibson’s enquiry 
is the way in which the body and its surroundings are critical to the process of 
perception.  The section also goes on to examine links between Gibson’s ecological 
enquiry and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological understanding of perception. 
 
 The second section of the chapter is informed by the work of cultural 
archaeologist Christopher Tilley.  Specifically, Tilley’s work examines how Gibson’s 
ideas might be used in conjunction with phenomenological concepts from Merleau-
Ponty, in order to understand an embodied experience of the landscape. Tilley’s method 
of enquiry is also of special interest. He combines immediate experience with other 
sources of information in order to reach fresh conclusions about the landscape.  This is 
of particular interest because, as I go on to show, an analysis that uses immediate 
experience as well as other forms of enquiry might also be applied to contemporary art 
practice.   
 
Finally, this chapter analyses the writing of Ingold.  Ingold is important.  
Writing in The perception of the environment, he examines some of the ways in which 
Gibson and Merleau-Ponty’s work might be used to conduct an enquiry into how an 
active relationship between a perceiver and the constituents of their surroundings 
provides an explanation of the operation of time within the landscape and, more 
specifically, how temporality might be articulated within visual art. This section 
explores Ingold’s use of Pieter Bruegel’s painting The Harvesters, an example of 
artwork that describes a bodily and temporal experience of the landscape.  An analysis 
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of this work shows the limitations that need to be imposed on the type of media and the 
age of the artwork when art is used as a tool to communicate ideas about the 
interrelationship between an active perceiver and their dynamic environment. 
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I 
An ecological approach to visual perception 
 
In order to understand an embodied experience of the landscape, it is first necessary to 
consider a relationship between a human perceiver and their surroundings.  Writing in 
The ecological approach to visual perception,85 Gibson proposes an approach to 
understanding perception that is based upon a reciprocal relationship between a 
perceiving organism and its environment.  Gibson’s writing is of importance for this 
thesis because his ideas underpin the cultural archaeological and cultural anthropological 
studies that inform this programme of research. 
 
Gibson’s enquiry provides a way of examining visual perception from a position 
that understands human and other sentient perceivers as whole beings in their 
environment. This position of mutuality between sentient beings and the space that is 
around them might be considered a radical departure from a cognitive point of view in 
which the mind is a disembodied receptacle for sensory data.86  This view can be traced 
back to the work of the seventeenth-century French philosopher René Descartes.87  It is 
widely recognized that Descartes posited a dualistic view of the body in which the mind 
operates outside and above the body. For Gibson, however, the importance of the bond 
between perceivers and their environment is based on the premise that no observer can 
exist without surroundings and that the essentially relational term ‘the environment’ is 
contingent on someone to perceive it. 88  Thus for Gibson, the words ‘animal’ – his term 
for a perceiving organism – and ‘environment’ make an inseparable pair.89  Furthermore, 
Gibson emphasises a relationship between an active perceiver and the ambient light that 
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is reflected from surfaces and objects within an environment.  He terms this light ‘the 
ambient optic array’.90 
 
 Gibson first suggests the ambient optic array in The senses considered as 
perceptual systems, where he asserts that light reflected from surfaces and objects can 
provide information to specify properties of the surrounding world. 91  At any point 
within an environment, he argues, light will converge on surfaces from all directions and 
provide direct information to a perceiver about their surroundings.92  The intensity and 
composition of this light will vary from one angle to another, such as between different 
faces or inclinations of surfaces, and this spatial pattern of light is the ambient optic 
array. 93 Illustration 1 shows Gibson’s illustration of the ambient optic array.  In this 
diagram, says Gibson, it is assumed that there is a steady source of illumination and the 
ground, he says, is humped but not cluttered.  The illustration, he adds, shows the 
separation of the ambient optic array at the horizon. 
  
Illus. 1: The ambient optic array from a wrinkled earth outdoors under the sky  
Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. 67. 
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The ambient optic array, says Gibson, contains all the information necessary for 
an active perceiver to understand their environment: the surfaces of an environment 
structure the light that reaches a perceiver and this restructured illumination provides 
direct information for visual perception.94   Writers on models of visual perception, 
Vicki Bruce, Patrick Green and Mark Georgeson, describe Gibson’s idea of the ambient 
optic array as a geometric abstraction, separate from a perceiver, and say that it contains 
light reflected from a surface that carries information for the observer.95 The whole array 
of light reaching an observer, they suggest, provides direct information about the layout 
of surfaces and objects.96 In this sense, the movement of the eye and the perceiver, and 
the movement within an environment, enrich the visual information, received by a 
viewer, about their surroundings. 
 
An understanding of how an environment is perceived using the idea of the 
ambient optic array is, then, in contrast to an appreciation of perception from a cognitive 
standpoint that relies on interpretation of sensuous data by the brain.97 Of particular note 
are the different starting points of a cognitive approach and Gibson’s model.  Whilst 
cognitive theory begins with the idea of an image being formed on the retina and then 
passed on to the mind, the starting point within Gibson’s approach is the light reflected 
from surfaces and objects within an environment that presumes the presence of a 
perceiver.98  Paul Rodaway, writing in Sensuous Geographies: Bodies, Sense and Place, 
suggests that Gibson’s idea of the ambient optic array shows perception to be an active 
and exploratory process. 99   Perception, he says, involves ‘the internal organs and the 
movement of extremities, as well as the specifically identified sense organs, and 
                                                 
94 Patrick Green Vicki Bruce, Mark Georgeson, Visual Perception:  Physiology, Psychology and 
Ecology (Hove: Psychology Press, 2003). 302. 
95 Ibid. 405. 
96 Ibid. 303. 
97 Ibid. 304. 
98 Ibid. 303. 
99 Rodaway, Sensuous Geographies:  Body, Sense and Place. 20. 
 36 
locomotion of the whole body through space’.100 Moreover, says Rodaway, this model 
explores the perception of space with analysis of an environment that comprises 
surfaces, edges, textures and movement.101  Rodaway elaborates on how the ambient 
optic array can be understood as a spatial concept.  If the term ‘space’ is used to 
represent the structure of an environment, that includes the sum of people, things and the 
distances between them, he says, then Gibson’s theory can be summarised as arguing 
that we perceive spaces because they structure the ambient light reaching our eyes.102 
Illustration 2 illustrates Rodaway’s suggestion that Gibson’s model of perception 
involves the whole body and the mind but is also situated in, and mediated by, an 
environment.103  It is worth noting that Rodaway’s diagram could be interpreted as 
inappropriate because of the fixed position of the ‘eye of observer’ that he tells us is 
‘moving through room’.  However, it isn’t moving but is rather fixed in a single position 
with no indication, i.e. the use of a dotted line, to suggest it might move about the room. 
     
                                       Eye of observer (moving through room) 
Illus. 2: The visual system or vision as spatial 
Rodaway, Sensuous Geographies: Body, sense and place, 122. 
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How does the ambient optic array provide information for perception?  For a 
perceiver, information about the environment is provided by the ambient optic array in 
two ways.  Firstly, says Gibson, the ambient optic array provides information about 
persistence and change within an environment.104 Gibson terms this idea invariants.  
Invariants are properties of the ambient optic array that are determined by some specific 
characteristic of the environment and remain constant as other conditions vary. For 
instance, the amount of background texture covered by an object increases with its size 
but is invariant with its distance.105  Similarly, an insect crawling over a rock can be 
considered as a variant feature that can be perceived by the persistence, or invariant 
character, of the rock. In each instance, invariant features within the ambient optic array 
are picked up by an observer and provide information about the physical properties of an 
environment.106  
 
The ambient optic array also provides a connection between movement, 
perception and time.  This connection occurs because the whole of the optic array is 
transformed as a perceiver moves through an environment and gathers information about 
surfaces and objects and about the relationship of those exterior faces and entities to 
their body. This perception occurs over time and leads Gibson to say: ‘Perception of the 
world and of the self go together and only occur over time’.107 
 
 Gibson elaborates on notions of time and contrasts them with ideas about 
space.108  The underlying feature of time, he says, is the sequential order of events, and 
space is determined by the adjacent order of objects and surfaces.  Sequential order, he 
adds, cannot be compared with adjacent order, nor is it analogous to adjacent order.  
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Moreover, argues Gibson, whilst the order of parts can be changed, the order of events 
cannot be permuted. For example, ‘you can reshuffle the parts but not the events, as you 
can rearrange the furniture in a room but not the happenings that occur in it’. 109  
 
What happens to the properties of an ambient optic array when a perceiver, or 
objects within an environment, move?  Movement brings about changes within the 
ambient optic array that are picked up by an active observer and Gibson terms this visual 
experience of movement the ‘optical flow’.110 Here, when a perceiver moves in an 
environment their motion will always be accompanied by a flow of visual features.  For 
instance, when an observer walks past several objects in an environment, the relative 
movement in the ambient optic array will be specifically associated with the 
arrangement of the things that the perceiver passes. Transformations within the optic 
array are produced by motion and inform a perceiver about their position in relation to 
various objects in the environment, as well as informing them about their own 
movement. Illustration 3 demonstrates this point. 
 
 
Illus 3: The transformation of the optic array when an observer moves  
Bruce, Green and Georgeson, Visual Perception, physiology, psychology and ecology, 306. 
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Changes in the optic array are produced by the motion of an observer and by the 
movement of objects in an environment. For a perceiver, changes only exist in relation 
to persistence. This is because persistence and change are terms where each part of the 
pair is reciprocal to the other and where a distinction can be made between movement 
and apparent stability.111  Gibson acknowledges the changes, or variants, produced by 
movement:  ‘What is clear to me now that was not clear before is that structure as such, 
frozen structure, is a myth, or at least a limiting case.  Invariants of structure do not exist 
except in relation to variants’.112  
 
It is interesting to note how Gibson came to consider optical flow within the 
ambient optic array.  During World War II, Gibson (in pursuit of training pilots to 
improve landings and take-offs) realised that the perception of distance was a critical 
factor in the successful training of airmen.113  Moreover, he maintained that the observed 
world remains perceptually stable despite movements of the perceiver. Diagrams were 
produced that show the optical flow for a pilot landing an aeroplane and how the 
invariant properties of an environment provide the basis for perception. Illustration 4, a 
‘landing glide’, shows the optical flow for a pilot landing an aeroplane.  In this example, 
there is an outflow of the optical array radiating from the point at which the pilot is 
aiming.114 
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Illus. 4: The optical flow for a pilot landing an aeroplane   
Gibson, The Perception of the visual world (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1950). 128.      
 
The nature of optical flow is affected by the direction of the movement of an 
observer.  For example, when an observer moves forwards sensory data appears to flow 
past the perceiver.  However, when the movement of the perceiver is reversed, the same 
flow appears to change direction and moves forward.115  From these observations of (the 
result of) movement, Gibson suggests that outflow specifies an approach towards things 
and inflow indicates a retreat from something.116  
 
Transformations in the optical flow are brought about by changes in the 
environment as well as by the motion of a perceiver. For example, environmental 
changes might include the slight movement of leaves in the wind or the extreme motion 
brought about by an earthquake.  Perception involves the mobility of the perceiver, 
movement of objects within an environment, or the motion of both.117 Gibson attributes 
his interest in the changes that occur within optical flow to childhood experience with 
his father who was a surveyor on the railways.  Gibson says: ‘I knew what the world 
looked like from a railroad train and how it seemed to flow inward when seen from the 
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rear platform and expand outward when seen from the locomotive.’118 Bruce, Green and 
Georgeson also comment on optical flow and its perception from a train.119  ‘If one was 
sitting on the roof of a train facing backwards’, they say, ‘there would be a continuous 
inward streaming of optical texture elements towards the point from which one was 
travelling’ (Illustration 5).  However, if one remained seated at a train window, the 
pattern of flow would be as shown in Illustration 6. 
 
Illus. 5: The optic flow field for a person sitting on the roof of a train, facing backwards 
Bruce, Green and Georgeson, Visual Perception: physiology, psychology and ecology, 307. 
 
 
 
Illus. 6: The optic flow field for a person sitting on a train and looking out of the window as 
they travel from right to left through this terrain  
Bruce, Green and Georgeson, Visual Perception: physiology, psychology and ecology, 308. 
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As we have seen, the environment in which we move structures the ambient optic 
array.  This structure within the ambient optic array means that the perception of our 
surroundings is affected by the surface texture within an environment.  Here, light 
reflected from surfaces on which we move, says Gibson, usually has regular texture, 
made up of elements of similar size and shape; examples of exterior surfaces with a 
regular texture might include areas of grass or a tiled floor.120  Light reflected from such 
surfaces forms a structure in the ambient optic array that Gibson terms a ‘texture 
gradient’.  In Illustration 7 a texture gradient is used to show a surface receding into the 
distance. 
                  
Illus. 7: Examples of texture gradients  
Bruce, Green and Georgeson, Visual perception: physiology, psychology and ecology, 303. 
 
Gibson discusses his ideas about textures and surfaces, together with notions of 
size constancy, in a military report, Motion picture testing and research: Aviation 
Psychology Research Report No 7.121  Here, Gibson uses an example of a ploughed field 
to show that with a textured background, estimates of the height of a distant pole in the 
field do not decrease, but only become more variable.  Furthermore, he says, texture 
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gradients change when the slant of a surface that is relative to a perceiver alters and 
areas with regular exterior faces can reveal information for a perceiver about the size 
and distance of objects.  The size of an object, says Gibson, will cover the same amount 
of background texture whatever its distance from the observer.122  More recently, 
philosopher Edward Casey suggests that Gibson’s understanding of texture gradients is 
based on a series of evenly decreasing gaps that move away from the perceiver as they 
place him or her in relation to these spaces.123  Moreover, Casey proposes that Gibson’s 
idea of texture gradients might be compared with methods of painting used by 
Rennaisance artists and also be associated with the grid system of Western map 
making.124 
 
What happens to areas of texture when moving objects cover them?  As an 
object moves, areas of surface texture are gradually covered by the shifting entity’s 
leading edge whilst its trailing border reveals regions of the background.  If the 
movement of the object is reversed, the textured surfaces that are covered in one 
direction are revealed by motion in the opposite way. Likewise, when an observer 
moves, textured surfaces within an environment that pass out of a perceiver’s view in 
one direction will reappear when their motion is reversed.125  Gibson calls this principle 
‘reversible occlusion’.  He suggests that reversible occlusion underpins a perceiver’s 
sense of a steady and constant environment and adds that in this idea even surfaces that 
are momentarily hidden can still be sensed.126 Gibson clarifies this notion.  Things that 
are temporarily out of sight, he says, can still be perceived because there is information 
in the ambient optic array about the edges that separate things.  The edges that separate 
objects, he says, provide information about things being in front of or behind other 
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entities.127 An edge that is a contour of a visible object, where another entity becomes 
hidden or revealed, is termed by Gibson as an ‘occluding edge.’128 Illustration 8 shows 
texture elements being hidden and revealed.  
 
  
Illus. 8: Elements being hidden and revealed   
Bruce, Green and Georgeson, Visual Perception, physiology, psychology and ecology, 308. 
 
A connection can be made between Gibson’s comments regarding the visible 
and the invisible features of an environment and phenomenological thought. 
Psychologist Harry Heft comments on Gibson’s idea of occluding edges and suggests 
that, phenomenologically, a surface that was previously visible, but becomes gradually 
hidden, is still experienced as persisting even though it progressively disappears from 
sight.129  Similarly, the surface that was previously invisible, but becomes visible as it 
emerges from behind an occluding edge, is experienced as having existed prior to the 
present moment.130 Gibson’s idea of an occluding edge arises, proposes Heft, from a 
phenomenological position.131  Specifically, within Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, 
perception always involves a relationship between the visible and the invisible because 
the surfaces and sides of objects cannot all be seen at the same time.132  Writing in The 
Visible and the Invisible in 1964, Merleau-Ponty comments on a relationship between 
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things that can be seen and those that are hidden from view:133 He suggests that every 
visible aspect of being is related to an invisible dimension.  The invisible, he says, can 
be imagined, but not seen; it is not non-existent, it pre-exists in the visible.134 For 
example, all the sides of an object cannot be seen at one time.  As one surface of the 
object moves into view, another disappears.  This means that the way in which we 
experience something depends on our bodily relationship with that object. 
 
There are also other ways in which Gibson’s theory of invariants can be seen to 
correspond to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.  Both Gibson and Merleau-Ponty 
understand perception as a continuous interchange between a body and the entities that 
surround it. Both writers take account of the direct and sensuous experience between an 
active perceiver and their dynamic environment. Gibson, for example, asserts that the 
body is a perceptual system that enables visual perception. ‘The eye’, he says, ‘is part of 
a dual organ, one of a pair of eyes, and they are set in a head that can turn, attached to a 
body that can move from place to place.’135 As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty also 
emphasises the role of the body in perceiving the world.  He says that we are embodied 
beings who make sense of the world by acting in and on it.  Our perception is always 
shaped by our position in space, our movements to or from the subject and by our 
specific tactile and other sensory perceptions of it.136  
 
The second way in which Gibson’s idea of the ambient optic array is able to 
provide information for a perceiver is by the concept of affordance.137 The affordance of 
a surface or an object is the meaning that it can provide for a perceiver.  For example, 
can it be held, eaten, walked on or sat upon? If any one of these actions can be fulfilled, 
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then it can be said to afford these potential actions for a perceiver.  Thus, meaning can 
be picked up directly from the ambient light within an environment.  This leads Gibson 
to suggest that if properties from the ambient optic array can specify the surrounding 
world, then meaning provided by surfaces and objects within an environment can also be 
determined without cognitive processing.138  He says:   
Perhaps the composition and layout of surfaces constitute what they afford.  If 
so, to perceive them is to perceive what they afford.  This is a radical hypothesis, 
for it implies that the “values” and “meanings” of things in the environment can 
be directly perceived.  Moreover, it would explain the sense in which values and 
meanings are external to the perceiver.139 
 
Other writers have commented on various aspects of Gibson’s concept of 
affordance.  Bruce, Green and Georgeson discuss ways in which the physical properties 
of objects imply potential meaning for a perceiver.  They suggest that if a surface is flat, 
extended and substantial then it has inherent properties of affordance for a perceiver.140  
On a different note, Heft suggests ways in which affordance might have a role in 
survival tactics.  Perceivers, he says, need to be able to detect obstacles that would 
impede access to resources such as food and shelter; surfaces or objects that prevent a 
perceiving subject reaching their destination also need to be considered in terms of 
affordance.141  Finally, Joan Iverson Nassauer, writing in Culture and changing 
landscape structure, comments on affordance being a property of the surfaces and 
objects within an environment.  She says that Gibson defines affordance as existing 
because of the value or meaning that something intrinsically possesses – its potential – 
rather than being dependent upon the perception of the observer.142  
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It has been noted by some writers that Gibson neglects the idea of cultural 
difference within his theory of affordance.143 Bruce, Green and Georgeson highlight this 
problem.144  They suggest that whilst it might be appreciated that affordances such as 
‘climbable’ or ‘graspable’ could be specified in the ambient optic array, it is 
questionable whether those essentially cultural categories, such as ‘eatable’ or ‘writable 
with’, could be contained within the reflected light.  Gibson’s theory reaches its most 
controversial, they suggest, with his assertion that a letterbox affords the posting of 
letters by human subjects of Western culture. Whatever pre-existing knowledge a 
perceiver has, they say, anyone encountering a letterbox would see an unyielding object 
with an opening in which small objects could be placed.  But to see it as a letterbox 
requires knowledge about the part that the object plays in a broader model of human 
activity and, in particular, knowing that stamped letters put in boxes like it will be 
collected and delivered to the addresses written on them.145  
 
Alan Costall also identifies a weakness between Gibson’s idea of affordance 
and cultural activities. The affordance of artefacts, are, he suggests, a focus for social 
influence that bring people together and offer joint activity.  Objects, adds Costall, are 
experienced in relation to the community within which they have meaning; the use of a 
resource by one subject arises through the influence of other subjects. For example, says 
Costall, a child learns to use a spoon through a situation structured by its parent, rather 
than being left to discover the function alone. 146   Ingold also asserts that Gibson 
‘devoted scant attention to the specifically social and cultural dimensions of human 
life.’147  As I go on to indicate, Ingold proposes that an environment affords joint and 
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practical actions that are shared by perceivers moving in the same region in pursuit of 
mutual activities.148  
 
A connection can be made between Gibson’s theory of affordance and 
phenomenological analyses of psychologists Glotzbach and Heft.  Writing in their paper 
Ecological and phenomenological contributions to the psychology of perception, 
Glotzbach and Heft propose: ‘For the phenomenologist, it is impossible to describe 
human experience without including meaning.  The person is not situated in the world as 
a mere object; one fundamentally experiences the world in terms of the possibilities for 
action which it offers.’149 On a similar note, Heft suggests that there is a 
phenomenological character in the idea of affordance. 150 An affordance, says Heft, as 
well as being associated with the features of an environment, is meaningful for an active 
perceiver as it establishes possibilities and limits in respect of actions.151  
 
There are also differences between Gibson’s theory of affordance and some 
strands of phenomenological thought.  Gibson’s analysis, for example, assumes that the 
world in which the perceiver moves is relatively fixed and somehow pre-prepared, with 
all its affordances ready and waiting to be taken up by a perceiver.152 However, Merleau-
Ponty points out that the process of embodiment is the same as the development of an 
organism in its environment. Rather than the world being somehow pre-prepared, 
Merleau-Ponty argues that it comes into being, with its properties, alongside the 
movements of the perceiver.153  Unlike Gibson’s model of perception, that claims 
meaningful properties to be held within the light reflected from surfaces and objects 
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within a perceiver’s surroundings, Merleau-Ponty puts emphasis on meaning emerging 
from an association between the body and the environment.  He says: ‘As the perceiver 
is a being-in-the-world, then the coming-into-being of the perceiver is part of the process 
of coming-into-being of the world.154 
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II   
A phenomenological appraisal of landscape experience 
 
Thus far we have established one of two key modes of analysis.  Next, in this section, a 
more overtly phenomenological analysis of landscape experience is developed through 
the examination of a relationship between an active perceiver and their dynamic 
environment.  Specifically, this section considers a method of analysing landscape 
experience that takes into account the whole body of the perceiver and its surroundings.  
 
Central to the concerns of this section is the work of cultural archaeologist 
Christopher Tilley.155  Writing in The Materiality of Stone: Explorations in landscape 
phenomenology, Tilley explores the experience of landscape from an embodied 
perspective.156  His examination of a bodily experience of the landscape is made from a 
position based on the direct encounter of a physically embodied mind in the world, 
rather than being something that occurs to a disembodied intelligence, somehow outside 
of the body.157  Thus, Tilley’s account provides this thesis with a way of considering an 
experience of landscape from a bodily, sensuous standpoint that is based on the material 
existence of the human body in the world. 
 
There are several ways in which Tilley’s phenomenological account of 
landscape experience is significant for this thesis.  First, his enquiry is important because 
it provides a way of encountering landscape using the body, rather than just the eyes.  
This standpoint is pertinent because experience of a landscape from an embodied point 
of view is a prime pursuit of this thesis.  Second, Tilley’s account explores some of the 
ways that a phenomenological analysis might produce a new understanding of landscape 
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through a linguistic redescription arising from bodily experience.158  This analysis is of 
particular interest for this thesis as there are connections that can be made between 
Tilley’s linguistic redescription arising from bodily experience and a redescription of 
landscape experience using visual art. 
 
Firstly, how does Tilley produce this linguistic redescription of landscape from 
bodily experience? In order to understand this issue it is useful to consider the context of 
Tilley’s enquiry.  As a cultural archaeologist, Tilley’s prime interest is in interpretation 
of the past through analysis of the present.  Specifically, writing in The Materiality of 
Stone, Tilley is concerned with the significance of ninety-three prehistoric menhirs - 
Megalithic stones from the Neolithic to the Iron Age - in western and northern Finistère, 
Brittany.159  
 
At the beginning of his investigation, and prior to an examination of the stones 
through bodily experience, Tilley engages in some initial research: library and archival 
enquiries and a consideration of previously recorded information. For instance, he writes 
how he has discovered that:  
Menhirs have been suggested to be landmarks or territorial boundary markers 
set up in association with the gradual post-Mesolithic clearance of the land for 
farming (Hibbs 1983; Burl 1985; Bender 1986; Patton 1993).160 
 
 This clearly is the result of a contextual understanding.  Tilley also employs an 
embodied approach in his encounter with the menhirs. This is the part of his enquiry that 
he refers to as ‘lived experience’ and includes a bodily encounter with the landscape.161 
In practical terms, this bodily encounter includes a consideration of the physical 
characteristics of the stones he is studying.  Accordingly, he writes: 
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One of the most massive menhirs is at Les Sables Blancs in the suburbs of 
Douarnenez.  This stone is 5.3 m high and 7.7 m around the base in 
circumference.  It is situated on a very steep slope overlooking the Baie de 
Douarnenez with its broad face looking outward.162 
 
Tilley’s bodily association with the stones also investigates the character of the stone 
itself - such as the constituent elements of the rock, the personal experience of touching 
their surfaces and the aural experience of the sound emitted when the stone is struck.163  
Tilley even considers the smell of the stone, contrasting the absence of any odour arising 
from the menhirs to the olfactory qualities of wooden posts that the stones might have 
been associated with over time. Writing of his sensuous experience of the stones in the 
Haut Léon region of Brittany, he writes: 
These menhirs with their often rough and indented surfaces appear visually 
much coarser than those in Bas Léon but the texture of the granite is very 
different…These stones are rough visually but feel relatively smooth, the precise 
opposite of many of those in Bas Léon.164 
 
 
From this evidence, we can see that Tilley’s prime concern, following his initial 
research, is in the effect that landscapes have on the body, prior to any further analysis 
of interpretation or cultural meaning.165  
 
However, this bodily way of experiencing a landscape needs to be analysed 
within the context of individual needs and interests.  We do not receive information 
about the world passively.  Rather, Tilley says, we act according to our own particular 
needs and interests.  It is within the context of these needs and interests, he says, that 
information is received.166  He states: ‘it is in the context of a needful body reaching out 
to the world that meaning and significance are found’.167  The following example from 
Tilley’s analysis of prehistoric menhirs arguably demonstrates a bodily context for 
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meaning.  In this instance, the context for the information that Tilley is receiving is his 
enquiry into the relationship between the powerful character of the stones and a human 
perceiver.  He says: 
The axe-like menhirs of Bas Léon, planted into the land, have enormous 
symbolic power.  There is an overwhelming aesthetic force to these stones 
which dwarfs the human observer….The process of shaping destroys the 
individuality of the stone and transforms it into a static cultural symbol fixed 
erect into the ground.168 
 
 Next, within his enquiry, Tilley follows an account of an embodied experience 
of a landscape with articulation of his field observations.  In respect of the menhirs in 
Brittany, this articulation involves such descriptions as: 
All the stones are of the same local granite, which is very coarse-grained with 
reddish pink quartz crystals.  These quartz crystals may be oblong in form, 
ranging between 2 and 5 cm long and 1 – 2 cm wide, or more rounded, square or 
irregular in form and up to 5 cm in diameter.  Thus the huge axe-shaped menhirs 
appear to the eye to be very smooth and uniform but they feel coarse, sharp and 
irregular when touched.169 
 
So, we have seen Tilley describe his phenomenological association with the landscape.  
However, he adds, ‘A ‘pure’ phenomenological approach on its own remains 
inadequate’.170  Rather, he says: 
           What is required is a constant attempt at an articulation between our bodily 
experiences and the production of reinterpretations using inspiration from 
existing texts which may inform us, be they archaeological, anthropological, 
geographical or geological or works in cultural and critical theory.171 
 
Thus, following a textual account of his bodily encounter with the stones, Tilley 
makes a further analysis and critical evaluation using pre-existing literature. It is this 
stage of the enquiry, he says, that leads to new understandings based on the first two 
steps in the analysis.  Hence, this final stage recontextualizes the first two phases to 
produce something new.  In the case of the axe-shaped prehistoric menhirs in Bas Léon, 
he writes: 
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In a landscape that was cleared for farming, menhirs gained a much greater 
potential to serve as landscape or territorial markers signifying the affiliation of 
different groups with discrete areas of land.  The significance and meaning of 
the menhir tradition changed and they became signifiers of people taking control 
over and laying claim to the landscape and altering it on a massive scale.  This 
stands in opposition to the more ancestral and mythic connections of unshaped 
stones, whose potential for establishing and maintaining a sense of individual or 
group difference was considerably reduced.172 
 
For Tilley, then, we can see that an enquiry into material forms within the landscape 
requires several distinct phases: initial research, a bodily association with the 
environment and critical evaluation using both pre-existing literature and information 
gathered from embodied experience.   
 
From Tilley’s enquiry we have seen what is at stake when words are used to 
describe an experience of landscape informed by the expanded field of phenomenology.  
However, for this thesis it is necessary to ask what is at stake when ‘art’ – or more 
accurately some form of audio-visual denotation that we might name ‘art’ – takes the 
place of writing.  This knotty question is of prime importance to this project and will be 
unravelled over the following chapters of this thesis. 
 
 Now, we shall consider in more depth ways in which Tilley uses Gibson’s 
ecological theory of perception and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.  As we saw in 
section one, there are close associations that can be identified between these two ways of 
understanding perceptual experience. 
 
Of particular interest for this thesis is Tilley’s idea about ways in which 
meaning and significance are gathered by a perceiver.  Tilley explains his idea in detail. 
The way in which we experience a landscape, he says, is always unfinished, uncertain 
and therefore ambiguous.  This ambiguity, he adds, provides ‘an inexhaustible field of 
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affordances for us’.173  This is interesting.  As we saw in the previous section, the term 
affordance, within the context of gathering meaning from an environment, is an idea 
from Gibson’s theory of perception.174  As we have also seen, a perceiver gathers 
information about the meaning of surfaces and objects from an environment in a ‘direct’ 
way, without the intervention of a retinal image.  This idea may be contrasted to the 
view of perception that relies upon the relationship of the eye and the brain.175  Indeed, 
Tilley states that whilst a ‘scientific’ view of perception may be able to reveal something 
of value in the case of physical objects, it cannot deal with ways in which human 
subjects perceive their environment.176   
 
Accordingly, Tilley extends his argument to consider an embodied method of 
gathering meaning from a landscape.  Firstly, he says, meaning within a landscape is not 
pre-given in consciousness, nor imposed on things but is rather discovered during 
practical activity. Landscapes, he says, ‘provide or furnish possibilities, either for good 
or ill.  An affordance is neither an objective nor a subjective property but both’.177 By 
this analysis, says Tilley, the perception of an environment provides meaning within a 
landscape that is potentially inexhaustible and encountered in the course of daily 
activity.178  
 
Tilley also references Gibson’s ecological enquiry when examining the role of 
movement within landscape experience.179 In particular, he notes Gibson’s stress on how 
perception is an ambient activity where the senses open the body to the world.180 Tilley 
applies Gibson’s idea to his study of embodied landscape experience: ‘Movement 
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between places’, he says, ‘involves their sequential experience, in their description the 
production of a narrative, linking the body to place and events in place’. 181  Landscapes, 
he adds, bring together bodies, movement and places into a whole.182  In Tilley’s 
analysis of the menhirs in Brittany, we find an example of movement linking body to 
place within a landscape.  In this instance it is the movement of water as well as the 
movement of the stones by human subjects that results in the formation of the landscape.  
He says:  
Although it [the stone] is situated near to the highest point of the Léon plateau, 
the origin of the stone is probably riverine, brought from the Aber Ildut, at least 
2.5 km to the west, Similarly, the broadest menhir at Kerscaven, embedded in a 
stream with water flowing along its sides, is 5.7 m high or three times the height 
of a person…The sheer enormity of such stones and the acts of their 
transportation and erection were intended to impress in the past as they do 
today.183 
 
           A connection can also be made between movement within a landscape and ideas 
of time. In this respect, says Tilley, ‘temporality is carried by the movements of the body 
into, out of, around and between places’.184  For example, in his description of the 
Neolithic menhirs, Tilley states: 
The same menhir may, in effect, appear as four or five different menhirs as one 
moves around it.  As one face becomes lost in movement, another different 
stone is revealed.  Such stones are obviously open to multiple interpretations 
depending on from where they are seen.185 
 
 
Moreover, he says, memory also needs to be considered within a temporal relationship; 
time, he asserts, as well as involving a moving perceiver and their environment, involves 
the recall of previous events.  Accordingly, Tilley writes of the way in which the rock at 
Bas Léon triggers memories of other menhirs encountered on a previous occasion.  He 
writes: 
The granite here sometimes has a series of small inclusions of much finer-
grained and harder rock completely lacking in quartz crystals and smooth to the 
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touch.  These inclusions may be rounded or somewhat irregular in form (like 
those found on the Kerloas menhir) but much more frequently they resemble 
axes in form.186 
 
Unlike Gibson, who suggests that we abandon the doctrine that views all awareness as 
memory except for the present moment,187 Tilley proposes that memory connects 
knowledge of one place to another.  He says: 
The existence and nature of time, like place, depends upon the existence and 
nature of a perceiving subject, and there is not perception of place and landscape 
without memory.  Past experiences become selectively conjoined with present 
perceptions and serve to colour them.188 
 
 
             Tilley elaborates on other ways in which temporality operates within the 
landscape.  Our perception of the world, he says, involves a relationship with both the 
past and the future; experiences that have gone before are carried forward by our body 
and enable us to interpret the world. Tilley’s account of the menhirs illustrates the way 
in which he understands perception and its association with time.  He says: 
The origin of the stones too, whether derived from rocks exposed along the 
shoreline, from river channels or estuaries, stream beds or particular rock 
outcrops, like time was an important ‘hidden’ dimension to their meaning and 
potency.  Each menhir would have its own origin story, which may have been 
mythologized over time or continue to reference the epic work of ancestors.  
Through time these stories might have merged and elaborated to incorporate 
world origin stories and cosmological knowledge.189 
 
Thus moments of lived experience are orientated by and towards the past and involve a 
merging of the two.  ‘Past and present fold in upon each other’, says Tilley. ‘The past 
influences the present and the present rearticulates the past’.190  
 
Specifically, Tilley takes a phenomenological approach that uses the framework 
of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of embodied experience.191  This approach, as we have seen, 
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emphasises the intertwining of subject and object.  Central to Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology is the idea of embodied experience.  This type of experience relies on a 
lived body and its relationship, through engagement and interaction, with the world.  As 
Tilley states: 
The body is concretely engaged in the world from a particular point of view that 
is always unfolding and changing in space-time.  The mobile interaction of the 
body in the world creates a framework for experience which is produced in this 
lived interaction.192 
 
           Tilley uses Merleau-Ponty’s idea of reversibility to examine some of the ways we 
might experience a landscape. He begins by considering a relationship with his own 
body.  Although the human body is ‘me myself’, says Tilley, I can also know it ‘from 
the outside’.193 He continues: ‘When I touch my left hand with my right hand, my body 
is both touching and touched, subject and object, a union of the two’.194 Tilley 
emphasises that in the same way as touching needs a body that can be touched, seeing 
entails a body that is capable of being seen.195 Accordingly, Tilley informs us that his 
enquiry involves ‘an opening of my body to things, a reversible relationship between 
touching and being touched, myself and other, the effect of myself on things and those 
things on me’.196   
 
Tilley asserts that Merleau-Ponty’s model of perception, an example that 
recognizes unity between a perceiver and the perceived, can be applied to landscape 
experience.  Accordingly, Tilley says: 
I touch the stone and the stone touches me.  To feel the stone is to feel its touch 
on my hands.  There is a reflexive relationship between the two. I and the stone 
are in contact with each other through my body but this process is not exactly 
the same as my touching my own body because the stone is external to my body 
and not part of it.  Touching the stone is possible because both my body and the 
stone are part of the same world.197 
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 Tilley also questions how a bodily relationship with our surroundings can be 
considered as a unified whole. To answer this question, he applies Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of an overlap between an observer and their environment.198  This overlap, which 
Merleau-Ponty terms flesh, considers a region at the borders of a body and its 
environment that enables us to speak of a commonality between people and things. 
Philosopher Isis Brook provides a useful description of the notion of flesh.  She says:  
Merleau-Ponty describes flesh as an element.  The element ‘flesh’ is both me 
and the world – ‘a texture’ – and it is our ability to both see and be seen, to 
touch and be touched that both gives us that direct experience of the enfolded 
nature of flesh and presents us with an emblem of that unfolding.199  
 
Brook claims that the idea of flesh has value for environmental thinking as it seemingly 
points to a relationship ‘between me and other humans and between me and non-
humans’.200  Significantly for this project, Brook says that flesh helps us to recognise 
and break down the idea of a dichotomy between an environment and its perceiving 
subjects.201 
 
Tilley uses the idea of flesh to suggest an active participation between a 
perceiver and the world.  Within a phenomenological enquiry into landscape experience, 
he argues, flesh shows that there is ‘commonality between other persons or other things 
and me’.202 In Tilley’s embodied association with the menhirs of Brittany, any parts of 
Tilley’s account that reveal his body in contact with the surrounding environment might 
be considered as evidence of flesh. For instance, he says: ‘This stone is remarkable for 
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whilst the surface of the quartz looks cracked and irregular, it is beautifully smooth to 
the touch with no sharp edges and an almost warm waxy texture’.203  
 
Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of perception, Tilley states that 
the unity and reality of something can only be fully appreciated when all the bodily 
senses with which we relate to the thing are acting together.204  Writing about the 
menhirs in detail, he states: 
The visual encounter of size and scale, shape and proportion was only one 
experience among many.  The nature and character of the raw material, the 
stones themselves – their colours, the constituent elements of the rock the 
personal and intimate experience of touching their surfaces and the aural 
experience of the sounds emitted when struck…similarly, the stones do not 
smell…What we are suggesting is that the ‘energy’, power and significance of 
the stones was derived from an interlinked combination of multiple sensorial 
characteristics, at least of the visual, the tactile and the acoustic, of which we 
would argue, the first two were primary and dominant in most instances.205 
 
           Tilley discusses the idea of perception as an overlap of senses.206 Perception of 
the landscape, he says, involves participation in the world whereby we do not separate 
our faculties of vision, hearing, touch and smell.  Rather, the senses all contribute to the 
whole experience at the same time.207  The multi-sensory character of experience, adds 
Tilley, should result in landscapes being conceptualised as heard, felt, touched and 
smelt; ‘landscapes are not just visionscapes’, he says, ‘but also soundscapes, 
touchscapes and smellscapes as well’.208  This is important.  Although it is not necessary 
to remind ourselves that this chapter is analysing Tilley’s phenomenological account of 
landscape experience for the purpose of creating an equivalence in visual art, it is 
helpful to consider the potential impact of ‘soundscapes’, ‘touchscapes’ and 
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smellscapes’, as well as just ‘visionscapes’ when considering points of contact between 
a sensuous engagement with the landscape and visual art practice.  
 
Our knowledge of ‘things in the world’, says Tilley, is limited insofar as it is 
impossible to give a complete description of an object, listing every attribute, because 
such qualities change according to how we perceive an entity and in what context.209 So, 
for example, the character of the light and the source from which it shines may 
fundamentally alter the qualities of a stone.  Also, it matters whether the stone is smooth, 
rough, shiny, large or small. Tilley says: ‘From a phenomenological perspective, these 
properties of smooth, rough, shiny, large or small are internally related.  The yellow 
colour of a stone and its surface texture make that stone what it is and cannot be clearly 
distinguished from each other’.210 Thus, says Tilley, rather than citing abstract 
characteristics, such as the colour or texture of something, we could say that things have 
their own properties.211 
 
Tilley considers how both visible and invisible aspects comprise an 
environment.212  He asserts that although the body is receptive to its surroundings, there 
are things that are always hidden from a perceiver.  Seen from this vantage point, 
perception involves a relationship between both the visible and the invisible.213 
Returning to the Neolithic menhirs in Brittany, he says: 
Two hundred metres to the west there is a short NW-SE row of three menhirs 
situated midway down a gentle west-east slope running along the axis of the 
ridge.  Today two of these are in a dense wood, the third is exposed in a 
field…This contemporary difference in the stones indicates in an interesting way 
how menhirs may have also looked very different in the past when encountered 
in wooded settings or a landscape cleared of trees.214 
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The notion of the visible and the invisible is examined by Merleau-Ponty, and 
forms the title of his last, and unfinished, book.215 The invisible, says Merleau-Ponty, is 
not an opposing feature of the visible. Rather, the visible contains the invisible and, 
likewise, that which cannot be seen is a part of that which is not hidden from view.216 
Tilley uses the example of a stone to describe an experience, according to Merleau-
Ponty’s principles, of visible and hidden surfaces:  
I can never see all the sides, faces or surfaces of a stone at the same time, but I 
can experience them in sequence, one by one, in a particular structure of 
encounter, but as one face appears in view another disappears.  I cannot see 
inside the stone, and if I break it in order to do so, I have destroyed that which I 
set out to discover and simultaneously created something new.  Thus the manner 
in which I experience an artefact, or a place, very much depends on the structure 
of my encounter with it.217 
 
 
 Tilley asserts an overt criticism directed towards most academic accounts of 
landscape experience. His study deprecates written accounts of landscape experience 
that are conducted without any actual experience of the subject of the enquiry; virtually 
all academic literature, he says, lacks experience of landscape and is therefore 
‘disembodied’.218 ‘Bodies’, he complains, ‘remain at the desk rather than in the field’, a 
charge levelled at Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical enquiry by Tilley. 219 Intriguingly, the 
closest to landscape Merleau-Ponty gets, Tilley suggests, is a discussion of Cézanne’s 
painting. (In Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty proposes that Cézanne tried to represent 
landscapes as he actually saw and felt them, ‘to make visible how the world touches 
us’220 rather than through the rules of linear perspective, and this assertion is examined 
in chapter three of this thesis.) Most academics, adds Tilley provocatively, ‘reduce 
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landscape to a matter of visual representation as opposed to bodily experience.  ‘Thus’, 
he says, ‘a geography of landscape becomes, peculiarly, a geography of paintings…’.221 
 
It is worth pausing at this point to consider the implication of Tilley’s criticism 
for this project. Tilley states that landscape is reduced (my italics) to a matter of visual 
representation.  Furthermore, Tilley adds, ‘in a purely visual description of a landscape, 
or in a photograph of it, we do not arrive back at that which we experienced.’222  From 
this statement it might also be construed that Tilley is resistant to the idea of visual 
imagery representing embodied landscape experience at all.  Furthermore, in a 
discussion in Norwegian Archaeological Review, Tilley’s account of the menhirs comes 
under attack from Ingold who comments on the large number of photographs in his book 
but notes the presence of only a few poor quality drawings.223  This lack of drawings, 
says Ingold, is strange given that Tilley states in his account that photography affords no 
more than the passive appreciation of a site.  After a consideration of Ingold’s criticism, 
Tilley responds that  ‘I would love to sketch my conclusions to this reply but 
unfortunately lack the artistic skill and brilliance that would be required to do so’.224 
 
  Tilley concludes his criticism of accounts that lack actual bodily interaction 
with an environment by advising what a phenomenological approach to landscape 
experience should comprise.  It should be, he says, a ‘richly textured carnal 
phenomenological “thick” description in which we truly attempt to reflect on the 
character of our experience, as opposed to a thin and sensorily impoverished 
“analytical” account’. Tilley’s explanation seemingly offers an opportunity for this 
project to provide examples of artwork to represent landscape experience that, as well as 
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conveying bodily interaction with a landscape, also exhibit qualities that reflect the 
character of that encounter.  
 
It is interesting to note that within his enquiry into landscape experience, Tilley 
combines pre-reflexive bodily forms of experience with material from other sources that 
might be considered consciously premeditated.  As we have already seen, pre-reflexive 
experience has been described as a fundamental ingredient of a phenomenological 
enquiry.  However, Tilley’s method seemingly accords with Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of the world that includes interplay between embodied, pre-reflective 
experience and that which has been meditated upon.225 In this idea, Merleau-Ponty, 
writing in The Primacy of Perception, suggests that ‘the idea of going straight to the 
essence of things is inconsistent…What is given is a route, an experience, which 
gradually clarifies itself and others’.226 
 
In a review of Tilley’s book, 227 The Materiality of Stone, archaeologist Simon 
Stoddart suggests that Tilley has developed an alternative mode of scholarship that 
provides a thought-provoking experience because it is not just the experience of one 
individual.228  Although Tilley’s book might not subscribe to the precise 
phenomenological approach of Merleau-Ponty, says Stoddart, factors combine that make 
it of particular interest.  Firstly, he says, Tilley uses rich sources of contrasting 
destinations that provide excellent examples for his enquiry.  Secondly, Tilley’s visits to 
the sites of archaeological interest use a level of thick description and this provides an 
insight into both his data and into aspects of the information that he finds interesting.  
Thirdly, says Stoddart, Tilley’s use of sensuous engagement emphasises ‘participant 
observation’ and also draws on the observations of other archaeologists who preceded 
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him.  Thus, Tilley’s account is not so much one that rejects previous experience, but 
rather, suggests Stoddart, his enquiry builds upon it.229 
 
The combination of pre-reflexive experience with sources that have been 
reflected upon is also a topic addressed by artist John Haworth.  Writing in ‘Beyond 
reason: Pre-reflective thought and creativity in art’, he also acknowledges that a full 
enquiry needs to combine pre-reflexive experience with material from other sources. 230 
Haworth points to examples from the work of Merleau-Ponty that emphasise the need 
for an embodiment theory not to negate the importance of reflection.  Merleau-Ponty, 
says Haworth, emphasises that pre-reflective experience is understood by reflection.231 
He adds that what Merleau-Ponty suggests is that pre-reflexive experience, ‘is a route, 
an experience, which gradually clarifies itself, which gradually rectifies itself and 
proceeds by dialogue with itself and with others’.232  
 
Ingold is somewhat less complimentary about Tilley’s method of enquiry and 
cites a list of inconsistencies regarding his approach to landscape. One of these 
inconsistencies concerns Tilley’s work on standing-stones and his claims that the 
research is based on experience.  If this is the case, says Ingold, why then does he deal 
with speculation about what people might believe?233 Moreover, says Ingold: ‘Tilley has 
a penchant for wheeling in the ancestors, whenever needed, to lend an air of 
ethnographic authenticity to his conjectures’.234  Ingold provides an example of Tilley’s 
speculation about belief.  He writes: ‘the solution basins created by erosion on a 
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standing-stone were perhaps regarded as carvings created by the ancestors’235 Clearly, 
Ingold fails to recognise Tilley’s expanded mode of phenomenological analysis.  Rather, 
he claims that Tilley remains encumbered by a tradition where material objects stand in 
for cultural concepts.236  Tilley, in response to the criticism of bringing ideas of ‘belief’ 
into his account says that: ‘Ingold sets up a strange distinction between “experience” and 
“belief”’.237   
 
Interestingly, although Ingold disputes aspects of Tilley’s method, he takes up 
a phenomenological position for his own interpretation of landscape experience.238  
Somewhat confusingly, Ingold and Tilley are seemingly at odds over what constitutes a 
phenomenological enquiry.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to venture into an 
analysis of all the different forms that a phenomenological interpretation of a landscape 
might take, but it is interesting to note that Tilley’s account of landscape experience, and 
Ingold’s embodied study have opposing notions of what comprises a linguistic re-
description of an embodied appraisal of an environment. 
 
This section has undertaken an analytical view of an expanded 
phenomenological interpretation of landscape experience from a cultural archaeological 
perspective. Whilst Tilley’s analysis has provided a useful insight into an expanded field 
of phenomenology, it has not fully investigated the relationship between a dynamic 
environment and an active perceiver. Therefore, in the next section, phenomenological 
aspects of landscape experience are examined from a cultural anthropological position 
that focuses on what it means to live and participate within an environment. Also, the 
next section introduces ways in which the embodied activity of an experience of 
landscape might be articulated within visual art. 
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III 
Embodied experience and notions of time 
 
We have seen in the previous two sections of this chapter some of the ways in which an 
active human perceiver interrelates with their environment; ecological and 
phenomenological notions of perception have been examined and applied to an 
embodied experience of the landscape.  Next, in this section, an embodied experience of 
the landscape is examined in order to establish a relationship between an active 
perceiver, a dynamic environment and their association with notions of time.  The idea 
of time, as we have seen earlier, is important within an embodied approach to landscape 
experience because temporality unfolds through bodily movements and actions over a 
period; furthermore, events that occur between an observer and their surroundings last in 
time.239  
 
Matters relating to an experience of the landscape and its relationship to time are 
issues examined by Ingold.240  Writing in The Perception of the environment, essays in 
livelihood, dwelling and skill, Ingold examines a bodily experience of landscape that 
puts an emphasis on day-to-day living and working; he terms this analysis a ‘dwelling’ 
perspective.241  Of primary interest to Ingold, within his dwelling perspective, are 
Gibson’s ideas of ecological perception242 and the phenomenological thoughts of 
Merleau-Ponty.243  
 
First, let us consider ways in which Ingold’s analysis of time and the landscape 
is informed by Gibson’s ecological model of perception.  As we have seen, Gibson 
proposes that a perceiving organism gathers information in a direct way from their 
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surroundings in order to determine the properties of an environment and their meaning.  
Within his analysis, Ingold adopts two elements from Gibson’s perceptual theory in 
order to develop his ideas about temporality and the landscape.  These elements include 
Gibson’s notion of invariants, an idea that addresses persistence and change within an 
environment, and his concept of affordance that addresses ways in which meaning can 
be gathered by a perceiver from their surroundings in a direct way. 
 
In order to understand ways in which Ingold views an association between time 
and the landscape, an explanation is required of ways in which he incorporates the 
notions of invariants and affordance within his analysis.  Firstly, let us consider Ingold’s 
use of the idea of invariants. Central to this concept is the idea of movement. Hence 
Ingold uses the idea of invariants to understand motion within an environment because 
the concept of a mobile perceiver is critical to his comprehension of time in the 
landscape.  According to Ingold, a perceiver looks for constancies, or invariants, as they 
move about an environment. These constancies, or invariants, underlie the changing 
patterns of light that reach perceivers from surfaces within their surroundings. In visual 
perception, says Ingold, we do not see patterns of light.  Instead, what we see are 
surfaces and objects because the light reaching our eyes undergoes a gradual 
transformation and it is the invariants that underlie these changes that specify what we 
observe.244 
 
Other writers comment on Gibson’s idea of invariants in association with 
landscape and its relationship with a moving perceiver.  Writing in Sensuous 
Geographies, Rodaway asserts that Gibson’s idea of invariants is of particular interest to 
disciplines that are concerned with both a physical and a human world.  This interest 
arises, claims Rodaway, because the concept of invariants gives significance to both the 
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environment and to the perception of a mobile observer.245  Moreover, says Rodaway, it 
is the structure and the texture of the environment that determines what is perceived and 
the locomotion of the whole body of a perceiver provides a corporal interaction with its 
surroundings.  Considering such a dynamic relationship, adds Rodaway, introduces the 
idea of time.246  Temporality is part of the dynamic nature of visual experience because 
those things that we see illuminated in a particular way at a certain moment persist over 
time.247  
 
Next, let us examine Ingold’s use of the notion of affordance in order to 
understand how a perceiver can gather information within the landscape.  Within his 
enquiry Ingold suggests that ‘to perceive an object or an event is to perceive what it 
affords’.248 As perception is an active and exploratory process, what we perceive is as a 
direct result of our actions.  Thus we pick up particular kinds of information depending 
on the activity we are engaged in.  As we have seen, the affordance of something 
provides practical information about the potential offered for activity within an 
environment.249  This means that knowledge about an environment is gained through the 
activities and engagement of a perceiver with their surroundings.  As a result, says 
Ingold, it is through practical activity associated with living in an environment that a 
world becomes meaningful.250  
 
There are differences worth noting between the theory of affordance and 
phenomenological ideas of how an environment can offer meaning to a perceiver. In the 
case of affordance, says Ingold, the environment to be explored is relatively fixed and 
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pre-prepared with its affordances in place ready to be taken up by whoever inhabits it.251  
In contrast, from a phenomenological perspective, the world comes into being, together 
with its properties, at the same time as the perceiver.252 Specifically, for Merleau-Ponty, 
the coming into being of the person is part and parcel of the process of coming-into-
being of the world.253 
 
Writing in From Darwin to Watson (and cognitivism) and back again: The 
principle of animal-environment mutuality, psychologist Alan Costall suggests that 
affordances are properties of the environment even though they are dependent upon the 
perceiver.  Apples, Costall says, afford eating – they constitute food – but this is relative 
to the perceiver:  If human subjects did not eat apples then this fruit would not be 
food.254  According to psychologist Edward Reed there is a social association between 
the concept of affordance and an environment.  Of primary concern to Reed is the idea 
that perceivers share affordances within an environment.  Perceivers, says Reed, are 
attuned through prior training and experience to focus on similar environments and it is 
through movement within the same surroundings, in pursuit of joint activities, that they 
will collect the same information.255 
 
How does Ingold use the concepts of invariants and affordance to establish 
ideas of how time operates within a landscape?  To begin with, let us examine Ingold’s 
use of the idea of invariants in connection with temporal notions of landscape 
experience. We have already seen that Ingold uses the concept of invariants to describe 
the interaction of a mobile observer with their surroundings.  It is through such dynamic 
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interaction that Ingold describes how time operates between perceivers and their 
environment.  It is helpful at this stage to consider Ingold’s description of the 
interactivity of perceivers and an environment as the ‘taskscape’,256 a term he uses to 
denote a pattern of dwelling activities.257 The taskscape, he says, describes a range of 
connected actions that include interactivity, as well as sound and movement, within an 
environment. According to Ingold, it is our experience, bodily activity and movements 
within the taskscape that provide us with a perception of time.258  It is the pattern of such 
dwelling activities, he says, that provides the inherent temporality of the taskscape.259  
 
Ingold relates the idea of movement and its relationship to time to Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology.260 For Merleau-Ponty, perception is temporal because 
experience involves participation in an environment over time.261 He says: ‘the passage 
of one present to the next is not a thing which I conceive, nor do I see it as an onlooker, I 
effect it’.262  Ingold uses this connection between participation and time to suggest that 
we perceive temporality within an environment not as spectators, but rather as 
participants, ‘in the very performance of our tasks’.263  Furthermore, the idea that we can 
‘observe’ the passing of time is, says Ingold, an idea based on a false impression of 
disembodiment.264  It is our own participation within an environment, he says, that 
provides us with a passage of time.  Writing in The perception of the environment, 
Ingold provides a detailed account of his ideas about time: 
Reaching out into the taskscape I perceive, at this moment, a particular vista of 
past and a future; but it is a vista that is available from this moment and no 
other.  As such it constitutes my present, conferring upon it a unique character.  
Thus the present is not marked off from a past that it has replaced or a future that 
will, in turn, replace it; it rather gathers the past and future into itself, like 
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refractions in a crystal ball.  And just as in the landscape, we can move from 
place to place without crossing any boundary, since the vista that constitutes the 
identity of a place changes even as we move, so like-wise we can move from 
one present to another without having to break through any chronological barrier 
that might be supposed to separate each present from the next in line.265 
 
Within Ingold’s account, ideas of bodily experience and movement are also 
employed to understand ways in which navigation within a landscape might relate to 
issues of time.266  His ideas of temporal navigation, which he terms ‘wayfinding’, are 
informed by Gibson’s concept of ‘direct’ perception.  In the concept of wayfinding, he 
says, an understanding of the location in which the perceiving subject moves relies upon 
place unfolding over time and this knowledge is brought about by the relationship 
between an active perceiver and their environment.  According to Ingold, the features of 
an environment are revealed as a perceiver travels along paths of view; we know our 
way about, he says, in terms of the specific order in which the surfaces of the 
environment come into, or pass out of, sight as we proceed along a path.  Ingold applies 
this idea to how we might perceive a view.  Visible surfaces, he says, comprise a 
‘vista…a set of unhidden surfaces; what is seen from here, with proviso that ‘here’ is not 
a point but an extended region’.267 Thus as a perceiver turns a corner, or reaches the 
brow of a hill, a set of previously hidden surfaces comes into view whilst those within 
the former vista disappear from sight.  Moreover, asserts Ingold, the passage from one 
vista to another constitutes a ‘transition’.  Therefore, he says, to travel from one place to 
another involves the opening up and closing off of vistas, in a particular order, through a 
continuous series of transitions. In this way, he says, vision takes place over time, along 
a path of observation. 268  
 
The significance of sound is discussed within Ingold’s interpretation of the 
landscape.  Sound, says Ingold, can be considered as having a temporal role because it 
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can be addressed in terms of bodily experience and movement and comes about by the 
interactivity of human actions and the environment.269 It is interesting to note ways in 
which differences can be identified between the perception of sound and how visual 
recognition occurs. Ingold says:   
To be seen, a thing need do nothing itself, for the optic array that specifies its 
form to a viewer consists of light reflected off its outer surfaces.  To be heard, 
on the other hand, a thing must actively emit sounds or, through its movement, 
cause sound to be emitted by other objects with which it comes into contact.270 
 
Thus what we hear, says Ingold, is activity.  Furthermore, he adds, activity can be heard 
even when the source of the sound cannot be seen.271 Archaeologist Christopher 
Witmore comments on Ingold’s analysis of how sound might be perceived within the 
idea of the taskscape. Witmore says that Ingold, by his analysis of sound, connects 
humans to the material world and to the qualities of bodily experience; Witmore 
believes that it is also sound that connects us to the actions of other entities. 272 
 
We have discussed several ideas from Ingold as to how time operates within the 
landscape. Now let us examine ways in which Ingold uses visual art to illustrate his 
theories of temporality within a landscape.  To illustrate his ideas about time and the 
landscape Ingold selects a sixteenth century painting, The Harvesters, created by Pieter 
Bruegel the elder in 1565. 
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 Illus. 9: Pieter Bruegel the elder, The Harvesters, 1565  
Oil on canvas, 118 x 163cm, New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art. 
 
This painting has a particular importance for Ingold.  The Harvesters, he says ‘more than 
any other, captures a sense of the temporality of the landscape’.273  He adds: ‘Rather that 
treating the world as its own painting, I should like you, the reader, to regard this 
painting by Bruegel as though it were its own world, into which you have been 
magically transported.  Imagine yourself, then, set down in the very landscape depicted, 
on a sultry August day in 1565.274  ‘I shall comment’, says Ingold, on features of the 
painting insofar as they ‘illustrate aspects of what I have had to say about landscape and 
temporality’.275 
 
First, let us examine Ingold’s interpretation of aspects of the painting and ways 
in which they might illustrate his ideas about time operating within a landscape.  He 
begins his analysis of the painting by considering the hills and valleys that are depicted 
in the picture.  These topographical features, he tells us, guide the viewer’s gaze in a 
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way that involves bodily movement. The contours of the landscape, he adds, are felt in 
the perceiver’s body.  ‘It is the movements of falling away from, and rising up towards, 
that specify the form of the valley’.276  By the actions of ascending and descending the 
contours are incorporated into our bodily experience.  Ingold continues.  Even if the 
perceiver stays in one spot, looking at the hills and valley involves movement of the 
eyes and the head. As you look across the valley to the hill, he says, the movement of 
your body accords with your attention as it takes in the landscape.277  Moreover, adds 
Ingold, the topography within the painting is persistent in relation to the human life-
cycle and erosion by flowing water and evidence of human activity are indications of 
landscape being formed and of time passing. 
 
Next, Ingold examines the paths and tracks within the painting.  These, he says, 
reveal something of the route taken to an observer’s current location and indicate 
experience that has taken place.  Furthermore, each path, he says, ‘shows up the 
accumulated imprint of countless journeys that people have made – with or without their 
vehicles or domestic animals – as they have gone about their everyday business’.278  
 
Another feature of Bruegel’s painting is the tree in the foreground of the picture.  
This tree, Ingold tells us, acts as a focal point for the whole landscape.  Moreover, its 
presence, he says, establishes a particular place and ‘the people are as much bound up in 
the life of the tree as is the tree in the lives of the people’.279 According to Ingold, the 
tree bridges a gap between invariant forms of the landscape and mobile forms of life.280 
Its solidity, he claims, ‘presides immobile over the passage of human generations’ whilst 
in contrast, its more transient aspect ‘resonates with the life-cycles of insects, the 
seasonal migrations of birds, and the regular round of human agricultural activities’.  
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Like the tree, the church is also a place filled with temporality.  Whilst the tree 
has its roots in the ground, says Ingold, so the church has people buried in its graveyard.  
Both of these buried things, he adds, have the same ‘temporal depth’.281  The church, 
Ingold informs us, is subject to changes over time from the effect of plants, animals and 
human subjects as well as the forces of weather and decomposition.  Furthermore, the 
church, he says, spans generations and would become a ruin without human input.  Also, 
adds Ingold, the church, by the sounding of its bells, may be heard as ‘a monument to 
the passage of time’.282  
 
Ingold also focuses on the corn in the painting.  This, he says, more than any 
other feature in the picture, brings the people together in a time-based way. The 
uniformity of the colour of the surface of the corn, he says, provides evidence of time by 
offering the people in the painting a shared visual experience.  This experience is, says 
Ingold, one that ‘binds every place in the landscape within a single horizon of the 
present…and provides a sense of coavalness’.283 Whereas the tree binds past, present 
and future and gives a sense of duration, he adds, the corn provides a sense of being in 
the present time, the moment at which the picture’s mise en scène was organised by the 
painter. 
 
Ingold also uses the corn to describe movement in the painting.  Where the corn 
has been cut, he says, it presents a ‘sheer vertical front’ whose outline progressively 
changes as the harvesters work.284  This interface in the landscape, he adds, is an 
example of the way in which form emerges through movement.285  Likewise, the sheaths 
of corn also provide evidence of movement.  Each sheaf has a regular form arising from 
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the process of binding the corn.  Also, he says, the carrying of the sheaves down the path 
to the hay-cart, is another part of the labour process that involves movement of figures in 
the painting.  
 
Ingold observes the activity of the people in the painting, both at work in the 
field and under the tree consuming bread. He describes how the activity of the people in 
the painting is revealed by sounds:   
Though the folk beneath the tree are too busy eating to talk, you hear the clatter 
of wooden spoons on bowls, the slurp of the drinker, and the loud snores of the 
member of the party who is outstretched in sleep.  Further off, you hear the 
swish of scythes against the cornstalks and the calls of the birds as they swoop 
low over the field in search of prey.  Far off in the distance, wafted on the light 
wind, can be heard the sounds of people conversing and playing on a green.286 
 
Ingold concludes his analysis of The Harvesters by proposing that in attending 
to the hills and the valley, the tree, the corn and the birds in the painting, the people in 
the picture are part of the environment in which they are working.  In short, he says ‘the 
landscape is not a totality that you or anyone else can look at, it is rather the world in 
which we stand in taking up a point of view on our surroundings’.287 
  
Although there are several reasons that can be cited as to why The Harvesters 
might be selected as an appropriate artwork to be viewed in terms of the temporality of 
landscape experience – reasons such as a consideration of bodily experience relating to 
Bruegel’s landscape activity,288 the idea of The Harvesters as one of a series of paintings 
that depicts time unfolding over a period, or the ecological notion of Bruegel’s attention 
to the relationship between human subjects and their environment289 (a biography of 
Bruegel by Carel van Mander, written in 1604, provides useful detail of his interest in 
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painting an experience of a landscape)290 – there are problems associated with Ingold’s 
use of a sixteenth century painting to articulate contemporary and embodied notions of 
landscape experience. These problems include difficulties with the use of a painting to 
articulate sounds that are heard within an environment, doubts about the use of a 
necessarily static medium to articulate dynamic experience and the lack of consideration 
given by Ingold to changes in technology between the sixteenth and the twenty-first 
centuries.  
 
Firstly, consider a painting and its capacity to denote sound.  In spite of 
highlighting the importance of sound in his temporal analysis of landscape experience, 
Ingold has selected a silent medium that relies wholly on the imagination of the viewer 
in respect of what might be heard within an environment.  Ingold’s suggestion that ‘you 
hear the swish of scythes against the cornstalks and the calls of the birds as they swoop 
low over the field’ cannot be articulated by paint.  Paint might stimulate the viewer into 
imagining they hear the actions of the scythes or the birds but is unable to convey the 
sound itself.   Other writers also recognise this problem. Witmore suggests that 
Bruegel’s painting provides us only with potential noise that can only be heard within 
the imagination of a viewer of the picture. The sixteenth century landscape depicted 
within The Harvesters, he says, was made with paint and a brush and the only sound that 
is mobilized in Ingold’s example ‘is the reality of oil on wood’.291  
 
Of sound, so time.  Although Ingold has emphasised the significance of 
movement within his temporal interpretation of landscape experience, he has selected a 
mode of art practice that is necessarily static and which does not articulate the dynamic 
character of a perceiver and their relationship to an environment.  Referring to the 
stream in the painting Ingold tells us that this ‘flows on toward the sea’.  As you watch, 
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he proposes, ‘the stream flows, folk are at work, a landscape is being formed, and time 
passes’.292  Such movement cannot be conveyed by paint.  Whilst it is possible to 
identify the movement of a viewer in relation to the painting, such a medium cannot 
reveal the movement of both a mobile perceiver and their dynamic environment.  Much 
has been written of the French artist Cézanne and his landscape painting and several 
critics have applied phenomenological principles to his artwork.293 Although this is an 
issue that will be discussed in chapter three of this thesis, it is worth noting at this point 
that although Cézanne employed bodily activities, such as painting the same view from 
different aspects and at different times, his pictures, like those of Bruegel, are 
nonetheless unable to provide qualities of movement or sound that have been identified 
as significant parts of an embodied experience of landscape.  
 
Changes in technology have taken place since the sixteenth century that also 
render Ingold’s choice of The Harvesters an inappropriate tool with which to articulate 
phenomenological ideas about a contemporary landscape.  Technological developments 
mean that landscape experience in the twenty-first century is considerably different than 
it was in 1563. Technological developments have effected many changes in the 
exchange of goods and their distribution; also, technology has contributed to 
transformations within areas of communication and travel and these changes have 
created an extensive gap between landscape experience in the sixteenth century and the 
present time. 
 
Writing in ‘These boots are made for walking:  Mundane technology, the body 
and human-environment relations’, Michael discusses Ingold’s neglect of ways in which 
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technology has changed between the sixteenth and twenty-first centuries.294  He praises 
Ingold for extending the idea of affordance by socialising it through his dwelling 
perspective of the landscape. However, says Michael, Ingold fails to recognise the role 
of technology in his account of affordance and its relationship to landscape experience.  
Affordances, says Michael, are not just between bodies and natural surfaces but are 
changed by technology.295 Within a contemporary landscape, he believes, the situation is 
significantly more complex than a straightforward connection, such as that made by 
Ingold, between a human subject and a natural environment. Michael identifies a 
specific problem with Ingold’s lack of attention to technological aspects of the footwear 
of the farm workers in The Harvesters.  The footwear, says Michael, looks to be made 
by local artisans, thus suggesting that the landscape is based on local society.  Chapter 
two will go on to examine Michael’s analysis of  the way in which technology mediates 
our experience of a landscape in more detail. 
  
It is interesting to note that Ingold, writing in Tools, Language and Cognition in 
Human Evolution, has himself commented on an association between technology and an 
activity.296 For example, he says that when he is writing with a pen, he concentrates on 
the writing and not on the pen. 297  However, this attention to technology is seemingly 
lacking in his analysis of landscape experience. 
 
Writing in Contested Natures, environmental sociologists Phil Macnaghten and 
John Urry, also cite Ingold’s use of The Harvesters as an inappropriate tool with which 
to articulate embodied and temporal notions of the landscape:  Unlike the rural scene 
that is depicted in Bruegel’s painting, they say, there has been a huge growth in science 
                                                 
294 Michael, "These Boots Are Made for Walking.: Mundane Technology, the Body and Human-
Environment Relations." 
295 Ibid.112. 
296 Kathleen Gibson and Tim Ingold, Tools, Language and Cognition in Human Evolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 450. 
297 Ibid. 
 81 
and technology that has resulted in consequences at both local and global levels.298  
Moreover, suggest Macnaghten and Urry, there have also been changes brought about 
by the development of visual and electronic communication systems that play a 
dominant role in how an environment is perceived. As well as all these changes, they 
say, new spatial practices have emerged which depend on the use of natural 
environments beyond the activity of agricultural work. For example, leisure pursuits and 
mass travel involve different types of interaction within an existing landscape.299  
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Summary 
 
This chapter has examined an embodied experience of the landscape which occurs 
between an active perceiver and their dynamic environment.  A relationship between an 
active perceiver and their dynamic environment, we can conclude, involves a reciprocal, 
interactive and mobile engagement between an observer and their surroundings and 
occurs over time. We can also infer that knowledge about the physical make-up and the 
meaning of our surroundings can be perceived in a direct way from the association 
between an embodied perceiver and their dynamic environment. This way of 
understanding an embodied experience of an environment is in accordance with some of 
the principles set out by Gibson in his ecological approach to visual perception.  It also 
accords with ideas from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception.   
 
In section one the perceptual experience of a human perceiver was examined 
using Gibson’s analysis of how meaning and physical structure might be determined in a 
direct way from the light reflected within an environment.  Here, the ideas of invariants 
and affordance were examined in order to understand a reciprocal relationship between a 
perceiver and their surroundings.  The idea of invariants was shown to reveal 
persistence and change within an environment and the concept of affordance explained 
that potential meaning might also be determined from a reciprocal relationship between 
an observer and their surroundings.  We were also able to deduce that although there are 
similarities between Gibson’s ideas about perception and Merleau-Ponty’s principles of 
embodiment, differences arise in relation to how meaning might occur within a 
landscape.  Whilst for Gibson meaning might be seen to be pre-existing in an 
environment, for Merleau-Ponty the world only becomes meaningful in relation to the 
bodily activity of a perceiver.  Furthermore, Gibson’s neglect of a cultural context has 
revealed the need to consider this aspect of an environment within an examination of 
embodied experience.  
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Section two examined a phenomenological analysis of a landscape informed by 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Gibson’s perceptual theory.  Here, we were able 
to see that these two ways of considering embodied experience might be applied to an 
examination of landscape experience.  Specifically, Tilley applies Merleau-Ponty’s idea 
of a fundamental reversibility between a subject and an object to an understanding of the 
landscape in order to explain a mutual relationship between a perceiver and their 
surroundings. He also applies Merleau-Ponty’s idea of an overlap between a subject and 
an object in order to overcome the idea of a separation between a perceiver and the 
landscape. Of prime concern to Tilley is the way in which the relationship between a 
human and their surroundings brings about affordance of a landscape.  However, in 
contrast to Gibson’s ideas, Tilley considers perception of a landscape to be influenced 
by memories from the past.  There is no perception of place, he says, without memory.  
Of particular interest to this thesis was Tilley’s method of combining immediate 
experience with sources of pre-existing literature to provide what we might term an 
‘expanded’ form of phenomenology.   
 
Finally, section three examined an analysis of time and the landscape, informed 
by the work of Ingold.  Here, we have seen that it is the movement of the body of a 
perceiver that provides an interaction with an environment and that through practical 
activity associated with living in an environment the world becomes meaningful.  Using 
Ingold’s analysis of the landscape, we have seen that participation within an 
environment can explain time in the landscape.  Likewise, we have seen that features of 
an environment are revealed over time, along a path of observation, as a perceiver 
moves through the landscape.   
 
Also in this section, problems associated with still and silent forms of artistic 
media were examined when considering ways in which visual art practice might 
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articulate embodied notions of landscape experience.  Ingold’s choice of artwork was 
shown to be inappropriate for articulating an embodied experience of the landscape.  His 
neglect of suitable media and lack of attention to the ways in which technology mediates 
our surroundings made his choice of The Harvesters inapt. Fluent articulation of 
landscape experience by the use of visual art is a primary concern of this thesis; 
therefore, the next chapter examines how technology mediates the relationship between 
an active perceiver and their dynamic environment.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Landscape experience and technology 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines some of the ways in which technology mediates our experience 
of the landscape and considers how technological intervention between a perceiver and 
their environment might be explained through phenomenological analysis.  An enquiry 
into ways in which our surroundings are mediated by technology is important because 
such intervention can affect our understanding of embodied landscape experience. 
Technological mediation also impacts on the choice of artwork employed to 
communicate ideas of engagement with an environment.  
 
There are several ways of approaching an enquiry into ways in which our 
environment is mediated by technology, such as a study of visualisation300 or an enquiry 
into the role of media,301 but in this chapter an analysis is conducted that approaches the 
issue from an embodied perspective.  Central to the concerns of this chapter is the 
writing of environmental sociologist Mike Michael302 and technological philosopher 
Don Ihde.303  Writing in ‘These Boots are Made for Walking: Mundane Technology, the 
Body and Human-environment Relations’,304 Michael provides a useful account of the 
role of specifically simple technologies and the ways in which they mediate between a 
perceiver and their environment.  Ihde meanwhile provides a phenomenological 
interpretation of how technology might mediate within an embodied relationship.  Using 
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these key texts from Michael and Ihde, this chapter examines the ways in which 
technology mediates the experience of an active perceiver and their dynamic 
environment from a position that considers the whole body and its surroundings. 
 
The first section in this chapter examines the role of specifically simple, or 
mundane technologies that often go unnoticed because of over-familiarity - for example, 
a pencil or footwear. Using Michael’s analysis, an enquiry is made into ways in which 
mundane technologies mediate the relationship between a perceiver and their 
environment. 305  The second section of the chapter examines how experience that is 
mediated by technology might be accounted for in a phenomenological way.  This 
section is informed by the work of Don Ihde who examines ways in which the 
phenomenological ideas of Merleau-Ponty might be applied to how technology can 
extend the limits of perception.306 Specifically, Ihde considers ways in which a 
perceiving subject might extend their sensory perception through a technological 
artefact.  Finally, in this section, a connection is made between a phenomenological 
appraisal of ways in which technology mediates our experience of an environment and 
its application within visual art practice. 
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I 
Experience and simple technologies 
 
How might we approach the complex issue of ways in which technology mediates the 
relationship between an active perceiver and their dynamic environment?  Writing in 
‘These boots are made for walking: Mundane technology, the body and human-
environment relations’, Michael considers ways in which specifically simple types of 
technology mediate relationships that occur between active perceivers and their 
surroundings.307  Michael says that simple, or mundane, types of technology are 
frequently overlooked because of their integration into daily life.  Mundane types of 
technology include articles of clothing and footwear, writing materials, walking aids and 
other simple items that, says Michael, have influenced our relationship with the 
environment in many ways.308  
 
Although there is not a clear dividing line between mundane and complex, or 
what he terms ‘exotic’ technology, Michael says that innovations in technoscientific 
areas – in particular developments that have occurred within information technology and 
biotechnology – can be considered as examples of exotic technology that have played a 
significant role in reshaping our lives.309   On the other hand, he says, mundane 
technology might include objects that are no longer novel and that are overlooked 
through familiarity.  In his analysis, Michael elaborates on a crossover that exists 
between mundane and exotic forms of technology and illustrates this idea with the 
example of a pair of walking boots.310  Walking boots, he says, can be considered as a 
mundane form of technology.  However, they also have within their design, production, 
                                                 
307 Michael, "These Boots Are Made for Walking.: Mundane Technology, the Body and Human-
Environment Relations." 
308 Mike Michael, Reconnecting culture, technology and nature (London, New York: Routledge, 
2000). 3. 
309 Ibid. 
310 Michael, "These Boots Are Made for Walking.: Mundane Technology, the Body and Human-
Environment Relations." 
 88 
and marketing strategies, evidence of exotic technology. Equally, says Michael, exotic 
technology is served by mundane technology; neither computer programmers, nor 
academics, he says, can operate without light bulbs, chairs, or footwear.311   
 
Seemingly mundane artefacts such as walking boots can also be examined in 
relation to Gibson’s theory of perception.312  Specifically, Michael analyses a connection 
between walking boots and affordance – a term that, as we have seen, explains how 
meaning can be gathered from an environment in a direct way by the interaction of a 
perceiver and their surroundings. A significant feature of the connection made by 
Michael between mundane technology and affordance is the notion that possible actions 
within an environment reflect the capabilities and limits of a perceiver’s body.313  This, 
says Michael, means that the environment, rather than determining action, merely 
suggests the possibility of performing activities.314  
 
Central to Michael’s analysis of affordance and mundane technology is the idea 
that an embodied relationship between a sentient being and their environment includes a 
perceiver, their surroundings, and simple technologies that comprise material surfaces 
that can provide meaning.315 For Michael, the concept of affordance does not simply 
arise out of an embodied relationship between a perceiver and the natural environment.  
Rather, it is interwoven with a multitude of other things, such as other humans, animals 
and technologies, all of which can expand or constrain affordances between a perceiving 
subject and the natural environment.  
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In order to discuss the idea of affordance Michael begins by considering certain 
characteristics about walking boots. Walking boots, he says, can reflect key aspects of 
modern life such as movement, production and transportation and are part of the 
environment itself insofar as, like any material technology, they are composed of 
surfaces.316  Moreover, he adds, walking boots can change potential meanings within an 
environment by expanding the range of possible actions for the body.  Michael 
elaborates:  A sequence of potential meanings, he says, can lead to ‘cascades’ of 
affordances where each link in the series relates to those connections on either side of it.  
For instance, says Michael, socks afford a more comfortable use of walking boots.  In 
turn, he adds, the boots afford the possibility of using crampons.  Moreover, he believes 
that this cascading series could be followed by the access to icy slopes afforded by the 
crampons.317  Accordingly, for the natural environment to become accessible, states 
Michael, a series of affordances has to operate.  So, for a mountain to afford climbing, 
for example, there has to be a cascade of affordances between the feet and the hillside.318 
 
There are also other ways in which walking boots impact on the relationship 
between a body and its environment.  Michael states: 
…there is the role of boots as mechanical technologies that can cause pain, 
dissolving identity and the relation between humans and nature; second there is 
the role of boots as signifying style and identity; third, there is the role of boots 
as embodiments of procedures of standardization and objectification; and 
finally, there is the role of boots as a technological means of physical and 
ecological damage to nature.319   
 
These other roles, asserts Michael, overlap and are never distinct.  Walking boots may 
be seen, he says, as material entities that mediate and assist in the flow of 
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communication between humans and their environment.320  Thus, states Michael, rather 
than nature affording for naked bodies, an underlying assumption that we were able to 
observe in the last chapter, it affords to bodies-and-boots.  Furthermore, only when 
mundane technology is considered, says Michael, do we see the complex interaction and 
communication involved in the relationship between a body and its environment.321   
 
Writing in ‘A Single Day's Walking: Narrating Self and Landscape on the 
South-West Coast Path’, geographer John Wylie identifies a problem with Michael’s 
account of mundane technology and its connection to the concept of affordance.322 
Michael’s account fails, says Wylie, because his world of expanding possibilities is 
dependent upon contact with a ground that is ‘phenomenologically unproblematic’.323  
As a walker becomes footsore, he says, ‘so the landscape no longer takes shape as a set 
of readily affording surfaces for purposive and smooth motion’.324  The surrounding 
world in Michael’s account, says Wylie, focuses exclusively on the body and this results 
in the environment being marginalised. 
 
Similarly, cultural geographers David Crouch and Luke Desforges also 
comment on Michael’s account of mundane technology and its association with the 
concept of affordance.325  They suggest that Michael complicates the role of 
technologies by picking ‘the seemingly trivial technology of the walking boot and 
arguing that the boot creates a particular sort of affordance with nature which cushions 
the blows of rocks and the dampness of water as the wearer wanders across the 
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landscape’.326 Furthermore, they say, the fact that walking boots become taken for 
granted enables the wearer to feel ‘immersed’ in their surroundings and able to ‘truly 
appreciate the feeling of the ground under their feet’.327  This, they add, is indicative of 
technology mediating within the sensual experience.  However, they say, technologies 
and their part in sensuous experience are not completely under the control of the human 
subjects who incorporate them in their practices.  As an example of this lack of control, 
they cite boots that cause pain because they are not properly worn in.  Boots that are not 
worn in, they say ‘produce feet that hurt, so that although cushioned from the blows of 
nature, new sorts of blows to the body are experienced’.328 
 
It is interesting that Michael takes an historical perspective on landscape activity 
and rural footwear. Rural footwear might be seen as an aspect of simple technology that 
Ingold neglects when selecting The Harvesters to articulate ideas of embodied 
experience. Michael takes an historical perspective on the association between landscape 
activity and rural footwear in order to examine the complex relationship that exists 
between a perceiver and their environment.329 He points out that agricultural workers in 
the middle ages frequently worked in the fields stripped from the waist down and were 
consequently barefooted. During the fourteenth century, says Michael, leather overshoes 
were used, but their development into rubber galoshes didn’t appear until 1830, when 
they were introduced from South America.  In eighteenth century England, states 
Michael, rural footwear had regional variations.  In northern England wooden clogs 
were favoured, whilst elsewhere shoes with studs around the heels were worn and in 
other places short boots known as ‘highlows’ were the custom. Rubber boots and shoes 
were initially just worn by the wealthy and only became the normal footwear for 
agricultural workers at the beginning of the twentieth century.  Generally, adds Michael, 
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protective footwear for rural workers evolved very slowly, mainly due to a lack of 
money, materials and invention. However, he adds, cultural conditions such as gender 
division and fashion also affected the choice of footwear.  
 
The point that Michael is making here is that rather than the somewhat simple 
analysis made by Ingold in respect of The Harvesters, the range of affordances within 
communities full of incomers and visited by tourists, such as exists in the modern world, 
is far more complex.330  For Ingold, the footwear was unproblematic and the affordances 
defined by locality and community.  However, in the modern world, a technology such 
as walking boots has a far more complex lineage.  In contrast to reflecting a modern 
world filled with, and mediated by, complex technologies, Ingold’s analysis of an 
embodied engagement with landscape is, says Michael, virtually hermetic.331  The 
landscape, he adds, rather than being made meaningful by locality and community, as 
Ingold’s use of The Harvesters might suggest, is, in contrast, complex and mediated by 
mundane technology.332   
 
How can walking boots afford within a contemporary landscape?  Michael 
suggests that within the heterogeneous relationship between humans and their 
environment that exists within a contemporary landscape, a mundane technology, such 
as walking boots, can be a transforming element.333 Certain makes of walking boots, he 
says, can characterise different groups of people.  For instance, brands like Berghaus or 
Salomon, he says, distinguish the committed walker whilst a brand such as CAT can be 
identified with urban use.334 Accordingly, we can see that an embodied relationship with 
an environment is a complex association.  
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Michael considers other ways in which mediating technologies reveal The 
Harvesters as failing to illustrate a contemporary experience of the landscape. A 
sixteenth century landscape painting, he says, can show an exchange operating between 
environment, people and tools.  However, he adds, within a contemporary landscape the 
properties that are exchanged have usually travelled further. Examples might include, 
says Michael, rubber, tourists or imported species.335  Furthermore, he adds, an extended 
distribution within the modern world makes for a far richer heterogeneity than that 
experienced within a sixteenth century painting; diverse new spatial practices, such as 
mass travel and new communications media, are re-shaping our understanding of the 
landscape.336   
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II 
Phenomenology and technology 
 
The previous section examined some of the ways in which simple forms of technology 
might mediate an embodied relationship between a perceiver and their environment.  Of 
particular interest in this section is how an analysis based on Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology might be used to examine ways in which technology mediates 
experience.  This analysis is important because phenomenological principles, 
specifically ideas about embodied experience from Merleau-Ponty, underlie both the 
textual accounts of embodied landscape experience, and the agendas from visual art, that 
inform this thesis.337 
 
Phenomenological notions of how technology mediates a relationship between a 
perceiver and their environment inform the work of Ihde.  Writing in Technology and 
the Lifeworld, Ihde suggests that our existence is filled with, and mediated by, 
technology. 338 He argues that human subjects are unable to lead lives without 
technology because they are inherently technological organisms.339 The various ways in 
which technology is incorporated into our daily lives affects the way we act, perceive 
and understand the world.  Like Michael, Ihde uses everyday examples, such as an alarm 
clock calling us into waking consciousness, to demonstrate how familiar technology 
may be overlooked.340  However, unlike the approach taken by Michael, Ihde addresses 
ways in which technology mediates our experience of an environment in a specifically 
phenomenological way. Research suggests that Ihde’s study attunes us to what we might 
consider the ‘natural world’, a world that includes an array of human artefacts and 
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technologies, and then introduces phenomenological complexities of those things that 
seem familiar to us.341   
 
Can there be, asks Ihde, a phenomenological philosophy of technology?342  To 
answer this question he draws on the work of Merleau-Ponty. Writing in Consequences 
of Phenomenology in 1986,343 Ihde considers how Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of 
embodied experience might be applied to an enquiry into how technology mediates an 
experience.344  He suggests that Merleau-Ponty’s ideas are particularly appropriate for an 
enquiry that addresses an embodied engagement with an environment because his work 
shows us that bodily experience may be extended through artefacts, or technology. Ihde 
quotes from Merleau-Ponty: 
A wooden wheel placed on the ground is not, for sight, the same thing as a 
wheel bearing a load.  A body at rest because no force is being exerted upon it is 
again for sight not the same thing as a body in which opposing forces are in 
equilibrium…Vision is already inhabited by a significance which gives it a 
function in the spectacle of the world and in our existence…The problem is to 
understand these strange relationships which are woven between the parts of the 
landscape, or between it and me as incarnate subject…Sense experience is that 
vital communication with the world which makes it present as a familiar setting 
to our life.  It is to it that the perceived object and the perceiving subject owe 
their thickness. 345 
 
Here, says Ihde, Merleau-Ponty shows a phenomenological association between 
a lived body and the perceived world. Moreover, says Ihde, Merleau-Ponty discerns that 
a body can be extended by technology.  Ihde explains: Within a relationship between the 
body and the world, Merleau-Ponty shows us that the lived body can perceive an 
environment more fully through technologies.346  He does this by proposing that by 
extending the limitations and activities of the human body with an artefact, perception 
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may be extended too. Merleau-Ponty provides an example of technology extending the 
activities of a perceiving subject:  
A woman may, without any calculation, keep a safe distance between the feather 
in her hat and things which might break it off.  She feels where the feather is just 
as we feel where our hand is.  If I am in the habit of driving a car I enter a 
narrow opening and see that I can “get through” without comparing the width of 
the opening with that of the wings, just as I go through a doorway without 
checking the width of the doorway against that of my body.347 
 
 
Ihde also considers Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological description of a stick, 
which a visually impaired person might use as an aid.  This description is used to 
illustrate how perception may be extended and mediated by technology.  He writes: 
The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him and is no longer 
perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the 
scope and active radius of touch and providing a parallel to sight.  In the 
exploration of things, the length of the stick does not enter expressly as a middle 
term: the blind man is rather aware of it through the position of objects than of 
the position of objects through it.  The position of things is immediately given 
through the extent of the reach which carries him to it, which comprises, besides 
the arm’s reach, the stick’s range of action.348 
 
 
Writing in Bodies in technology in 2002,349 Ihde proposes that the example of 
the blind man’s stick shows that the cane/road touch is what the perceiving walker first 
experiences and this, says Ihde, leads Merleau-Ponty to suggest that technologies may 
be considered as embodied.350  Moreover, he adds, the cane extends the walker’s body 
and this leads to a changed sense of embodiment. Perceptual experience that is extended 
in this way, Ihde says, results from the materiality of the mediating technology.351  
Furthermore, he adds, the blind man’s stick provides a basis for understanding how 
perception might operate at a distance and be mediated through technology.  
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Other writers refer to Merleau-Ponty’s description of the blind man’s cane to 
discuss ways in which technology mediates our experiences of an environment.  Within 
his analysis of technology, Hood suggests that the meaning of a technic – a term he uses 
to cover all artefacts which could be said to make something possible – is in the role it 
plays in mediating an experience. 352 Hood compares the cane of the blind man with the 
stethoscope of a physician and suggests that both of these instruments are information-
gathering devices that bring about, and sustain, contexts for human experience.353 For 
example, he says, a cane used as an aid by a blind person can enable recognition, and 
therefore usage, of areas of an environment that visual impairment would otherwise 
prevent.  Likewise, a stethoscope can detect irregularities in breathing and heartbeat that 
would not be visible to the human eye or ear and which provides extended information 
for a physician. The position of the technic within an experience, Hood says, is made 
possible by the relationship between the technic, the body and some area of the 
immediate environment.354  
 
Heft, writing in Ecological Psychology in Context, also discusses the 
relationship between a perceiving human subject and a technological artefact, such as a 
tool, that mediates between an observer and their environment and extends bodily 
action.355  Of particular interest to this project is the way in which he compares the 
properties of tools with Gibson’s idea of how meaning might be perceived within an 
environment.356 Both tools and affordances, says Heft, exist in the environment as 
separate from a perceiver.357 Whilst affordance refers to a relationship between a 
perceiver and a feature of the environment, he says, a tool refers both to the engagement 
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between the perceiver and their environment and also to the association between the tool 
and the task.  He writes: ‘Tools are environmental features that can become appropriated 
into the goal-directed action of the individual; and in doing so they extend or amplify 
actions, and they alter the body’s phenomenal boundary during their use’.358  
 
There are two ways, proposes Heft, that we interact with tools.  Firstly, we 
interact with them as extensions of our own limitations.  Here, tools are environmental 
features that become appropriated into our actions and alter the body’s phenomenal 
boundaries.359  However, we also associate with them as objects that are apart from us 
within the environment.360 In this case, tools exist potentially as independent objects 
between a perceiver and their environment. Moreover, proposes Heft, our interaction 
with tools allows us to do things that would otherwise be impossible and, as such, not 
only extend our range of possibilities, but also affect our way of thinking.  Heft gives an 
example.  In multiplication, he says, it is usually simpler to perform the calculation on 
paper.  In this case, he says we are thinking with a pencil and a piece of paper.361 The 
reason why these tools are useful, he says, is because rather than trying to perform the 
task on our own, it is distributed across the person and the implements.362 
 
Ihde examines how implements that extend our perceptual boundaries can be 
considered in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in order to discover features 
about the ways in which we engage in a bodily manner with technologies.363 Our 
embodied perception, says Ihde, is transformed by a relationship with technologies.364 
He terms this type of association ‘embodiment relations’ and discusses this idea using an 
example of a perceiving subject and their experience of writing on a blackboard with a 
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piece of chalk.365 In this example Ihde suggests that the blackboard is experienced 
‘through’ the chalk and that the human subject feels the smoothness or roughness of the 
board at the end of the chalk.366 From this analysis, Ihde concludes that the chalk, rather 
than being a separate object, is absorbed into the experience as an extension of the body.  
Accordingly, Ihde terms touch that involves a technological artefact as a ‘distance 
sense’.367  
 
In a similar way, and of particular significance to this project, Ihde considers 
how optical devices bring technology into an experience.368  Central to this idea is the 
manner in which a visual artefact, such as a lens, can be situated between the seer and 
the seen in a position of mediation such as might be experienced with the use of 
spectacles or a telescope.369 Within these examples, he says, the optical technologies are 
taken into a perceptual experience by being perceived ‘through’ the technology.  
Accordingly, whilst sight is directed to the other side of the optic, he adds, one sees 
‘through’ the lens.370 Using his own spectacles as an instance where the concept of 
embodiment relations operates, he proposes: ‘My glasses become part of the way I 
ordinarily experience my surroundings; they “withdraw” and are barely noticed, if at all.  
I have then actively embodied the technics of vision’.371  
 
It is significant for this thesis that in her phenomenological analysis of film 
experience Sobchack picks up on Ihde’s idea of optical instruments and embodied 
relations.372  She considers the relevance of Ihde’s idea in connection with ways in 
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which perceptual extension might be involved within moving imagery.373 In particular, 
Sobchack suggests that Ihde’s example of writing with a piece of chalk on a blackboard, 
an instance that he uses to describe perceptual extension, can be substituted with a 
motion picture camera.374  Sobchack states that ‘For the filmmaker, the world …is 
experienced through the camera. It is seen and felt at the end of the lens.’375  Sobchack 
also asserts that Ihde’s account of instrument-mediated perception might be related to 
the projection of a film.376   
 
It is worth pausing here to consider the impact on this project of Ihde’s idea of 
embodiment relations and Sobchack’s appropriation of his concept. Ihde, by an analysis 
that links the idea of perceptual extension and optical devices, has provided this thesis 
with a connection between ways in which technology mediates a bodily experience of an 
environment and how this idea might be applied to visual art practice.  If we replace 
Ihde’s example of embodiment relations, a case in point that uses instruments such as 
spectacles and telescopes, with a new model that includes cameras and projectors, then 
we have an instance of one way in which technology mediates our environment and that 
impacts on representation within visual art practice. Specifically, we have a model that 
impacts on methods of art practice that incorporate the use of lens-based media.  This 
significant connection will be examined in detail in chapter three. 
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Summary 
 
In summary, the material presented in this chapter shows that our bodily association 
with an environment needs to take into consideration both simple and more complex 
types of technology.  We have also seen that these technologies, when looked at in terms 
of embodiment, can transform our experience of the landscape.  In addition, we have 
determined that ways in which technology mediates our experience of an environment 
may be understood within an analysis that uses phenomenological method. Specifically, 
we have observed that the phenomenological philosophy of Merleau-Ponty is an 
appropriate means of understanding the embodied relationship that exists between a 
perceiver, technological artefacts and an environment.  
 
In the first section, an analysis of Michael’s work revealed that the way in which 
technology mediates our experience of an environment is a complex association that 
needs to take into account seemingly simple technologies as well as the more obvious 
complex ones. An examination of Michael’s work revealed not only a single mode of 
mediation between a perceiver and their environment but a series, or ‘cascade’ of 
technologies that provide what we have seen Gibson describe an affordance of the 
landscape.  From Michael’s account of how an experience might be transformed by the 
seemingly simple technology of footwear, it was useful to see how Ingold’s neglect of 
such technology makes his choice of artwork inappropriate for a fluent articulation of 
embodied landscape experience. 
 
The second section revealed that technologies might be considered in an 
embodied way that accords with the phenomenological principles of Merleau-Ponty.  
Here, Ihde’s account of technological mediation showed the boundaries of a perceiver’s 
perception to be extended by technology, leading to a changed form of embodiment.  
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology was used to discover how we engage in a bodily 
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manner with technology and how our embodied perception might be transformed by 
technology being absorbed into experience as an extension of the body.  Of particular 
interest in this section is the way in which optical instruments might also be examined as 
technologies that extend the boundaries of perception.  Here, Ihde’s idea of technology 
that incorporates the use of a lens might also be applied to moving imagery that utilises a 
camera and a projector.  This connection is important because moving imagery is used 
within this enquiry as a means to articulate ideas about embodied landscape experience.   
 
The first two chapters of this thesis have established ways in which an active 
perceiver might experience their dynamic environment and this fulfils the first part of 
this enquiry.  Informed by the ideas formed in the first two chapters, the next chapter 
moves forward to consider ways in which landscape experience might be articulated 
within visual art.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Embodied experience and visual art practice 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter examines ways in which visual art practice might articulate notions of 
embodied experience.  It is significant that this issue is analysed because, as we have 
seen in chapter one, problems arise when an inappropriate form of art practice is used as 
an example to articulate notions of embodied landscape experience. Accordingly, this 
chapter considers forms of artwork that have been cited by critics as providing evidence 
of whole body movement and it examines some of the ways in which technology might 
mediate within art practice. 
 
Section one examines some of the ways in which whole body experience is 
involved in the making and viewing of visual art. In contrast to the eye/mind/image 
model of perceiving artwork, this section considers an analysis whereby an embodied 
and sensuous association between a perceiver and an artwork is examined.  Using the 
work of art theorist Joyce Brodsky, an analysis is made of how an artist and a spectator 
might engage in whole body experiences within the making and the viewing of an 
artwork.377  Central to Brodsky’s enquiry are the phenomenological principles of 
Merleau-Ponty. As we have seen, these theories have also been identified as being 
pertinent to an enquiry into landscape experience and to an analysis of how technology 
mediates our experience of an environment.  
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Section two analyses ways in which specifically moving imagery might 
articulate embodied notions of experience.  This analysis is significant because, as we 
have already established in chapter one, problems arise with the use of a painting, a 
necessarily still form of art practice, as an example with which to describe an embodied 
experience of the landscape. Writing in Address of the Eye, Sobchack examines ways in 
which a sensuous engagement with moving imagery might be explained using 
phenomenological principles.378 Specifically, she considers Merleau-Ponty’s idea of a 
fundamentally reversible relationship between a subject and an object, and Ihde’s notion 
of perceptual extension by the mediation of technology, to explain embodied ideas about 
the experience of film.  
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I 
Phenomenology and art practice 
 
In order to consider ways in which ideas of embodied experience might be articulated by 
examples of artwork, this chapter begins with an examination of phenomenological 
notions of embodiment within the context of artistic practice.  Central to this analysis of 
embodied experience within art practice is the work of Brodsky.379  Writing in ‘How to 
“see” with the whole body’, Brodsky examines notions of bodily experience and their 
relationship to art practice.380 She analyses both the making and viewing of artwork 
within a phenomenological framework and suggests that a multi-sensory, whole-body 
experience is involved in both the construction and the observing of art.381  Moreover, 
says Brodsky, a new appreciation and awareness of ordinary things is brought about by 
the making and viewing of art.  Artwork, she adds, is just another type of encounter 
between people and things in the world; it is merely a subset of encounters that occur 
through bodily experience.382 
 
Brodsky’s ideas about artwork and embodied experience are of significance to 
this thesis for several reasons.  Firstly, notions of embodied experience, as we have seen 
in the first two chapters, inform each of the key texts used within an enquiry into a 
bodily association with a landscape.383  Also, for the purpose of this study it is important 
that Brodsky’s analysis is informed by the phenomenological ideas of Merleau-Ponty. 
Brodsky proposes that Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of embodiment can be applied to both the 
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making and viewing of artworks and that his work ‘comes closest to viewing the body in 
a manner that seems to dislodge the eye/mind/image paradigm’.384 Within her enquiry, 
Brodsky considers notions of embodied experience by using examples of artwork from 
French artist Paul Cézanne and American artists, Jackson Pollock and Nancy Spero.  
Brodsky also provides this enquiry with an introduction into ways in which digital 
media might be understood in terms of embodied experience and this is relevant because 
examples of artwork provided for analysis in chapter five include a digital video. 
 
Let us first consider some of the ways in which Brodsky’s analysis is informed 
by the work of Merleau-Ponty. Within Brodsky’s enquiry, Merleau-Ponty’s breakdown 
of the subject/object dichotomy is used for the purpose of an analysis of embodied 
experience and its relationship to art practice.  Writing in ‘How to “see” with the whole 
body’, Brodsky considers Merleau-Ponty’s concept of embodied experience and his 
notions of the activity of a painter.385 Merleau-Ponty says: ‘The painter takes his body 
with him…Indeed we cannot imagine how a mind could paint.  It is by lending his body 
to the world that the artist changes the world into paintings’.386  Significantly for this 
project, Brodsky asserts that: ‘Merleau-Ponty understood what many artists know in 
their bodies, that the eye/mind/image model of perception only minimally illuminates 
the ways in which we engage with the world’.387 
 
Brodsky notes that Merleau-Ponty viewed the nineteenth century artist Paul 
Cézanne to be a paradigm of ideas about embodied experience and art practice because, 
by giving up the use of outline in his painting, and by ignoring the rules of perspective, 
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he ‘abandoned himself to the chaos of sensations’.388  Furthermore, by painting things 
many times over, Cézanne attempted to represent what happens when we move our head 
and things we can see seem to be in motion.389  Moreover, Cézanne did not attempt to 
choose between feeling and thought in his painting but instead challenged tradition by 
trying to paint perception or ‘matter as it takes on form’.390  Cézanne’s paintings, says 
Brodsky, are about being-in-the-world with others and with other things, even though he 
was reclusive and detached from society.  He conveys direct experience within the 
conventions of artistic tradition.391  Furthermore, adds Brodsky, Cézanne rejects both the 
scientific character of Renaissance perspective and the colour sensation sought by the 
early Impressionists, to convey his ideas.  Instead, he develops ideas from the ancient 
Greeks and Romans that use tonal colour to suggest solidity and spatial complexities to 
convey experience.392   
 
Experience from a phenomenological viewpoint, as we have seen, involves an 
overlap of senses, or synaesthesia.  In her analysis of visual experience, Belova remarks 
on Cézanne’s paintings as an example of Merleau-Ponty’s argument that the senses 
overlap. 393  As we also observed earlier, an overlap of senses is considered part of a 
phenomenological experience of landscape. 394  Belova says that Cézanne’s paintings 
present a mass of distorted colours and space that seem to vibrate.  The reason for this, 
she adds, is because ‘Cézanne tried to depict things as they appear to us in the world, in 
their wholeness, without being separated by our five senses’.  
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Similarly, Jay proposes that Merleau-Ponty understands Cézanne as someone 
who is devoted to painting the visible world as an exact study of appearances within the 
world, an idea he derived from earlier Impressionists.395 Jay cites Merleau-Ponty, who 
says: ‘We see the depth, the smoothness, the softness, the hardness of objects.  Cézanne 
even claimed that we see their odour.’396 Cézanne, Jay says, attempted to paint objects 
that were present to all the senses at the same time.  However, he adds, Cézanne also 
tried to rediscover the density of objects that the Impressionists had dissolved.  For 
Cézanne, he says: 
The object is no longer covered by reflections and lost in its relationships to the 
atmosphere and to other objects: it seems subtly illuminated from within, light 
emanates from it, and the result is an impression of solidity and material 
substance.397  
 
Moreover, Jay believes that Cézanne restored the effect of density to objects whilst 
retaining a sense of embodied experience.398 He achieved this, says Jay, by replacing the 
earlier Impressionists’ limited palette of primary colours with one that included earth 
tones, as well as white and black. Cézanne’s efforts to make visible how the world 
touches us led him, declares Jay, to be an influence to later painters, leading to 
movements such as Cubism, Futurism and Vorticism that made further explorations into 
his changes to the received visual order.399 
 
It is also interesting to note Cézanne’s own writing about the idea of sensation.  
In a letter to fellow artist Charles Camoin, dated the thirteenth of September 1903, he 
writes of the necessity to revitalize ‘in contact with nature, the instinct, the sensations of 
art that live within us’.400 Similarly, in another letter, this time to his former school 
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friend, Henri Gasquet, Cézanne speaks of ‘expression of the confused sensations that we 
bring with us when we are born’.401  
 
Brodsky also adopts Merleau-Ponty’s concept of a fundamental reversibility 
between the seer and the seen.   As we have seen, in this idea, the viewed, by inviting 
the look of a perceiver, has as much power over the looker as the viewer has over the 
perceived.  Writing in Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty says:   
The enigma is that my body simultaneously sees and is seen.  That which looks 
at all things can also look at itself and recognize, in what it sees, the “other side” 
of its power of looking.  It sees itself seeing…it is visible and sensitive for 
itself’.402 
 
 
Again, Brodsky uses the painting of Cézanne to illustrate her ideas.  In this instance, she 
uses Cézanne’s self-portraits to demonstrate her ideas of the artist as both the seer and 
the seen. She proposes that Cézanne’s bodily experience is evident in his self-portraits 
both through the twist of his torso and also by his eyes, which, in the painting, look in 
different directions.403  Many of Cézanne’s self-portraits, she says, show a difference in 
the direction of where the eyes are looking.  By doing this, she says, Cézanne has 
activated and complicated the movement of the body.  With one eye engaging with the 
artist’s mirror, and the other eye looking elsewhere, there is an engagement between 
viewer and artist in a manner that brings an awareness of the artist as both seer and seen; 
as subject and object.  Moreover, says Brodsky, within the self-portraits that show a 
marked turn of Cézanne’s head over his shoulder (Illus. 10) he leaves an area at the top 
and sides of the painting that, through the use of vigorous brush strokes, conveys an idea 
of energy.  Thus, she says, the activity of the head determines the painting of the 
background.404 
                                                 
401 Paul Smith, Interpreting Cezanne (London: Tate Publishing, 1996). 48. 
402 Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and  Mind." 162. 
403 Joyce Brodsky, "Cezanne Paints: 'Whole Body' Practices and the Genre of Self-Portrayal," 
Visual Studies 20, no. 1 (April, 2005). 9. 
404 Ibid. 40. 
 110 
                      
Illus. 10: Paul Cézanne, Self-portrait, 1877-80  
(25.5 x 14.5 cm), Musee d’Orsay, Paris, France. 
 
Other writers also make a connection between Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the seer and 
the seen and Cézanne’s paintings.  Of particular interest to this enquiry is Hugh 
Silverman’s phenomenological consideration of Cézanne’s landscape paintings.405  
Specifically, Silverman considers Cézanne’s representations of Mont Sainte-Victoire in 
Aix-en-Provence, an area of landscape he painted frequently. The mountain, says 
Silverman, was virtually invisible to the residents of Aix-en-Provence; it was hardly 
noticed because of its familiarity and continual presence.406  Cézanne, he says, painted 
the mountain from many different locations, each site constituting a different view of the 
mountain; he painted it at different times of the day and in all the seasons of the year 
over a period of several decades. He used oil on canvas and watercolours on white 
paper.  Moreover, says Silverman, Cézanne repeatedly ‘brought his body’ to a location 
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from which he could see the mountain and regularly ‘lent’ his body to the mountain in 
the act of painting it.407 He says: 
By lending his body to it [the mountain], standing before it with his easel and 
palette, Cézanne would lean forward toward his canvas and render visible what 
the profane eye would not see.  Through both vision and movement, Cézanne 
would transpose the visibility of his own body in its relation to the mountain into 
the secret visibility of his canvas.  The tracing of the invisible in the visible 
mountain would be inscribed onto the canvas and the new visibility would 
appear.  Painting with his eyes and his hands, he attends to the depth of being 
there in the mountain; he establishes that depth along with colour, form, line, 
movement, and contour in the painting.408 
 
 
Art historian Jane Munro also considers a painting of Mont Sainte-Victoire 
made by Cézanne at the beginning of the twentieth century.409      
                     
Illus. 11: Paul Cézanne, Mont Sainte-Victoire, 1904-1906  
Oil on canvas, 73.8 x 81.5cm, Kansas, The Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art. 
 
In this painting, says Munro, Cézanne was concerned with ‘stablilizing’ the 
sensations he experienced when positioned before the landscape.410  His paintings of 
trees, says Munro, provided him with forms that gave a strong internal structure to his 
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composition.  These forms, she says, filtered more transient elements in order to create 
patches of colour that could convey composition and modelling of form.411   
 
It is relevant at this point to mention the work of art historian John Steer who 
brings Cézanne into his analysis on painting in connection with Gibson’s theory of 
perception.412  As we have seen, Gibson’s ideas of invariants and affordance provide a 
way of understanding how an active perceiver gathers information within an 
environment.  Writing in ‘Art History and Direct Perception: a general view’, Steer 
considers the relevance to art history of invariants and affordance. 413  Steer argues that 
Gibson’s perceptual theory offers a radically different interpretation to those concepts of 
perception based on the retinal image.  They are more likely to be of use to the history of 
art, he says, than a theory based on a disembodied way of looking.414  First, he considers 
Gibson’s idea of invariants that, as we have seen, addresses persistence and change 
within an environment. It is a condition of any picture, argues Steer, that an artist utilizes 
some unchanging features of an environment rather than others. Moreover, proposes 
Steer, the concept of invariants: 
Does more than do away with the retinal image as a part of visual experience: it 
provides for picture-making an expandable set of what may…be described as 
“elements of likeness” which have little or nothing to do with absolute likeness 
but everything to do with the way in which the invariant principles governing 
different kinds of likeness are picked up and exploited.415 
 
Steer applies the idea of invariants to Cézanne’s painting.  Within modes of paintings 
that are derived from the Venetian school, he says, and which reach their most complex 
development in the work of Cézanne, different sets of invariants are brought into play 
and this is why these particular paintings, as well as paintings generally, can articulate 
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our experience of the world.416  Invariants, he says, are elements in which the artist is 
interested in and which he or she abstracts from the world.417 What this process of 
abstracting does, he states, is bring aspects of our visual experience to our awareness.  
Steer proposes: 
In this sense, and this sense only, do paintings teach us to see and this is why, 
when we emerge from an exhibition, the world can often look so strangely like 
the images at which we have been looking.  What we are for the moment 
selecting for attention in the world itself are the invariant factors abstracted from 
it by the artist.418 
 
Steer also considers Gibson’s theory of affordance, which, as we have seen, 
provides a direct and practical way for a perceiver to understand potential meaning 
within their environment.  He uses the concept of affordance in connection with 
paintings and argues that it has significant implications within art because it suggests 
ways of avoiding a separation between sensation and meaning in a picture.  If the 
affordance of something is significant within visual perception, he says, then it is also 
important in representational images.419 When we view a painting, says Steer, ‘we 
should not consider our visual experience of it as one thing and the meaning we attach to 
it as another’.420  
 
Although Steer has helpfully noted ways in which the concepts of invariants and 
affordance might be applied to painting, critically, he points out that pictures are unlike 
our experience of the visual world because they are flat and static and the world is three 
dimensional and experienced through movements over time.421  This is important and, 
significantly for this thesis, can be applied to the paintings of both Bruegel and Cézanne.   
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Brodsky considers phenomenological notions of embodied experience in 
connection with more recent artwork.  She uses the work of Abstract Expressionist 
painter Jackson Pollock to consider whole body experiences that are involved in both the 
making and the viewing of artwork.  Brodsky proposes that there are numerous practices 
using whole body experience that are involved in the process of making art but that 
these experiences usually remain outside the perceptual level of the viewer.422  
Moreover, she says, many of the practitioner’s actions are related to the complexities of 
everyday living at any given moment, and these intricacies are frequently overlooked.  
Using Pollock as an example, Brodsky suggests that an understanding of Pollock’s work 
is changed by knowing that he painted on large pieces of canvas on the floor, brought 
about by his interest in Native American Indian sand painting. (Illus.12)  
          
Illus. 12: Jackson Pollock in East Hampton Studio,  
Pollock-Krasner House and study centre, New York.423  
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Accordingly, says Brodsky, knowledge of the embodied processes that inform 
the artwork changes the viewer’s perception of the work.  This perception arises from a 
relationship between the active viewer and the work that is a result of embodied 
practice.  She says: ‘What I see hanging on the wall is now also a factor of what I know.  
As I change my perceptions so the work changes and that dialogue takes place between 
my lived body and the embodied work’.424 
 
Brodsky uses Pollock’s work to show how whole-body practice may be 
undermined by the way the artwork is exhibited.  In spite of the artist pouring and 
dripping paint onto a canvas placed on the floor, she says, the painting, with the 
collusion of both the artist and the gallery, is shown both framed and wall-mounted. 
(Illus. 13) 
 
       
Illus. 13: Jackson Pollock, Mural, 1943, Iowa, University of Iowa Art Museum. 
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As Pollock wrote himself: 
My painting does not come from the easel.  I hardly ever stretch my canvas 
before painting.  I prefer to tack the unstretched canvas to the hard wall or floor.  
I need the resistance of a hard surface. On the floor I am more at ease.  I feel 
nearer, more a part of the painting, since this way I can walk around it, work 
from the four sides and literally be in the painting.  This is akin to the method of 
the Indian sand painters of the West.425 
 
           
Other writers also question the presence of bodily action in Pollock’s work.  Art 
critic Jonathon Katz argues that bodily action is present in Pollock’s work both through 
literal marks, such as handprints, and also in the way in which the paint is applied. He 
refers to Pollock’s painting Number 1, 1948.  In this painting Pollock has dripped paint 
onto his canvas that is placed on the floor.  In contrast to conventional brush strokes, he 
uses a stream of paint to produce a continuous trajectory over the canvas.   Katz says 
that although it is only Pollock’s handprints that are evident, they are suggestive of the 
actions of his whole body.426 (Illus. 14)  Moreover, says Katz, the relationship between 
the evidence of body, such as the handprints, and the notions of bodily movement, 
through the pouring and gestural ways in which the paint is applied to the canvas, 
demonstrate a merging of body and materials.  Furthermore, he adds, evidence of the 
process suggests ways in which the artist, through bodily action, engages with his 
materials and this, he says, provides evidence of the presence of the artist.427 
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Illus. 14: Jackson Pollock, Number 1, 1948, 172.7 x 264.2 cm, (detail), New York, The 
Museum of Modern Art. 
 
What of the relationship between bodily experience and contemporary artwork?  
Brodsky claims that although we have become accustomed to contemporary artwork 
involving the viewer in multi-sensory and interactive experience, an emphasis on seeing 
still dominates discussion of modern practices.428  Moreover, she asserts, in most 
contemporary art the wish to address the whole body, through interactivity between the 
work and the viewer, is evident both in the artist’s conscious and unpremeditated 
strategies. Thus, says Brodsky, bodily experience is implicated even in art considered 
primarily visual.429  Artists, she suggests, are a leading force in understanding 
embodiment and interaction as significant factors in bringing about new social 
practices.430 
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Brodsky considers an embodied encounter with the artwork of American artist, 
Nancy Spero.  She specifically examines Spero’s scroll-type work entitled Notes in time 
on Women.431 (Illus.15)  
                       
 Illus. 15: Nancy Spero, Notes in time on women, (detail) 1979, Handprinting, gouache, collage 
on paper, 24 panels, 51 x 6398 cm overall. 
 
Brodsky describes her embodied encounter with this work which is exhibited 
 
around all four walls of a gallery space: 
 
As I began to look I was constantly aware of the imagery surrounding me, and I 
frequently turned to see what was across the room, noticing, for example, that 
the stamp of the goddess was repeated many times on the continuous scroll.  I 
finally broke the progression to move across the gallery space compelled by her 
repetitions of this, and other images of women from diverse cultures both past 
and present.  My actions in real time were engendered by the dispersal of 
repeated images in Spero’s constructed time/space framework that was anything 
but linear.  The repetition and fragmentation enabled me to intercede at any 
place, and meaning expanded as I physically related part to part at my own 
discretion.432 
 
By the use of repeated and fragmented imagery, says Brodsky, Spero’s work 
enables meaning to expand as a viewer progresses around the gallery.  Moreover, she 
adds, the movements that a perceiver needs to make to view the work were intended 
within the making of the work and entail a relationship between the whole body of the 
viewer and the artwork, in this case the scroll.  Furthermore, adds Brodsky, a clearer 
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understanding of the process of constructing the artwork is brought about by the 
interaction between the work and the viewer and this, she says, heightens the meaning of 
the work.  It also, she asserts, provides a better understanding of the relations between 
real-life experience and what happens in the more rarefied atmosphere of an art gallery.   
 
Brodsky compares the experience of viewing artwork with other sorts of 
experiences.  She believes that, unlike the still popular notion that art asks for a different 
reaction to that required in other situations, the experience of viewing artwork is a form 
of the way we interact with the world.433 To articulate her idea, Brodsky refers to the 
work of John Dewey who, in 1934, wrote: 
When artistic objects are separated from both conditions of origin and operation 
in experience, a wall is built around them that renders almost opaque their 
general significance, with which esthetic theory deals.  Art is remitted to a 
separate realm, where it is cut off from that association with the materials and 
aims of every other form of human effort, undergoing and achievement.434 
 
Both making and perceiving art, says Brodsky, are lived experiences that bring 
about an awareness that is often lacking in day-to-day activity.  Moreover, she says, 
these lived experiences can bring about appreciation and critique that may reflect on 
what is usually considered to be ordinary practices, by raising awareness of ‘what is 
actually happening in them’.435 
 
How can notions of embodied interaction with artwork be applied to works of 
art that comprise digital information?  Brodsky proposes that, as with other forms of art, 
sensitivity to viewing practices helps in understanding the artwork.  Manipulating 
imagery on a computer screen is, she says, a very different activity to participation in 
multi-media events that involve digital technology.  In the case of the computer screen, a 
viewer frequently interacts with the hands and the eyes, following pre-designed choices.  
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This activity, says Brodsky, ‘is closer to writing and reading text than to most ways of 
making and responding to material artworks’.436  Digital artworks that involve the use of 
a computer screen and a keyboard, says Brodsky, curtail the movement of the artist and 
the viewer and in this situation the eye dominates. The computer, she says, is positioned 
to enhance all kinds of disembodied activity.  On the other hand, virtual reality 
technology now exists where emphasis is on the user’s body, in conjunction with 
technology, to produce a new reality.  
 
Brodsky’s views are helpful in establishing connections between digital forms 
of practice and whole body experience.  However, we have already established that 
experiences where seemingly the eye dominates actually include the whole body.  Thus 
Brodsky’s comments about which organ or limb might dominate the experience are 
unhelpful.   
 
Other writers comment on the connection between embodied activity and 
electronic forms of artwork.  Writing in Touch: Sensuous theory and multisensory media 
Laura Marks proposes that digital imagery involves processes that are no less material 
than the medium of film.  The medium, she says, is the physical trace of the object 
whose image it transmits.437  Moreover, adds Marks, although digital video by 
‘knowing’ everything that it holds in memory can be seen to offer a weaker link to the 
phenomenal world it records, digital video’s virtual body becomes physical as soon as 
attention is given to the software and hardware platform from which it originates.438 
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Similarly, Haworth comments on digital art practice and embodied experience.  
Writing in ‘Embodied mind and creativity in digital fine art’,439 Haworth asserts that a 
recurring topic in the practice of digital art is whether it makes the human body and 
material objects redundant.  Significantly, he uses the work of Merleau-Ponty to suggest 
that redundancy of the body and material objects need not be the case when digital 
imagery is employed. Specifically, he says that Merleau-Ponty indicates that we do not 
see the world, but see with the world,440 which, says Haworth, in artistic terms, suggests 
that ‘different media with which we interact have different voices which play a part in 
the creation of enriched being, perception and consciousness’.441 The making of digital 
imagery, he says ‘can be seen to involve an interaction between consciousness, the body, 
technique and materials, in which the print emerges’.442 Although making digital art 
involves machines, Haworth believes it is not ‘machine-driven’, rather, it is ‘machine-
facilitated’.  ‘The ultimate product’, he says, ‘depends on living in the world’.443 
 
Haworth uses his own artwork, which combines research and practice, to 
explore interplay between mind, body and technology in art. Merleau-Ponty, says 
Haworth, stresses that pre-reflective experience is understood by reflection. What is 
given by pre-reflective experience, according to Merleau-Ponty ‘is a route, an 
experience, which gradually clarifies itself… and proceeds by dialogue with itself and 
with others’.444  
 
Haworth considers artistic process to include an interaction between 
consciousness, the body, technique and materials from which the artwork emerges.  Any 
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artwork, he says, is situated within a tradition of art and this influences perception.  The 
artwork can also be influenced, he says, by the body’s situation in geographical place 
and, he adds, ‘this process of interaction and exploration generates and reveals 
possibilities and visual experiences’.445  Furthermore, suggests Haworth, the process of 
exploration becomes a vehicle for seeing which is influenced by the technology.  This 
interaction, he says, extends into the world.  Visual explorations undertaken with the 
computer can influence what one ‘sees’ in the world, and this, in turn, influences what is 
recorded experientially, mentally and digitally.446 
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II 
Phenomenology and moving imagery 
 
The previous section examined notions of embodiment associated with static types of 
media, such as paint and printmaking. An analysis of this media was useful in terms of 
ideas of embodiment in making and viewing art and it was also noteworthy for 
observing historical precedents of phenomenological experience in art practice.  
However, the analysis failed to consider notions of bodily engagement in respect of 
artwork that employs moving imagery. We have seen in chapter one that movement is 
an inherent part of a dynamic relationship that exists between an active perceiver and 
their environment.  Thus, in this section, a phenomenological approach to moving 
imagery will be examined. 
 
A phenomenological approach to moving imagery is central to the work of film 
theorist Vivian Sobchack.447  Writing in The address of the eye: a phenomenology of 
film experience and Carnal Thoughts, embodiment and moving image culture, Sobchack 
addresses a relationship between moving image culture and sensuous bodily experience. 
Significantly for this enquiry, her work is based on a bodily relationship between the 
viewer and the viewed, with an emphasis on corporeal activity, rather than a 
disembodied, or ocularcentric approach.  Also of importance to this enquiry is 
Sobchack’s examination of the role played by technology within an embodied approach 
to moving imagery.  
 
Sobchack’s work is informed by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology448 and Ihde’s 
ideas about technology.449 Firstly, Sobchack’s analysis considers film experience as a 
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system of communication based on bodily perception, an idea that accords with 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.  Within her analysis of film, she considers the 
relationship between the viewer and the viewed and examines viewing as an embodied 
activity.450 A key feature of Sobchack’s enquiry is an analysis of some of the ways in 
which technology mediates an experience of film.  Accordingly, Sobchack applies 
Ihde’s analysis to her enquiry in order to examine phenomenological notions of 
technological intervention within the medium of film.451 
 
The topic of still forms of photography is a subject addressed by Sobchack as 
one that captures traces of ‘real’ existence; the photograph, she says, freezes and 
preserves a moment in time.452  However, the still photograph, she says, fails to 
communicate the power of movement that is a fundamental part of a living body.453  
Furthermore, she adds, the photograph is different to our lived experience by never 
engaging in the activity of ‘becoming’.454  She notes: 
The photograph freezes and preserves the homogeneous and irreversible 
momentum of this temporal stream into the abstracted, atomized, and 
essentialized time of a moment.  But at a cost.  A moment cannot be inhabited.  
It cannot entertain in the abstraction of its visible space, its single and static 
point of view, the presence of a lived and living body.455 
 
In contrast, claims Sobchack, the images within a motion picture exist in the 
world as a temporal flow.456 Unlike the still photograph, she says, film exists for us ‘as 
always in the act of becoming’.457  Moving imagery, which exists as a flow over time, 
does not transcend our lived experience of time but instead seems to share in it.  Thus a 
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film, proposes Sobchack, exists for us as a visible representation of the coming-into-
being of activity. Writing in Address of the Eye, she proposes: 
…film is always presenting as well as representing the coming into being and 
representation.  It is a presence inserted in the world and our experience not as a 
series of discrete, transcendental, and atemporal moments, but as a temporal 
movement – as a presenting felt as presence and its passing, as a presence that 
can then be said to have a past, a present, and a future.458  
  
Furthermore, she says, by transforming frozen points of view into objects 
moving in time and space, the film reconstitutes the photographic in a radical way.459 
Although moving imagery relies on photographic technology, Sobchack suggests that 
film is more connected to life and to the accumulation of experience, rather than its loss, 
than still photography. She writes: 
Although dependent on the photographic, the cinematic has something more to 
do with life and with the accumulation of experience – not its loss.  Cinematic 
technology animates the photographic and reconstitutes its materiality, visibility, 
and perceptual verisimilitude in a difference not of degree but of kind.  The 
moving picture is a visible representation not of activity finished or past but of 
activity coming into being and being.460 
 
She says that film represents not only moving objects but also the movement of the 
human perceiver.461 Thus for Sobchack, the significance of film lies in its emergence 
and existence that is encountered through an active and embodied viewer. 
 
Sobchack considers the writing of philosopher Arthur Danto who comments on 
differences in perceiving moving and still imagery that are related to time.462  Danto 
explains:  With moving imagery, ‘we do not just see that they move, we see them 
moving: and this is because the pictures themselves move.’463 Danto ascribes this idea of 
movement to notions of time and describes an experiment to reveal how motion shows 
that still photography is not temporal in the way film is.  In this experiment he suggests 
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that if one were to run a slide of the title page for eight hours, and compare this with 
running a film of the title page for eight hours, the difference would be apparent.464  
Firstly, says Danto, although one could not necessarily tell just by looking if it is a slide 
or if it is a film - as what is experienced will be the same in both cases – knowledge, 
however arrived at, should, he says, make a difference.  Danto attributes this knowledge 
to the circumstances of showing the film or the slide:  because of the type of projection, 
he says, at the end of eight hours the film will be over but not the slide.  This is 
interesting and reinforces the idea, made in the previous chapter, of the significance of 
mediating technology.  Danto relates his experiment to painting.  Paintings, he says, like 
slides, lack beginnings and endings. ‘Our viewing of a painting’, he says, ‘may indeed 
have a beginning and an end, but we don’t view the beginnings and endings of 
paintings’.465  
 
Sobchack suggests that the most significant feature of Danto’s idea is film’s 
dependence upon movement.  Neither a lived body nor the body of film are, she says, 
static.  Even seemingly static films, such as images of the Himalayas are, she adds, not 
still at all.  Moving pictures, she says, are just that – pictures which move, not just 
pictures of things in motion.466  
 
It is worth briefly turning to Gibson again at this point.  Writing in The 
ecological approach to visual perception, Gibson explores the idea of a still picture 
taking shape ‘in a frozen world by an observer who holds still and uses one eye’.467 ‘The 
arrested optic array’, as he refers to a still image, is, he says, ‘an unusual case of the 
changing array’. This mode of looking, he says, is not what the eye evolved for; ocular 
rest is a special case of optical motion, not the other way around.  Rather, says Gibson, 
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the eye developed to register changes and transformations. He discusses the ‘motion’ of 
a film: 
The progressive picture displays transformations and magnifications and 
nullifications and substitutions of structure along with deletions and accretions 
and slippage of texture.  These are the ‘motions’ of the motion picture…The 
progressive picture can also of course depict the movement of the observer 
himself in the environment as well as the motions of objects.468 
  
Furthermore, he adds, because of this development, moving imagery, such as 
film, should be the basic form of depiction and the still image, such as a painting or a 
photograph, should be a special form of it.  Gibson elaborates.  Moviemakers, he asserts, 
‘are closer to life than picture makers’.469 This proximity, he adds, is because moving 
imagery can depict the movement of a perceiver in the environment in a way that 
paintings cannot. Moreover, says Gibson, what gets depicted in a film is movement 
within an environment, a flow of events that is picked up by the visual system.470  Thus, 
adds Gibson, to watch a film is similar in some ways to observing everyday life.   
 
Gibson also discusses ways in which moving imagery is different to everyday 
life.  He explains: The viewer is at the mercy of the filmmaker when it comes to 
selecting which aspects of the film to scrutinise, or to the composition of edited film.  
The information within the image, says Gibson, provides ‘a sort of partial, second-hand 
perception for stay-at-home observers’. 471 This is a critical point for this thesis.  
Although an analysis of my own moving imagery will not be made until the final 
chapter, it is worth noting at this point that it is by not editing and by actively restricting 
selection of imagery that my own art practice reduces the ‘partial, second-hand’ 
characteristic of film which Gibson refers to.   
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The illusion of reality, says Gibson, that is present in moving imagery, shows 
that some of the same kind of information is present in films as occurs in the perceptual 
experience of a moving perceiver.472  Significantly, he says that film, by being 
something other than a simple surface, provides the human observer with a variety of 
new experiences that come closer to perception than the still picture.  However, he 
warns, films do not become perception. Rather, he says, the information for the surface 
of the image is contained within the light.473  As we saw in chapter one, within his 
theory of perception Gibson proposes that information about an environment is gathered 
by a perceiver from the light reflected from surfaces – what he terms the ‘optic array’.  
In the case of moving imagery, claims Gibson, the structure of the array undergoes 
transformations.  Unlike still imagery, he says, the array in film is not frozen in time.474 
 
How does Sobchack draw upon Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theory to 
explain embodied experience in relation to moving imagery?475  First, let us take an 
overview of how Sobchack views Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ideas in relation 
to cinematic experience.  For Merleau-Ponty, she suggests, the lived body is a system 
that enables access to, and engagement with, the world.  Significantly, adds Sobchack, 
he sees the cinema as a visible paradigm of being in the world.476 According to Merleau-
Ponty, cinema is able to visibly demonstrate the complexities of perception.477 
Furthermore, and of particular interest for this thesis, the technology associated with 
cinema becomes a way of being in the world that rests on a consideration of technology 
as an extension of human perception.478  For this reason, Sobchack suggests that 
Merleau-Ponty, writing in Sense and Nonsense, considers the cinema as a philosophical 
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model of phenomenological description.479 He writes: ‘The movies are peculiarly suited 
to make manifest the union of mind and body, mind and world, and the expression of 
one in the other’.480 
 
How does Sobchack apply Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to the relationship 
between a filmmaker and a viewer?  First, let us consider how Sobchack draws upon his 
notions of embodied experience to explain film experience. 481 Using Merleau-Ponty’s 
ideas about the viewer and the viewed she considers film experience as an embodied 
activity. She considers how films describe experience and how viewers experience film.  
Moreover, Sobchack, by considering both the filmmaker and the viewer as viewing 
subjects, suggests that film experience is the relationship between the expression of 
perception and the perception of expression.482 Writing in Address of the Eye, she states: 
…the film experience is a system of communication based on bodily perception 
as a vehicle of conscious expression.  It entails the visible, audible, kinetic 
aspects of sensible experience to make sense visibly, audibly, and haptically.  
The film experience not only represents and reflects upon the prior direct 
perceptual experience of the filmmaker by means of the modes and structures of 
direct and reflective perceptual experience, but also presents the direct and 
reflective experience of a perceptual and expressive existence as the film.  In its 
presence and activity of perception and expression, the film transcends the 
filmmaker to constitute and locate its own address, its own perceptual and 
expressive experience of being and becoming. 
 
Thus Sobchack understands film as being an embodiment of the filmmaker’s perception 
of the world and the expression of that perception. Sobchack explains the experience of 
film by the activities of two bodies: the filmgoer’s body and the body of the film, which 
has its own perception of a world.483 For Sobchack, the filmgoer perceives the film 
within their lived body. The film’s existence is lived as the filmgoer’s body.484 Sobchack 
claims her idea of film body fits with Merleau-Ponty’s idea that other bodies become 
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‘the theatre of a certain process of elaboration and as it were, a certain view of the 
world’.485  This being the case, Sobchack asserts that with the camera considered as a 
perceptive organ, the projector could be understood as its expressive organ and the 
screen as the centre of meaningful experience. In this way, Sobchack takes a view of 
cinematic imagery as existing as a visible performance of embodied experience and 
suggests that the film is to cinematic technology as human perception and its expression 
is to human physiology.486 Writing in Filmosophy, Frampton identifies a problem with 
Sobchack’s idea.487 He says that in seeing film as a body, Sobchack, rather than 
emphasising its physical, mechanical qualities, conceptualises film as a lived-body so as 
to reveal its animated and intentional character.  By claiming that film has a body, says 
Frampton, Sobchack is anthropomorphising film in a way that is ‘forced and limiting’.488 
Phenomenology, suggests Frampton, concerns human engagement and reality.  Film-
being, he adds, is not human and the film-world not real.489 By conceptualising film as a 
body, Sobchack separates it from the film-world and this, says Frampton, is a problem 
when phenomenology is translated to film.  A human perceiver, he says, is ‘separate yet 
mingled with our world’.  However, film ‘is’ its world.  ‘…we need to give film its own 
terms’, he says, ‘not second-hand phenomenological ones’.490 
 
For media theorist Jane Stadler, Sobchack’s notion of the film’s body can be 
seen in a broader light.  Stadler proposes that Sobchack uses ‘film’s body’ as a 
descriptive term that includes both the technological instruments that facilitate the 
production and reception of the film, as well as the perception and expression of the 
human beings involved in forming meaning within the film.491 She says: 
                                                 
485 Sobchack, The Address of the Eye. 140. 
486 Ibid. 166. 
487 Frampton, Filmosophy. 42. 
488 Ibid. 46. 
489 Ibid. 
490 Ibid. 43. 
491 Stadler, Intersubjective, Embodied, Evaluative Perception: A Phenomenological Approach to 
the Ethics of Film. 240. 
 131 
…awareness of the movement of the camera and variations in sound in the film 
are evidence of the presence and movement of an intentionally directed 
attention, and it is here that the film’s body reveals itself and the accuracy and 
applicability of Sobchack’s terminology become evident.492 
 
Central to Sobchack’s ideas about film experience is her idea of a ‘viewing 
view’.  The viewing view draws on Merleau-Ponty’s idea of a fundamental reversibility 
between a subject and an object. For Sobchack, it is the fundamental reversibility of 
perception within Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology that makes it relevant for an enquiry 
into moving imagery.493  The idea of reversibility, as we have seen, describes a 
breakdown between a subject and an object, whereby the viewed has as much power 
over the viewer as the viewing subject has over the viewed object.494 Significantly for 
this thesis, a fundamental reversibility between a perceiver and their environment 
underpins both Tilley and Ingold’s descriptions of landscape experience and, earlier in 
this chapter, has also been cited in various forms of art practice.  In a similar way, 
Sobchack uses Merleau-Ponty’s notion of reversibility between subject and object to 
describe the complex series of relationships that operate within film experience.495  
Sobchack understands film itself as an ‘object-subject’ that sees and is seen.  For her, 
film is both a viewing subject and a visible object for the filmgoer.496 She states that film 
is a direct means of having and expressing a world.  It is not just a view, but rather, by 
seeing and expressing what it sees, is a viewing view.497 Critically, Sobchack declares 
that in its visual address and movement, moving imagery allows us to see objectively for 
the first time what was once a visible impossibility: that we are at the same time both 
subject and object in the world, both the seer and the seen.  
 
                                                 
492 Ibid. 242. 
493 Sobchack, The Address of the Eye. 3. 
494 Belova, "Feeling the Image: A Phenomenological Account of a Visual Experience.". No page 
nos. 
495 Sobchack, The Address of the Eye. 128. 
496 Frampton, Filmosophy. 41. 
497 Ibid. 
 132 
Other writers comment on a relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s theory of 
reversibility and the experience of film.  One example is film theorist Laura Marks who, 
writing in The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses says 
that Merleau-Ponty’s model offers a position of mutuality between self and other that 
enables meaning from a film to be experienced in the body.498 Furthermore, adds Marks, 
the experience of film is a special and intensified example of the mutual relationship 
between bodily experience and the world because there is an exchange between two 
bodies – that of the viewer and that of the film.499 Moreover, she adds, if film viewing is 
comprehended as an exchange between the viewer and the film, then the viewer, rather 
than being seen as passive, must be understood as participating in the cinematic 
experience.500  
 
As we have already seen, an inherent part of Merleau-Ponty’s idea of 
reversibility is the notion of flesh.  In this novel idea, Merleau-Ponty describes what 
happens in the interaction between body and environment.  Flesh, he says, describes a 
bodily engagement with an environment and occurs on the border between the body and 
its surroundings.501 For Sobchack’s analysis into film experience, flesh is an appropriate 
way of describing an experience that collapses the distinction between the viewer and 
the viewed.  The notion of flesh, she says, brings about an intertwining of the body and 
the world.502 Moreover, notions of flesh enable an examination of the ways in which 
experience emerges through our bodily senses and how we inhabit cinematic space.503  
Significantly for this thesis, Sobchack suggests that the notion of flesh has an impact on 
ways in which technology mediates the experience of film.504 She cites the example of 
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the film American Beauty, as one in which the ‘camera’s eye’, by making little 
distinction between human subjects and inanimate objects creates a correspondence 
between human flesh and the ‘flesh’ of things.505   
 
It is useful at this point to discover ways in which Sobchack’s enquiry is 
informed by Ihde’s ideas of how technology mediates an experience. Ihde’s work is of 
particular interest to Sobchack because his analysis is informed by Merleau-Ponty’s idea 
of human experience emerging through the relationship of the lived body and the 
world.506 Moreover, Ihde uses Merleau-Ponty’s idea of lived experience to draw 
attention to ways in which technology impacts on the relationship between an embodied 
perceiver and the environment.  Central to the work of Ihde, as we saw in chapter two, is 
a phenomenological interpretation of how our perception might be extended by 
technology. Ihde says that this type of association must be attentive to both the 
technology involved and to the lived experience itself.507 Significantly, a key issue in 
Sobchack’s analysis is the relationship between human subjects and technologies of 
perception.  
 
Sobchack considers Ihde’s analysis.508  In chapter two it was noted that she uses 
Ihde’s idea of the experience of writing on a blackboard with a piece of chalk.  In this 
example, Ihde proposes that, rather than being a separate object, the chalk is absorbed 
into the experience as an extension of the body.509  For Sobchack, Ihde’s example of 
extending the senses with technology is transferable to moving image culture in order to 
gain insight into the complex series of relationships between artist, viewer and 
technology that are involved in film experience.  She says: 
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If we substitute the motion picture camera for the chalk, Ihde’s initial 
description will seem familiar to anyone who has ever confidently engaged the 
world with that mechanism (confidence here invoked because it implies an 
already appropriated knowledge of, and experience with a machine more 
complex in its operations than a piece of chalk).  For the filmmaker, the world 
(whether “real”, drawn, or constructed in any other fashion) is experienced 
through the camera.  It is seen and felt at the lens-world “junction”, the 
“terminus” of the filmmaker’s intentional extension into the world…In a more 
ambiguous manner, Ihde’s description of this first modality of instrument-
mediated perception is descriptive also of the spectator’s relation to the world as 
it is engaged and made visible by means of an instrument, the projector.510 
 
However, whilst Sobchack acknowledges that Ihde’s interpretation of 
instrument-mediated perception is pertinent to moving imagery, it lacks, she says, the 
full description needed to account for the instrument-mediated nature of film 
experience.511  The reason for this failure, says Sobchack, is because Ihde’s analysis 
relates to the single act of instrument-mediated perception, such as a scientist looking 
through a microscope.  This single act of instrument-mediated perception is different, 
she argues, from the more complex acts of instrument-mediated perception and 
expression that occurs in film experience.512 Sobchack explains this more complex form 
of perception.  Within film experience, she claims, there are two instruments within the 
act of mediation - the camera and the projector.  Thus, film, says Sobchack, includes two 
acts that engage and address each other; the camera and the projector bring about two 
embodied acts of perception and expression.  And this, she says, is different to Ihde’s 
single act of mediated perception that he illustrated through the chalk and blackboard 
example.513 Furthermore, adds Sobchack, a double act of instrument-mediated 
perception involves the filmmaker perceiving the world through the camera and the 
spectator perceiving, through the instrumentality of the projector, a perception of the 
filmmaker’s relationship to the world.514  Accordingly, says Sobchack, although this is a 
more complex relationship regarding mediation of technology, it does still give priority 
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to the lived body as a way of explaining how film experience may be mediated by 
technology.515 
 
Other writers comment on Sobchack’s appropriation of Ihde’s idea of 
technologically mediated perception.  Communication theorists, Tammy Bennington and 
Geri Gay, suggest that Sobchack uses Ihde’s ideas to show that the mediated perceptions 
of the filmmaker and the spectator converge at the limits of the camera’s/filmmaker’s 
perception; a limit, they say, that is in and of the world.516  They provide a useful 
‘diagram’ of this series of relationships: 
 
(Filmmaker - camera) > World < (Spectator – projector)517 
 
Thus, they say, the perception of the filmmaker is mediated by the camera, the body of 
the film itself, and by the projector.518 
 
What happens when Sobchack’s views are applied to digital forms of moving 
imagery, rather than film? In contrast to her view of cinema, Sobchack considers 
electronic imagery as being less related than film to embodied experience.519  The 
structure of electronic representation leads her to suggest that it ‘phenomenologically 
diffuses the fleshly presence of the human body and the dimensions of the body’s 
material world’.  By technologically transforming imagery into pixels, Sobchack feels 
that electronic imagery, in comparison to cinema, belongs to no-body.520 The electronic, 
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adds Sobchack, has a tendency to trivialize and devalue the human body.521 Writing in 
Carnal thoughts: Embodiment and moving image culture, she writes: 
Television, videocassettes and digital discs, VCR and DVD recorder/players, 
electronic games, personal computers with Internet access, and pocket 
electronics of all kinds form an encompassing perceptual and representational 
system whose various forms ‘interface’ to constitute an alternative and absolute 
electronic world of immaterialized – if materially consequential – experience.  
And this electronic world incorporates the spectator/user uniquely in a spatially 
decentered, weakly temporalized and quasi-disembodied (or diffusely 
embodied) state.522 
 
The electronic, says Sobchack:  
 
…can ignore AIDS, homelessness, hunger, torture, the bloody consequences of 
war and all the other ills the flesh is heir to outside the image and the datascape.  
It can ignore the lived body that not only once imagined its techno-logic but 
gave it substantial grounding, gravity, and value…if we do not take great care – 
we are all in danger of soon becoming merely ghosts in the machine.523 
 
Writing in Touch: Sensuous theory and multisensory media Marks takes a 
different view of embodiment and electronic imagery. 524 Of particular interest to this 
project is Mark’s work concerning phenomenology and digital video, as this medium, as 
well as film, is employed within this project.  Marks disagrees with the dominant view 
that presents digital media as immaterial, disconnected and discreet – consisting of pure 
data.525 Instead, Marks suggests that digital media offers evidence of materiality.  This 
materiality can be seen, she says, in the way in which the data are stored – in the form of 
code – within digital video and other forms of new media.  Digital media also embodies 
materiality, says Marks, on social and global levels both within social exchange and 
within material enterprises such as e-business and web art.526 In a review of Marks’ 
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book, critic Ted Kafala comments that Marks has drawn to attention the materiality of 
digital media and the relationship between the embodiment of art and new media.527  
 
Marks considers electronic imagery in a way that relies on Merleau-Ponty’s 
embodiment theory for a ‘haptic’ examination that focuses on a bodily relationship 
between the viewer and the image.528 (Mark’s use of the term ‘haptic’ originates from its 
use by art historian Aloïs Riegel at the turn of the twentieth century and is based on a 
phenomenological understanding that involves a sensuous understanding using the 
whole body.)529 In her essay How electrons remember, Marks addresses the question of 
what happens to materiality in digital media.530 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go 
into detail on Marks discourse on quantum physics, solid-state engineering and quantum 
computing, but it is worth noting that her argument points out that ‘the electron, as 
physical entity, thickens and interconnects the physical world’.531 Similarly, in her essay 
Immanence Online, Marks notes that work on the Internet, ‘far from being virtual, 
indexes several layers of material, interconnected life’.532  Writing in Film-Philosophy, 
Melanie Swalwell proposes that although Marks’ enquiry focuses on film and video, 
many of her arguments indicate a point of contact with artists working in new media and 
with those who experiment with film and video.533  
 
Of particular significance to this thesis is the way in which Bennington and Gay 
comment on Sobchack’s notions of instrument-mediated perception and digital forms of 
moving imagery.534  They question what might happen if digital forms of imagery and a 
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computer replaces Sobchack’s model of a camera and a projector.535 ‘The digital body of 
the video’, they propose, ‘does not express the filmmaker’s perception through an 
unfolding in time but rather through a multi-dimensional unfolding in space and through 
time’.536 Bennington and Gay elaborate.  There are multiple frames and juxtapositioning 
of frames, rather than a single frame, they say, which provides the screen onto which the 
video is projected (the expression of the filmmaker’s perception). Moreover, they add, 
there is no isomorphism between the temporal sequence of the viewing of the video and 
the sequencing within the video’s body.537  
 
Bennington and Gay look at digital media in the light of Sobchack’s model of 
phenomenological film experience.  They suggest that a multi-dimensional 
understanding is reached that acknowledges a diversity of experiences involved in the 
creation, perception and interpretation of digital media.538 Furthermore, say Bennington 
and Gay, digital imagery can be seen as a form of mediated engagement with the world. 
Phenomenologically-inspired film theory contributes, say Bennington and Gay, to a 
more complex understanding of digital media and can provide insights into visual 
perception not available from literary approaches that dominate discussion around 
digital media.539 Phenomenology, they say, can explore the acts of perceiving and 
expressing and the commutation between them as they are mediated by the various 
technologies.540  
 
Haworth also explores theories of embodiment and digital practice.541 Although 
Haworth writes specifically of digital prints, his ideas of Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment 
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and digital practice might similarly be applied to digital forms of moving imagery. The 
ideas of Merleau-Ponty, suggests Haworth, allow critical insights within fine art practice 
that can enhance understanding and appreciation.  Specifically, he adds, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests that we do not see the world, but see with the world.542  In artistic terms, says 
Haworth, this means that ‘different media with which we interact have different voices 
which play a part in the creation of enriched being, perception and consciousness’.543  
Significantly for this thesis, Haworth considers the use of computer generated artwork 
and embodied practice and says that ‘the process of exploration becomes a vehicle for 
seeing which is influenced by the technology’.544 Artistic vision, says Haworth, is 
continually reshaping itself in association with the world and this includes, he adds, 
technology, geographical place, culture and events.  However, he says, the final artefact 
is dependent upon living in the world.545 
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Summary 
 
This chapter has examined some of the ways in which still and moving imagery might 
articulate notions of embodied experience predicated on a range of writing from 
phenomenology and parallel sources.  Moreover, it has analysed some of the ways in 
which still and moving imagery might provide evidence of phenomenological notions 
that, in the previous chapters of this thesis, have been attributed to ways in which an 
active human perceiver engages with a dynamic environment. 
 
In the first section, Brodsky’s account of whole body practices that are involved 
in the making and viewing of art have shown some of the ways in which Merleau-
Ponty’s ideas about embodied experience might be applied to art practice.  Specifically, 
we have seen that although paintings by Cézanne might articulate his sensuous 
engagement with his surroundings, they fail to reveal evidence of his movement within a 
dynamic environment unfolding over time.  Likewise, from the example of Spero’s 
work, although we were able to determine that by strategic placement of the artwork an 
artist can manipulate the bodily movements of the viewer, we were unable to see 
evidence of the dynamic relationship that exists between the artist and her environment.  
Usefully, from the example of Pollock’s painting we were able to determine that the way 
in which artwork is shown has an impact on a viewer’s understanding of the bodily 
actions of the artist in the making of the work.   
 
We also saw in section one how Gibson’s ecological theory of perception might 
be applied to static media such as painting.  However, as we have seen, Gibson’s 
perceptual theory that relies on perception from the light reflected from surfaces in an 
environment requires both the movement of a perceiver and a changing environment.  
The static nature of painting is unable to articulate an environment experienced by such 
movement that occurs over time.  Finally, this section showed how obviously material 
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forms of artwork, such as painting and printmaking, and less obvious types, such as 
digital media, can both be explained in terms of bodily activity within their construction 
and viewing processes. 
 
The second section of this chapter used Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of a fundamental 
reversibility between a subject and an object to show how film experience might be 
explained in terms of reversibility between the viewer and the viewed.  From the 
phenomenological ideas of Sobchack we have seen film experience as a reversible 
relationship between the viewer and the viewed that is mediated by the camera and the 
projector.  Moreover, we have seen ways in which moving imagery is more suited to an 
articulation of embodied experience because a film unfolds through movement over 
time.  Significantly, a medium that unfolds over time has some similarities to the 
experience of a human perceiver.  We have also seen that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
flesh, that describes an overlap between subject and object, can be explained within the 
context of film by the distinction the moving imagery gives to human subjects and 
inanimate objects. 
 
In addition, we have seen in this section that moving imagery accords more 
closely than still imagery to Gibson’s ideas of a moving observer perceiving their 
environment through the light reflected from surfaces within their surroundings.  Whilst 
still imagery has little in common with such a perceptual theory, moving imagery 
provides a similar sort of experience. 
 
Of particular significance in this section is Sobchack’s application to film 
experience of the idea of perception being extended by technology.  Here, we have seen 
that Ihde’s idea, based on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, can be used to understand 
embodiment relations within moving imagery.  However, we have seen that whilst 
 142 
Ihde’s example uses just one instrument of mediation, film experience relies on a more 
complex association that includes two instruments – the camera and the projector. 
 
An examination into phenomenological principles surrounding film is of 
assistance in establishing ways in which moving imagery might fulfil the requirements 
of an artistic depiction of the dynamic nature of the relationship between a perceiver and 
their environment.  However, for the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to consider 
examples of film used within visual art in particular, rather than in the context of 
cinema. Consequently, chapter four will examine a case study where a contemporary 
visual artist has used film within an art gallery context rather than for projection within a 
cinema. 
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CHAPTER 4   
 
Art practice and moving imagery 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines ideas of embodied experience in connection with Disappearance 
at Sea by Tacita Dean546 that, significantly, major critics have cited in a 
phenomenological way.547 It is important to examine a phenomenological analysis of a 
film made for exhibition within a gallery rather than a cinema because the prime aim of 
this thesis is to analyse ways in which contemporary art practice might fluently 
articulate notions of embodied landscape experience. This chapter will thus analyse 
Dean’s film to establish ways in which notions of embodied landscape experience might 
be understood within moving imagery used within visual art. 
 
 The chapter begins with an examination of ways in which a film shown in an art 
gallery provides a different bodily experience from one shown in a cinema.  Then, 
following a formal analysis of Disappearance at Sea ideas of embodied experience are 
discussed in relation to the film. Next, Dean’s method of using embodied experience in 
conjunction with textual information is considered.  This is significant because, as we 
have seen, a method of enquiry that brings together embodied experience with 
information from other sources has been identified as being used to analyse a sensuous 
engagement with a landscape.  Ideas about movement are also examined in connection 
with Disappearance at Sea and an analysis is made about the role of time within the 
film.  Technology plays an important part in Dean’s film and this is investigated in terms 
of how it might mediate experience both for Dean and for the viewer. 
                                                 
546 Tacita Dean, Disappearance at Sea, 1996, 16mm colour anamorphic, optical sound, 14 
minutes. 
547 Maria Walsh, ‘Narrative Duration: Tacita Dean’s Disappearance at Sea’, Silvester, ed., 
Reading Images and Seeing Words. 57. 
Daniel Birnbaum, Chronology (New York: Lucas Sternberg, 2005). 68. 
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I 
Case study: Tacita Dean, Disappearance at Sea 
 
There are several ways in which Dean’s film might be examined in association with 
phenomenological ideas.  Firstly, there are phenomenological implications for the 
context within which Dean has chosen to show her film because critics have cited 
significant differences in terms of embodiment between a film made for cinematic 
viewing and one produced as an artwork.  One writer who has commented on these 
differences in respect of Dean’s work is art historian Maria Walsh.548  She says that 
meaning can be conveyed in a bodily sense by the space the film is shown in and 
through the content of the film.  Walsh says that it is important that Disappearance at 
Sea is a gallery installation as it gives the film ‘a different address than the cinema 
theatre’.549  Walsh explains.  The cinema, she proposes, can lull the viewer into a dream-
like state that makes them unaware of bodily coordinates other than those they receive 
from the image they are viewing. Whereas, says Walsh, the gallery installation space 
foregrounds the body’s location in space.550  She also comments specifically on the 
imagery within Disappearance at Sea in relation to the viewer’s body.  Dean, she says, 
upsets our sense of bodily coordination by obliterating the horizon in the film and this 
creates an immersive space for the viewer. 551  Also, adds Walsh, our equilibrium is 
upset by Dean’s use of a black interval in the film.552  
 
The significance of the location where a film is shown is also a point noted by 
film theorist Daniel Frampton.553  Frampton suggests that the intellectual and attentive 
context of a gallery persuades the viewer to ‘fill in the blanks’ in the frequently 
                                                 
548 Maria Walsh, ‘Narrative Duration’, Silvester, ed., Reading Images and Seeing Words. 
549 Ibid. 67. 
550 Ibid. 68. 
551 Ibid.  
552 Ibid. 
553 Frampton, Filmosophy. 207. 
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fragmentary nature of gallery film.  Significantly, he uses Disappearance at Sea to 
illustrate such a phenomenon.554 
 
We have seen in chapter three that the projection process can also have an 
impact on the phenomenological relationship between a viewer and the film. Writing in 
Film art phenomena, filmmaker and critic Nicky Hamlyn suggests that although Dean’s 
films are shown in art galleries, they also relate to the cinema. 555  The reason for this, 
says Hamlyn, is that the projection processes are not explicitly addressed.556 The loop 
machines that allow the films to run continuously, he says, are enclosed and thus hidden 
from the viewer.  Furthermore, he adds, Dean’s longer films are shown from specially 
constructed projection boxes.  In this respect, he suggests, the work also conforms to the 
usual practice of video artists who use digital projectors mounted above the spectator.557 
For this thesis, Dean’s choice of projection is significant.  We have seen in previous 
chapters that the ways in which technology mediates our experience of an environment 
is a significant part of a phenomenological analysis.  Thus the projection arrangement 
for artwork that is seeking to articulate phenomenological experience needs to be 
considered as an aspect of the work. 
 
Critic and art historian Jean-Christophe Royoux also writes about Dean’s 
method of projection and its impact upon viewing practices.  He too comments on her 
use of looping mechanisms that provide continual playing potential.  In contrast to 
Hamlyn, Royoux says that by showing her work in such a way the projection apparatus 
used in Dean’s films are an integral part of their presentation.558  As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, the way in which artwork is shown has an impact on the viewer’s 
                                                 
554 Ibid. 
555 Nicky Hamlyn, Film Art Phenomena (London: British Film Institute, 2003). 43. 
556 Ibid. 
557 Ibid. 
558Jean Chrisophe Royoux, ‘Cosmograms of the present tense’, Marina Warner Jean-Christophe 
Royoux, Germaine Greer, Tacita Dean (London, New York: Phaidon Press, 2006). 56. 
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perception of how the work was made. By showing the films with a 16mm projector, 
Royoux says that Dean’s filming of material objects is closely linked with the format of 
their presentation.  There is, says Royoux, ‘a perfect fit between what is represented, the 
way it is represented and its presentation in exhibitions’.559   
 
Filmmaker Guy Sherwin also comments on Dean’s projection techniques. He 
says that by having no obvious beginnings or endings, and thus being appropriate for 
continuous projection, Dean’s films are suited to a gallery situation.560 Sherwin’s 
comments might be considered in contrast to the idea, seen in chapter three, that a 
feature of moving imagery is its beginnings and endings.  Here, beginnings and endings 
were associated with moving imagery whilst in static forms of imagery, such as 
paintings, it was suggested that beginnings and endings do not exist. 
 
Somewhat confusingly, the attention given to the presentation of Dean’s films 
by Hamlyn, Royoux, Sherwin and Frampton suggests that the way in which Dean has 
chosen to show Disappearance at Sea could be seen as contrary to existing practice 
within a gallery situation, yet also at odds with usual cinema practice.  When attending 
an artist’s talk, that included a viewing of Dean’s film Palast at the Tate Modern gallery 
in London, 2006, there was no mention by Dean, who was present at the showing, 
whether the film was to be seen in a different form to the cinematic way in which it was 
presented.561 It is interesting to note that in Tacita Dean: Recent films and other works, a 
catalogue produced to accompany an exhibition of Dean’s work at the Tate Britain 
gallery in 2001, Dean’s film work is described as ‘filmography’, a term that has been 
used to describe artists’ films rather than film created for cinema.562  
 
                                                 
559 Ibid. 
560 Hamlyn, Film Art Phenomena. 54. 
561 ‘Tacita Dean: Artist’s Talk’, Tate Modern, Bankside, SE1, Tuesday, 6th June 2006. 
562 Tate Britain, ed., Tacita Dean: Recent Films and Other Works (London: Tate Gallery 
Publishing Ltd, 2001). 75. 
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It is significant at this point to look at the methods used within this thesis when 
Dean’s film is considered within the overall structure of this enquiry.  First, in order to 
understand quite how an analysis of Dean’s film fits within the overall structure of this 
thesis it is helpful to look back over what has been presented so far. Thus far the thesis 
has considered some of the ways an embodied association with the environment might 
be understood through an analysis of landscape experience.  In addition, the thesis has 
looked at ways in which visual art might articulate such experience of an environment.  
Within these analyses, examples have been cited from the key texts selected for this 
thesis.  For instance, in chapter one, in the case of Tilley, his example of the menhirs at 
Finistère provided this thesis with a way of understanding an expanded method of 
phenomenology.  Looking at Tilley’s example revealed how his method of analysis 
includes embodied experience together with sources of pre-existing literature.  Similarly, 
in this chapter, we can see that artwork might also use embodied experience together 
with more reflective elements.  For this thesis then, Dean’s work might be considered in 
an intratextual way as ‘pre-existing artwork’. 
 
Before considering how notions of embodied experience might be discussed in 
relation to Dean’s film, the visual and audio content of Disappearance at Sea will be 
examined.  In order to provide this information, I have viewed Dean’s film several times 
and taken notes that have informed the following analysis.   
 
The 16mm film has a playing time of fourteen minutes.  The film comprises 
seven cuts, each of about two minutes duration, of different views of and from a 
lighthouse.  
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Illus. 16: Tacita Dean, Disappearance at Sea, Film stills, 16mm colour anamorphic film with 
optical sound, 14 minutes, London, the Tate Modern gallery. 
 
The camera, fitted with an anamorphic lens that provides a widescreen format, is fixed 
to the lighthouse lamp during filming.563  The film commences at dusk.  It opens with 
intermittent light from clockwise rotational movement of the lighthouse lenses that gives 
an overall impression of a gold, grey and bronze image.  There are two light bulbs 
visible in the centre of the image, and a barely discernible landscape beyond.  The image 
of the moving lenses and the distant landscape fills the frame and is accompanied by a 
mechanical sound.  The second cut changes to what can be seen from the lighthouse, out 
towards the sea. Here, a cliff, a horizon line and a flat sea are visible beneath a 
darkening sky, and movement of the lighthouse lenses can be detected on the far left of 
the frame.  Also, structural elements of the lighthouse window casing can also be 
observed.  Within the third cut, the lenses can again be seen moving clockwise and the 
sky may be glimpsed through the lenses.  The imagery in this cut is darker than the first 
and second cuts, and rings that form part of the glass lenses cause distortion of the light 
                                                 
563 Maria Walsh, ‘Narrative Duration’, Silvester, ed., Reading Images and Seeing Words. 59. 
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that moves across the frame.  Again, two bulbs are visible and a mechanical sound can 
be heard.  The fourth cut reveals a red, cloudy sky with a horizon line just below 
halfway down the screen.  Here, the lenses of the lighthouse may be seen rotating on the 
left of the frame and the edge of the window of the building and its structure can also be 
observed.  In this cut the image is partly red/orange, as a result of the sunset, and partly 
blue/grey from the light through the lighthouse lens.  Also, a dark sea and cliff can be 
seen, as well as intermittent light flashes.  This cut has a mix of mechanical and screechy 
sounds – possibly the cry of gulls.  In the next cut a dark cliff with a beam moving from 
left to right across the frame is visible.  Also, there is a strip of sunset in the upper right 
of the frame and again a combination of mechanical and gull-like sounds.  The sixth cut 
reveals a rotating lens again, but this time with strong contrast between the intermittent 
light of the lighthouse beam when it is on and the darkness of a night sky when it is off.  
Here, the structure of the lighthouse casing can be seen and slight marks on the glass 
bring the viewer’s awareness to the presence of the lighthouse window.  The final cut 
begins with a black screen but after a few seconds a light can be seen travelling from left 
to right in the top right part of the frame.  In this cut, the screeching sound fades and the 
film ends.  
 
It is worth noting a difference in the last cut to the first six parts of the film.  In 
contrast to the first cuts, Dean has revealed that the last scene of Disappearance at Sea 
is faked.564 The reason for this, she says, is that lighthouses do not project their light 
onto the sea; they project it above and into the air.565  Consequently, Dean has 
intervened with a mirror and a torch in order to create light on the surface of the sea. 
This is significant.  Her intervention with a mirror and torch means that the film needs to 
be considered in a way that incorporates Dean’s ideas following a period of reflection.  
On the one hand, this might be considered a phenomenological ‘glitch’.  However, if we 
                                                 
564 Marina Warner, “Interview: Marina Warner in conversation with Tacita Dean”, Jean-
Christophe Royoux, Tacita Dean. 30. 
565 Ibid.  
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think about an interpretation of phenomenology that, as we saw earlier, considers 
immediate experience as a route to further enquiry, then Dean’s activity with the torch 
and the mirror might be viewed in terms of an ‘expanded’ phenomenology. However, it 
is worth noting that it is others who have attributed Dean’s film with phenomenological 
ideas, rather than Dean herself.  Accordingly, ways in which the film might be 
considered to ‘fail’ in phenomenological terms are not stated as a comment of inept 
action on Dean’s part.  
 
How can ideas of experience be understood within the context of Dean’s 
film?  Experience enters the film in several ways.  First, there is Dean’s embodied 
experience of making the film.  We know quite a lot about this topic from a textual 
component that accompanies her film.  Dean has authored a book, entitled An Aside, 
which provides a textual narrative to accompany Disappearance at Sea.566  The title of 
Dean’s book is interesting. An ‘aside’ is a term taken from Shakespearian theatre 
denoting something spoken directly to the audience by an actor that doesn’t affect the 
action on the stage.567 Dean comments on an ‘aside’ in another exhibition catalogue.568  
Here she says: ‘For me it is active: it is no stage whisper but a decisive moment when an 
actor chooses to address the audience directly whilst not affecting the action on stage’.569   
 
Other writers comment on Dean’s use of a textual component.  Writing in 
‘Afterword’ within Dean’s textual component,  critic Theodora Vischer suggests that 
although one does not need to be familiar with the narrative discourse of Dean’s texts in 
order to watch her films, the complexity of the film is reinforced through its discourse of 
                                                 
566 Museum fur Gegwenwartskunst Basel, ed., Tacita Dean: Selected Works from 1994-2000, an 
Aside (Basel: Museum fur Gegenwartskunst Basel, 2000). 
567 Ibid. 54. 
568 Tacita Dean, An Aside: Selected by Tacita Dean (London: Hayward Gallery Publishing, 
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the textual components.570 Likewise, Royoux suggests that the textual component of 
Dean’s work plays a specific role. He says that by revealing Dean’s experience in 
Disappearance at Sea, the book has an impact on our understanding of the actions and 
objects that she employs in her work.  Thus, says Royoux, the textual component 
contributes towards saving a fragment of reality from the past, thus preserving the 
memory of actions or objects that would otherwise disappear.571  
 
For this thesis, it is interesting to note that Dean’s work comprises several 
elements and is arguably indicative of her method of making art having common 
features with what we have seen as a mode of ‘expanded phenomenology’.   Firstly, 
there is the film itself that has been made after some initial research by Dean.  The 
content of this film, we have seen, incorporates both material recorded from a fixed 
point on a lighthouse, which might be considered ‘pre-reflective’ and also comprises a 
cut that has been made following intervention by Dean.  In addition, there is a textual 
component that accompanies the film that provides information of both bodily 
experience and details of material from other sources.   
 
What else does Dean’s textual component tell us about the making of 
Disappearance at Sea?  Firstly, from the textual component, An Aside, we learn that a 
tragic story informs Disappearance at Sea. This is the story of Donald Crowhurst, one 
of nine competitors who attempted to sail around the world single-handedly in the 
Sunday Times Golden Globe Race of 1968.572  Dean informs us that Crowhurst was ill-
prepared for such a race, being a family man with a failing business and no professional 
sailing experience.  However, she explains, his determination to enter and win the race 
set him on a path of delusion that resulted in him leaving Teignmouth in an unfit boat, ill 
                                                 
570 Theodora Vischer, ‘Afterword’, Basel, ed., Tacita Dean: Selected Works from 1994-2000, an 
Aside. 54. 
571 Jean-Christophe Royoux, Tacita Dean. 61. 
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prepared and afraid.573  Furthermore, Crowhurst’s journey was entangled with the affairs 
of Teignmouth Council and he became a means for the council to gain publicity.  
Hopelessly caught up by his own bravado and by obsessive civic pride, he was towed 
out on the 31st October for the start of the race.  Moreover, narrates Dean, as he tried to 
hoist his foresails they became hopelessly entangled, and he had to be brought in to 
shore again for assistance before finally setting off in the race.  As he was mid-way into 
the Atlantic, Dean tells us, Crowhurst realised that he wouldn’t survive one day in the 
Roaring Forties – a particularly windy region of the Atlantic – let alone make it around 
the world.  At this point, says Dean, Crowhurst set about faking his journey. Crowhurst 
managed to convince the world, Dean informs us, that he was making great progress and 
in June 1969, when his fictional journey collided with his actual journey, he was able to 
radio Portishead and learn that he was officially winning the race.  Then, Dean reports, 
the BBC radioed through plans to meet Crowhurst off the Isles of Scilly.574 But in 
reality, says Dean, Crowhurst had lost all track of time and no longer knew where he 
was.  Moreover, she says that he had developed an obsessive relationship with his faulty 
chronometer – an instrument to measure GMT time at sea – and that as a result of this 
association he was suffering from ‘time-madness’, a common problem for sailors who 
have to locate their position by rigorous time keeping.  Finally, says Dean, Crowhurst, 
with a distorted sense of time and overwhelmed by his deceit and his offence against 
what he regarded as ‘the sacred principle of truth’575 jumped overboard with his 
chronometer.  He was, she says, just a few hundred miles off the coast of Britain.  
 
We also learn, in An Aside, of Dean’s own experiences in relation to her quest to 
find out more about Crowhurst’s tragic story.  She provides evidence of her own interest 
in the event and of her subsequent quest in connection with the story.  Firstly, we are 
told how Dean’s quest began.  It was with a train journey, she tells us, a journey that 
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passed through Teignmouth where, she says, the train ‘is often moving too fast for you 
to make out its name’.576  Dean also reveals her experience with the townsfolk of 
Teignmouth:  Speaking to an ex-council member, Fred Tooley, she tells of how she 
heard of Crowhurst’s involvement with Teignmouth Council and how she was 
particularly struck by the minutes from a meeting of Teignmouth Council Publicity 
Committee, published in a book by two Sunday Times journalists who had covered the 
race at the time.  They wrote: 
“And his final verdict, as reported in the local paper, put the tragedy into the 
right perspective from Teignmouth’s point-of-view.  ‘Despite the sad end,’ Mr 
Bladon, the ex-Chairman of the Council, told the meeting, ‘The voyage has 
brought up more publicity than this Committee has managed in fifty years.  We 
have had this extremely cheaply, and I hope the town appreciates it’.  Donald 
Crowhurst would have been glad to hear he did not die in vain”.577 
 
Dean also describes her visits to the offices of the local Teignmouth newspapers 
and photographers in search of further information about Crowhurst’s part in the race.  
Neither office could provide any original image of the event nor remember the postcard 
that Dean recalled being issued to commemorate the race.578  In addition, Dean tells us 
about meeting the honorary archivist of Teignmouth museum in order to examine 
literature relating to the race.  Here, Dean was shown a painting by a local artist of 
Crowhurst’s trimaran, Teignmouth Electron, that in the picture, she says, ‘floated 
awkwardly on a ferocious blue brown sea’.579 In the corner of the painting, Dean tells us, 
was an image of Crowhurst’s disembodied head painted against the waves. Dean was 
told by the archivist that the painting was considered too inappropriate to be shown after 
the tragedy and had stayed out of sight, ever since, in the museum.  Also, we are 
informed of Dean’s meeting with the boat pilot who towed Crowhurst out at the start of 
the race.  Dean relates the pilot’s description of the day he towed Teignmouth Electron 
out to sea for the start of the race.  ‘It was obvious to everyone’, he said, ‘that Crowhurst 
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didn’t want to take part’.580  Furthermore, Dean tells us, the pilot hinted at a conspiracy.  
The whole trip, he told Dean, was set up as a publicity stunt that went wrong.581 
 
It is evident from Dean’s writing that the time-madness aspects of Crowhurst’s 
story intrigue and inspire her and form the basis for Disappearance at Sea.  
Accordingly, Dean chooses to use Berwick lighthouse as a location to make the film.  
For Dean, a lighthouse is able to represent aspects of Crowhurst’s disturbed state of 
mind.  She explains the reasons for this.  Writing of the lighthouse in An Aside, Dean 
tells us that as the train approaches Berwick-upon-Tweed it is possible to imagine ‘the 
smallness of that enclosed space in relation to the vast immensity of the space beyond: 
the space that is the sea’.582  She says: 
At night, you watch in the blackness for the rotations of the lighthouse and you 
decipher time in the gaps between the flashes.  Without this cipher, there is no 
time.  Crowhurst’s “time-madness”, where he believed he was floating through 
prehistory, utterly alone in an unforgiving seascape so far removed from human 
contact is only just possible to imagine standing in the last human place where 
the ocean starts and the land ends in a solitary beacon of safety.583 
 
Significantly, adds Dean, ‘Like the man in the moon’… ‘you can just make out the 
anguished face of Donald Crowhurst’...‘he becomes the light of the lighthouse, his gaze 
fixed eternally on the horizon as he looks out upon the sea’.584  
 
Using information from the film and the textual component of Dean’s work, 
how might notions of embodied experience, be attributed to Disappearance at Sea? As 
shown above, experience that involves the whole body is important within a 
phenomenological enquiry.  And, as Merleau-Ponty has written, experience can be 
understood from an embodied viewpoint.585 As we have also seen, at the core of 
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Merleau-Ponty’s idea of an embodied viewpoint is the temporal and reciprocal 
intertwining of an organism and its environment. This intertwining has been discussed in 
terms of landscape experience as well as in connection with a selection of embodied art 
practices.  Now, it will be considered in association with Disappearance at Sea.   
 
Dean relates notions of embodied experience in the textual component of her 
work.  Bodily actions such as ‘walking up grassy slopes’,586 ‘wandering to a concrete 
jetty’587 and ‘having fish and chips in a café’,588 reveal some of Dean’s bodily activities 
involved in the making of Disappearance at Sea. Admittedly, these statements relate 
little about Dean’s bodily sensations but nevertheless they do provide evidence of 
Dean’s enquiry being informed by actual experience rather than using information from 
a literary, or intellectual source. Analyses that are made solely from a desk, as we 
observed in chapter one, might be considered as providing a ‘disembodied’ type of 
enquiry. 
 
The experience of sound is significant to Dean’s work.589 In chapter one, we 
observed that sound is also an important issue within an account of an embodied 
experience of the landscape.  In an interview with cultural historian Marina Warner, 
Dean states that sound can heighten the sense of loss or disappearance within a film.590 
Accordingly, Dean says: 
For me, making a film is connected to the idea of loss and disappearance.  When 
I put in the sound of a dog barking or a motorbike passing at dusk, I am so 
aware of the feeling of abandonment it can create.  It’s incredibly powerful, 
sound.  It is so descriptive of that particular night time loneliness or dusk 
loneliness.591  
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The sounds within Disappearance at Sea change from the grinding of a 
revolving lighthouse lantern to the screeching of gulls above the sea.592 These sounds are 
significant because, as we observed earlier, sound is able to convey activity that is not 
necessarily visible within a landscape.  
 
Earlier in this thesis an overlap of our bodily senses was considered.  As we 
observed, this idea, termed synthaesthesia, is an idea discussed by Merleau-Ponty and 
describes a significant part of how we perceive an environment.593  Whilst watching and 
listening to the final cut in Disappearance at Sea, where the screen becomes filled with 
only a black image but the sound of screeching gulls can be heard, a viewer becomes 
aware of an overlap of senses.  The idea of an awareness of overlapping senses 
occurring when one sense ceases is an issue discussed by Merleau-Ponty.  He says that 
we can become aware of the interaction of the senses in perception when the sound of a 
film we are watching breaks down momentarily.594   
 
An embodied analysis of our surroundings, as we have seen, needs to consider 
ways in which technology mediates our experience of an environment. In chapter two, 
both simple and complex types of technology were seen to have an impact on the 
embodied experience of a human perceiver. 595  In chapter three of this thesis, such an 
analysis was also shown to be applicable to an experience of film.  Accordingly, Dean’s 
film provides this thesis with the opportunity to apply ideas of technological mediation 
to an example of artwork that comprises moving imagery.  
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In order to evaluate some of the ways in which technology mediates between a 
perceiver and their environment within Disappearance at Sea, it is necessary to examine 
the series of relationships that are involved in the making and the viewing of the film.  
There is a complex chain of experience, events and technical apparatus that can be 
identified as operating within the film.   Firstly, the initial link might be considered as 
being Dean’s train journey where she became fascinated with Teignmouth as the town 
associated with Crowhurst. It is significant that it is Dean’s experience, mediated by 
technology, in the form of the train, which initiates the film.  Following this train 
journey, many years later, Dean begins her quest in Teignmouth.  This experience, as we 
have learned from her textual component, involves bodily activity together with material 
artefacts, evidenced by such things as a postcard issued to commemorate Crowhurst’s 
trip and the minutes of the Teignmouth Council Publicity committee.  These seemingly 
simple artefacts, along with many other ‘mundane’ technologies that were alluded to in 
chapter two, might be seen as significant parts of Dean’s experience of her surroundings.   
 
Next in the chain of actions and technology comes Dean’s experience with the 
16mm camera and its anamorphic lens.  This camera is a complex piece of equipment 
that might be considered as an example of what is termed, in chapter two, ‘exotic’ 
technology.  The lighthouse itself is somewhat an enigma.  Although considered 
complex at the time it was constructed, it might, in today’s terms, be considered a 
relatively simple device.  (However, it is worth noting that advanced lighting techniques 
using a hydrogen fuel cell are being used to provide up-to-date technology within 
unmanned lighthouses that continue to operate today.) 596By attaching the camera to the 
lamp of the lighthouse Dean extends the use of the camera.  However, by not actually 
holding the camera Dean’s action means that ‘perceptual extension’ occurs at a distance 
and thus arguably cannot be considered in terms of technology extending the perceptual 
boundaries of the body that was explained in chapter two.  Dean’s experience of 
                                                 
596 ‘Lighthouse is powered by hydrogen’, The Times newspaper, 6/11/07, 22. 
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capturing the imagery at Bewick lighthouse also includes the mirror and torch used to 
fake the light across the sea. By the addition of such an action, Dean makes the already 
complex series of relationships even more diverse.  The torch and the mirror change the 
series of relationships between Dean, the camera and the lighthouse. The potential 
meaning of something, or its affordance has been shown in chapter one to be a way of 
understanding an environment.  Thus, for the sea to be visible in the film, a series of 
affordances is required between Dean’s body, the torch and the mirror.  
   
The idea of a ‘viewing view’, seen in chapter three, might be applied to 
Disappearance at Sea.597 In this idea, the material body of the film might be considered 
as ‘seeing’ the landscape from the point of view of the lighthouse and ‘expressing’ the 
view when the film is exhibited.  Finally, the image reflected from the screen, the screen 
itself, the projector and the experience of the viewer need to be considered within the 
chain of relationships associated with Dean’s film.  
 
There is further evidence of technological mediation within Dean’s film. 
Specifically, redundant technology plays a significant role in her work.598  Crowhurst’s 
disaster happened in 1968 and when Dean tried to find details of the voyage she found 
yellowing newspaper articles, failing memories and a certain reluctance to revisit what 
had befallen Donald Crowhurst.599  The faulty chronometer; the use of a lighthouse – an 
almost redundant form of navigation; her choice of medium – film rather than video or 
digital technology, arguably all relate to an interest in redundant technology.  
Furthermore, almost all the apparent technology – the yacht, the chronometer, the 
camera, the lighthouse and the projector, although hi-tech or ‘exotic’ at the time of their 
production, are now virtually obsolete compared to the equivalent items available today.  
Of interest to this thesis is that by positioning almost redundant objects and events 
                                                 
597 Sobchack, The Address of the Eye. 
598 Jean-Christophe Royoux, Tacita Dean. 62. 
599 Basel, ed., Tacita Dean: Selected Works from 1994-2000, an Aside. 24. 
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within a present day context, Dean’s actions can be understood as the past impacting on 
the present – an issue discussed above in chapter one. 
 
An inherent part of embodied experience is the notion of movement.  As chapter 
one demonstrated, an embodied relationship between a perceiver and their environment 
involves the movement of both of these elements. Later, in chapter three, ideas of 
motion were also examined in association with embodied notions of artwork and with an 
experience of film.  Furthermore, movement within film has been seen to include the 
motion of the perceiver and their dynamic environment, both within the capture of the 
imagery and within the imagery viewed in the film.  In addition, there is the movement 
of the viewer to consider. Movement is also present within the projection process, both 
within the mechanical components of the projector and in the film itself being pushed 
and pulled through the viewing apparatus.  
 
Accordingly, we need to consider aspects of movement within Disappearance at 
Sea.  Firstly, some of the imagery in the film will be examined for evidence of 
movement. In the first cut, there is evidence of movement of the lighthouse lenses.  This 
movement brings into question the identity of the perceiver in Dean’s film.  Can the 
lighthouse, standing in for the gaze of Crowhurst, be accorded the perceptual properties 
of a perceiver? As chapter three observed, phenomenology deals with the relationship 
between a human perceiver and their world.  A lighthouse is not human and therefore 
cannot be given the status of a perceiver.  It can, however, be considered as part of a 
phenomenological association in a mediating role. Accordingly, the movement of the 
lighthouse lens is part of the mediating technology involved in the relationship between 
Dean and the landscape.  Interestingly, Frampton suggests that Disappearance at Sea 
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‘becomes’ the bulb of a lighthouse, both mesmeric and mechanical’.600 Dean’s film, he 
says ‘offers a filmic anatomy of a lighthouse, through a beam that glances off rocks’.601  
 
In the film, the sweeping beam from the lighthouse reveals persistence and 
change within the landscape.  Again, this is interesting.  As chapter one illustrated, 
persistence and change that is revealed by the light reflected from surfaces within an 
environment is a way of explaining how we might understand the physical 
environment.602  This explanation, Gibson’s idea of invariants, relies upon the 
movement of both a perceiver and their dynamic environment. Thus, in Disappearance 
at Sea, the seemingly invariant parts of the image, such as the cliff and the structure of 
the lighthouse, determine our perception of those parts of the film that appear to be 
moving, such as the lighthouse lenses and the beam of light that sweeps across the sky.  
 
Movement, as we have seen earlier, occurs over time.  Moreover, time has been 
discussed throughout this thesis as an inherent part of an embodied relationship. As we 
have also seen, time is a fundamental part of the way in which a human perceiver 
experiences the landscape. How then might time be understood within Disappearance at 
Sea?  Firstly, the camera reveals a landscape being disclosed over time.  Accordingly, 
features in the film are revealed as the landscape unfolds over time.  In this way, we can 
apply the temporal notion, seen in chapter one, whereby some surfaces are revealed as 
others pass out of view.   
 
Another way in which time might be understood in Dean’s film is suggested by 
Royoux who says that the unfolding of the film allows a past object, or situation, to be 
represented in the present.603  Here, an association can be made between the past 
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602 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. 
603 Jean-Christophe Royoux, Tacita Dean. 61. 
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impacting on the present within an interpretation of embodied landscape experience, an 
idea observed in chapter one, and Dean’s film.  A further example of how time operates 
within Disappearance at Sea is revealed in An Aside.  Here, as we saw earlier, Dean 
contrasts the time-gap between the flashes of the lighthouse with Crowhurst’s ‘time-
madness’.604 Without the gaps between the flashes of the lighthouse beam, she says, 
there is no time.  Likewise, Crowhurst lost all sense of time when his chronometer 
failed. 
 
It is relevant that Maria Walsh relates the temporal dimension that is present in 
Disappearance at Sea to the work of Merleau-Ponty.605 Walsh says that putting an 
emphasis on experience clarifies an understanding of time.  It ‘debunks the mastery 
which the notion of a centralized consciousness entails’, she says.606 Furthermore, she 
adds, an emphasis on experience also immediately introduces temporality.  In her 
enquiry into Dean’s work, Walsh highlights ways in which duration within 
Disappearance at Sea connects with ideas of time.  Firstly, she says, the film creates ‘a 
stark and startling sensory effect’ that unites its separate cuts.  The length of each cut, 
she adds, makes us sense something outside of the film, which is where we are located 
in time and space.  Each shot, she says, is held for a longer period than we need to 
recognise the image. Thus the viewer’s idea of time, brought about partly by the lack of 
drama, she says, is emphasised by the cuts and lingerings made at the time of the film 
but which also cut and linger in the viewer’s own time.607  Walsh also comments on time 
in connection with the audio content of the film.  She suggests that off-screen sounds, 
such as the screeching gulls and the noise from the projector, contribute to a sense of 
something beyond the image.608 The beyond of the image is not simply off-screen space, 
says Walsh, but is rather ‘a sense of human time, spread out and seeping through the 
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spectator’s body’.609  It is through duration, she adds, that time in the film passes into a 
space which connects with the spectator’s own formation of experience.  Furthermore, 
suggests Walsh, objects in the film, such as the lighthouse, the sky, the light and the 
horizon offer different sorts of time.  The lighthouse, she says, presents a human 
measurement of cosmic forces whereas the horizon can be seen as the limit of cosmic 
time.610  
 
It is pertinent at this point to consider another film made by Dean that also 
incorporates notions of movement and time – Fernsehturm.611 
 
 
Illus. 17: Tacita Dean, Fernsehturm, 2001, Film stills, 16mm colour anamorphic film with 
optical sound, 44 minutes. 
 
 Dean made Fernsehturm in Berlin in October 2000.  The work consists of a 44 
minute, 16mm colour anamorphic film and, in the catalogue produced to accompany the 
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minutes. 
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exhibition in which the film was shown, there are several paragraphs of text, written by 
Dean, that inform us of her interest and activities in connection with the work.  From 
this, we are able to see a further example of Dean’s method of producing artwork by 
combining immediate embodied experience with other elements. 
 
In Fernsehturm, Dean’s fixed camera records the revolving of the restaurant at 
the top of Berlin’s television tower.612 This action allows us to observe Dean’s 
relationship with her environment being mediated by technology.  In this instance, both 
the camera and the revolving restaurant can be considered in terms of mediating 
technology.  Dean tells us within the textual component that accompanies this work that 
she first went up the tower in 1987 on a college trip to Berlin, thus memories are strong, 
when Dean returns to the tower, both of the smell and the delight of the rotational aspect 
of the restaurant.  Here, we are provided with an example of Dean’s sensuous 
experience. We are also provided with evidence of memories of past events affecting the 
present, an issue discussed in chapter one.  Moreover, Dean reveals in her textual 
component ideas that might be related to issues of time and movement:  In 1987, she 
discovers, it took an hour to rotate 360 degrees.  Now, she finds out, it only takes half an 
hour to do the full rotation.  With the process of reunification of Germany, Dean muses; 
the speed at which the restaurant revolves has doubled.  Also, within the text, Dean 
comments on the interior of the restaurant.  The staff, she says: ‘move around the 
restaurant floor as if choreographed for the corps de ballet, never pausing to show 
disorientation or doubt as their world continually shifts and moves away from them’.613 
In this example, we can observe a relationship between a perceiver and their dynamic 
environment, an issue that has been shown to be significant within an enquiry of 
embodied experience.  Both Dean’s relationship with her surroundings and an 
association between the staff and their environment are revealed.  Within her text, Dean 
                                                 
612 James Quandt, "Tacita Dean, Schaulager, Basel," Artforum. November 2006, 2. 
613 Tacita Dean,Sara Hughes Susan Daniel-McElroy, Arwen Fitch and Kerry Rice, ed., Tacita 
Dean: Berlin Works (St. Ives: Tate St. Ives, 2005). 
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reveals time as a prime concern.  In this respect, she writes: ‘the revolving sphere in 
Space still remains our best image of the future, and yet it is firmly locked in the 
past…As you sit up there at your table, opposite the person whom you are with and with 
your back to the turn of the restaurant, you are no longer static in the present but moving 
with the rotation of the Earth backwards into the future’.614  
 
We can determine from the film and the accompanying text that issues of 
method, technology, movement and time recur in Dean’s work. The constantly changing 
conditions, brought about by both the shifting aspect of the rotating restaurant and the 
change from day to night, enables Dean to explore light and time using the mediating 
technology of the camera and the circular revolving platform of the restaurant.615 In a 
similar manner to Disappearance at Sea, a camera in a fixed position on a moving part 
of a building records what is taking place in front of it.616 Interestingly, Marina Warner 
compares the illusion created by Dean’s technique to being in a stationary train and 
thinking you are moving when in fact it is the train alongside that is moving.617 This 
illusion, says Warner, has a relationship to cinema, which slows down time or puts the 
viewer in a ‘different space of time’.618 
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Summary 
 
An analysis of Dean’s work has provided evidence of some of the ways in which 
embodied experience might be examined within art practice that uses moving imagery 
but that has not been specifically made within the framework of this thesis. Moreover, 
by describing ways in which embodied experience might be understood in Dean’s work, 
points of contact have been established between Disappearance at Sea, and 
phenomenological notions of landscape experience.  
 
The information provided within this chapter shows that the part played by 
experience in Dean’s work is complex. Phenomenological, pre-reflective experience has 
been complemented by sensitivity to other forms of enquiry. In addition, visual and 
textual information about experience and its mediating technologies have provided the 
opportunity to examine ways in which Dean’s film might be understood in terms that 
have been brought to light in the earlier chapters of this thesis in respect of an embodied 
experience of landscape.   
 
Moving imagery, as we have seen, provides a way of articulating embodied 
experience because it is able to reveal experience unfolding through movement over 
time.  By using the medium of film, Dean’s work is able to provide evidence of a 
landscape unfolding over time.  We have also seen that although Dean’s looped film is a 
gallery installation, the discrete placement of the projector means that it shares some 
characteristics with cinematic projection processes. 
 
This thesis has identified movement as a significant factor when considering 
embodied landscape experience.  In this chapter, movement has been identified 
operating in several ways within Disappearance at Sea. We have seen that the medium 
employed and the placement of the camera provide the viewer with a sense of 
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movement.  However, when considered phenomenologically, the attachment of a camera 
to a lighthouse raises questions about the role of a perceiver in a technologically 
mediated relationship.  
 
Time has been discussed as a fundamental part of a phenomenological 
relationship throughout this thesis.  Experience, we have observed, unfolds over time.  
In this chapter time has also been discussed in relation to Dean’s film.  Here, the 
unfolding of imagery that occurs over time indicates a temporal dimension. The flashes 
of the lighthouse beam might also be understood in a way that indicates the passing of 
time.  Furthermore, a temporal dimension is conveyed by the idea of what might happen 
when we lose sense of time.  Here, Dean’s textual component tells us about Crowhurst 
and his ‘time-madness’ that arises as a result of his broken chronometer.  
 
The ways in which technology mediates an experience has been discussed as an 
inherent part of a phenomenological relationship.  Some of the ways in which 
technology mediates within embodied experience have been examined in an analysis of 
Disappearance at Sea.  We have also seen the significance of such mediation when 
technology fails, such as in the case of Crowhurst’s chronometer. Furthermore, the 
significance of technology has been seen to operate in the chain of affordances that 
occur within filmic experience.  In Disappearance at Sea such a chain of affordances is 
provided by a sequence that includes, amongst other things, a camera, a lighthouse, a 
torch and a mirror.   
 
Of particular relevance is Dean’s method of enquiry. By using immediate, pre-
reflective embodied experience, as well as a textual document that includes information 
from sources other than her spontaneous bodily experience, Dean’s artwork arguably 
provides us with an example of ‘expanded phenomenology’.  This is significant because 
such an enquiry might be aligned with Tilley’s phenomenological method that we 
 167 
observed in chapter one.  Here we saw evidence of an enquiry that uses information 
from immediate embodied experience in conjunction with pre-existing literature. 
 
Dean’s film has provided this thesis with an example of embodied experience 
articulated through moving imagery that is employed within a visual arts context. From 
this examination, a firm ground has been established whereby my own practice, and that 
of others, might be analysed in terms of embodied experience discussed earlier within 
this thesis.  By identifying links between Dean’s film and phenomenological principles 
cited throughout this thesis, a bedrock is provided from which to analyse ways in which 
my own practice might articulate notions of embodied landscape experience.  This 
analysis will be provided in chapter five. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Bren Unwin and embodied landscape experience 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines some of the ways in which my own art practice might articulate 
embodied landscape experience, thereby answering the research questions posed at the 
start of this submission.  This is significant because the way in which my own art 
practice articulates notions of embodied landscape experience is a key issue within this 
project.  In this chapter, ideas of embodied experience that have arisen throughout this 
thesis are examined in relation to my own art practice in order to analyse ways in which 
my film and digital video might articulate a phenomenological experience of the 
landscape. 
 
Two artworks in particular are the key concern of this chapter.  The first artwork 
to be examined in relation to embodied landscape experience is a 16mm film entitled 
Line.  This film has a playing time of two and a half minutes and is intended for showing 
in a gallery space using a 16mm projector.  The second artwork to be examined is a 
digital video entitled Length II.  This artwork has a playing time of one and a half hours, 
is shown using an LCD screen with integral DVD player, and has also been made with 
the intention of being exhibited within a gallery space.  
 
 The choice of location for the making of the two key works is important.  In 
previous examples of my work I have used unusual landscapes – for example, a site of 
volcanic activity and a quarry (see appendix 1).  However, in these examples, the work 
looked beguiling because of the spectacular nature of the landscape.  Moreover, I was so 
captivated by the subject that I stopped thinking about the experience and was instead 
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lured into thoughts of aesthetics.  As a result, I have looked to my commonplace 
experience of moving within a landscape through spaces that are familiar to me.  This 
has resulted in a process of revising my repertoire and its implications by using a 
selection of imagery from journeys that I frequently take by car, train, bicycle, bus and 
moped.  As we have seen in chapter three, a new awareness of ordinary things is brought 
about by the making and viewing of art practice.619 
 
In this chapter then, notions of embodied experience that have been examined 
within this thesis are applied to my own art practice that relies upon my own frequently 
taken journeys as the basis for its imagery.  Firstly, ideas from written accounts of a 
sensuous engagement with a landscape are used to analyse how phenomenology and 
parallel enquiries might be applied to my own practice in order to understand some of 
the ways in which my artwork articulates notions of embodied experience.  Specifically, 
within this part of the enquiry, particular attention is given to the role played by 
movement and time within my own practice.  Ideas of movement and time, as we have 
seen, have both been shown to be of particular importance within an embodied 
association with an environment because experience unfolds through movement over 
time.  
 
 Secondly, the way in which our experience is mediated by technology is 
addressed in relation to my own practice. The manner in which technology mediates an 
embodied experience of landscape is complex and multi-faceted.  Both the role of the 
body and the role of the media need to be considered. Phenomenology, as we have seen 
above, is acutely aware of the complex mechanisms whereby experience is absorbed 
into the body.  As Merleau-Ponty has written, the experience of things is grounded in 
our bodily relationship with those things.620  Moreover, both simple and more complex 
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620 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception. 
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technologies that mediate our experience of an environment have been shown to play a 
significant role within our association with a landscape and thus also need to be 
examined in relation to my own art practice. Finally, the method employed to make my 
artwork is analysed in relation to the method of expanded phenomenology that we have 
observed operating within written accounts of landscape experience and within the work 
of other artists. 
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I 
Digital recordings of art practice submitted as part of this thesis 
(Attached to inside back cover.  Please note that the actual work will be available 
for viewing at the oral examination of this thesis). 
 
i. 
DVD:  Line 
This DVD contains a digitally recorded version of the 16mm film Line. 
 
ii 
DVD: Length II 
This DVD contains a digitally recorded version of the digital video, Length II 
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II 
An analysis of Line and Length II 
 
 
 
Illus. 18: Bren Unwin, Line, 2007, 16mm film, 2.38 minutes. 
 
 
 
 Illus. 19: Bren Unwin, Length II, 2007, digital video, one and a half hours. 
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Firstly, the way in which Line and Length II might articulate notions of an embodied 
experience of the landscape will be examined in terms of ideas from phenomenological 
and parallel enquiries that have been analysed above.  To begin this examination, 
aspects concerning an embodied engagement with a landscape will be analysed in 
relation to my 16mm film Line.  
 
As we observed in chapter one, within a sensuous engagement with the 
landscape, a visual experience unfolds over time along a path of observation.621 In the 
film Line, a visual experience that unfolds over time along a path of observation can be 
perceived by the viewer of the film as a series of buildings, electricity cables, trees and 
various other features associated with a suburban environment unfold from a point of 
observation from the window of a train as it travels through the Hertfordshire landscape. 
Here, as some features of the landscape come into view, others pass out of sight.  
Significantly, the features are observed from a point of view that reveals the movement 
of a perceiver travelling on a train and the motion that occurs within their surroundings. 
 
We have seen in chapter one that a significant element of an embodied 
association with an environment is the idea of movement of both an active perceiver and 
their dynamic surroundings.  Within Line there is evidence of both my bodily movement 
and of motion that occurs within my surroundings.  The motion of the railway train and 
my embodied vision ‘panning’ the landscape is revealed by the strategic placement of 
the camera, screwed to its monopod and resting on the floor of the train.  Also, by 
directing the lens of the camera through the window of the train, the projected imagery 
reveals movement, such as other trains, within the environment.  Although for most of 
the duration of the film the movie camera is panning in the same direction as the train’s 
forward motion, at other times the camera moves horizontally in the opposite direction 
to the movement of the carriage.  These different forms of movement provide the film 
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with a range of motion that might be seen to accord in some ways to how an active 
perceiver travelling on a train observes their dynamic environment. This movement is 
significant. For the observer of the film there is an awareness of a mobile viewpoint in 
the film, provided by my embodied position extended by the camera and the train.  
Likewise, the viewer is aware of both static and moving objects and surfaces in the 
environment observed from my embodied and mobile position on the train as it travels 
through the landscape.  In this way, the viewer perceives my experience as one that 
occurs between an active perceiver and a dynamic environment.    
 
As we have seen in chapter two, notions of embodiment that are revealed in the 
artwork, and the way in which the work is shown, can reveal something of the bodily 
actions involved in its production.  In Line the two types of movement that a viewer 
observes in the film - my whole-body activity and events within the environment - 
provide evidence of the embodied way in which the artwork was made.  Evidence of my 
whole body activity is provided for the viewer by the camera recording the movement of 
the train that is extending my bodily experience, whilst other events that occur within 
my surroundings are filmed through the window of the train.  For the viewer then, the 
embodied experience of seeing the film is influenced by the mediating technology and 
this is significant.  If I had simply held the camera then the experience for the viewer 
would be quite different and probably more varied in terms of camera movement.  
However, by attaching the camera to the monopod and resting the combined structure on 
the train floor, the type of bodily movement perceived by the viewer of the film 
emphasises the mediating technology and accords specifically with the embodied 
experience of a train journey.   
 
The essentially reversible character of a phenomenological relationship, which, 
as we have seen in chapter three, might also be applied to film experience, can be 
considered in relation to Line.  Within the idea of reversibility, what is being looked at is 
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afforded similar powers to the subject who is looking.  The imagery within Line, by 
directing the gaze of the viewer within the gallery, might be understood in terms of 
reversibility between a subject and an object.  Using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, 
we have also seen from Sobchack’s analysis that film might itself be considered as an 
object/subject that sees and is seen. As we have also seen in chapter three, a film 
provides a ‘viewing-view’ by, arguably, ‘seeing’ and expressing what it sees.622  In the 
context of Line, a ‘viewing-view’ can be explained by the landscape imagery that has 
been captured from the position of the train being projected onto the screen in the 
gallery for the viewer’s attention.  
 
The idea of time has been discussed as an inherent part of an embodied 
experience because experience unfolds through movement over time.  In Line, the notion 
of time might be applied in several ways.  Broadly speaking, the viewer is able to 
perceive my mobile experience on the train unfolding through movement over time.  
Furthermore, the viewer’s own engagement with the film within the space of the gallery 
also unfolds through experience over time and thus can also be understood in a temporal 
way.  There are also other clues in Line as to how time might function.  Firstly, there is a 
rhythm to the film provided by the type of camera used to shoot the film and this might 
be said to give Line a certain pace. This regular pace can be perceived as a pattern of 
time in a similar way to how music or poetry might contain a characteristic pattern of 
beats that unfolds as a temporal type of activity.  In Line it is significant that the rhythm 
in the film is provided by the winding mechanism of the 16mm mechanical camera. The 
viewer’s perception of the imagery is affected by the power of the mediating technology 
that has been placed in a position that extends the limits of my bodily capabilities.  Also, 
although the train journey was taken in seemingly constant environmental conditions 
there are slight changes that a viewer can perceive in the surrounding landscape that are 
indicative of time passing. The movement of clouds and changing light are both 
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indicators of the type of temporal activity that occurs in the cycle of night and day and in 
seasons of the year.  
 
Now, let us consider embodied experience in relation to my digital video Length 
II.  Here, we are able to determine that digital imagery, as we have seen in chapter three, 
can also be understood in a phenomenological way.623  Notions of materiality that are 
significant within an understanding of embodiment can be seen in the way in which 
digital media stores data and also how it operates within social exchange.  In Length II, 
the coded information that is held on the DVD is evidence of its particular sort of 
materiality.  Moreover, by exhibition of the digital video, ideas of embodiment can be 
understood in a relationship that exists between the imagery and a viewer of the work in 
a similar way to an artwork that employs the medium of film. A viewer has a different 
sensuous encounter with Length II than with Line in respect of sound.  Here, once again 
it is the mediating technology that accounts for the different type of experience that the 
viewer has when looking at, or listening to, a digital video with a sound track rather than 
if they were viewing a 16mm, silent film.  
 
 Just as there are ‘gaps’ or perceived cuts for the viewer at the points in the film 
when the camera is being rewound, so too there are two points in Length II where the 
viewer may perceive that they have ‘missed’ something.  The first time that this happens 
is at a service station where I turn off the digital movie camera because of the possibility 
of contravening the privacy of fellow human subjects.  Such ethical consideration is part 
of our lives in the twenty-first century that was probably not an issue in sixteenth 
century Flanders.  It is also significant for Length II that an action such as switching off 
the camera, performed because of a consideration of fellow human subjects, results in a 
different experience for the viewer. The second ‘missing’ part of the digital video is the 
absence of a short part of the sound track that records my conversation, via my mobile 
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telephone, with the police.  Here again, it is to protect privacy, this time my own, that 
the change in the sound track of the work has occurred.  Such an action might be seen as 
phenomenologically problematic when considering pre-reflective experience, but, rather 
than a decision related to aesthetics or narrative, the edit was made so that the digital 
video did not compromise my own security when the work is experienced by other 
human subjects.  The need to consider personal security is very much a part of twenty-
first century existence that perhaps would have been rather different in 16th century 
Antwerp. These actions, both of which impact on the viewing experience of Length II, 
highlight the inappropriate usage by Ingold of an old, still and silent artwork. 
 
As in the film Line, the imagery within Length II reveals movement of both the 
perceiver and their surroundings. Also, in a similar way to Line, Length II provides 
evidence of experience unfolding through movement over time.  In Length II, this sense 
of movement is achieved by the placement of the digital movie camera in a position that, 
as far as possible, simulates the actions of my body in the car. Although it is possible to 
cite some similarities between the camera position and my seated body within the car, 
we have seen from Gibson’s account of experience and film that moving imagery is not 
the same thing for a viewer as actually being there.  However, it is worth noting that the 
use of moving imagery within Length II provides an experience for a viewer that is 
closer to the idea of an embodied relationship with an environment than could be 
provided by the use of still imagery.   
 
As the car travels along the motorway the motion detected within the digital 
video by the viewer makes them aware of the camera viewpoint being from within the 
vehicle rather that ‘of’ the vehicle.  This is significant because it means that the viewer 
is offered imagery of my embodied experience, extended by the car and the camera 
rather than imagery taken from a distant point that would indicate a separation between 
my experience and the landscape.  
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How might Merleau-Ponty’s idea of an overlap between a subject and an object 
be understood within Length II?  As we have seen, the idea of flesh is of value to a 
sensuous enquiry into landscape experience as such a concept can provide an 
explanation of how something is, for perceiving subjects and also for the world. 624  
Within Length II we can observe the movement of my body and the motion, both 
perceived and actual, within the surrounding environment.  The flow between my body 
and the environment necessarily reveals movement of both elements.  In this way, there 
is not a particular emphasis on either my body or the landscape and an idea of separation 
that might be associated with an ocularcentric understanding of vision has conceivably 
been removed. 
 
In chapter one, we were also able to observe the way in which written accounts 
of landscape experience are informed by the perceptual theories of Gibson. His ideas 
about the physical structure and meaning within an environment showed that 
information might be perceived from the light reflected from surfaces within an 
environment. Within Length II, reflected light reveals for the viewer surfaces passing 
into and out of sight as my journey progresses. Furthermore, invariant forms within the 
imagery enable the viewer to determine the moving elements within the digital video.  
For example, the stability of the dashboard is an invariant feature in relation to the 
changing landscape seen through the windscreen of the car.  However, when we 
consider the different viewing processes associated with digital video and film, issues 
arise that need to be considered when applying aspects of Gibson’s theory. Whilst in 
digital video, imagery is provided by visual information being transformed into 
electrical signals,625 in film it is the intermittent mechanism of the projector that 
advances the film and allows the light to project the imagery onto a surface that results 
                                                 
624 Brook, "Can Merleau-Ponty's Notion of 'Flesh' Inform or Even Transform Environmental 
Thinking?". 355. 
625 Sylvia Martin, Video Art (Koln: Taschen, 2006). 6. 
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in the moving imagery perceived by the viewer.626  The action of light on the surface of 
individual images that are visible on celluloid film, and that has occurred as a direct 
result of my embodied experience in the landscape, is seemingly in closer accordance 
with Gibson’s idea of ‘direct’ perception than is digital technology that relies on changes 
that happen in the translation of unrecognisable, encoded information.  
  
 We have also seen, in chapter two, that a cascade of affordances between a 
perceiver and their surroundings is dependent upon each step in the succession of 
potential meanings, in order to bring about activity within an environment.627  Such a 
cascade of affordances can be applied to Length II. For example, the road surface 
affords the smooth contact with the tyres of the vehicle that, in turn, afford the motion of 
the car. Also, the engine, the fuel, the bodywork, the upholstered seating, my clothing, 
the camera and the windscreen are all entities that afford a relationship between the 
environment and my body. For the viewer, most of the technologies mentioned above 
are taken for granted and not perceived as separate parts of my embodied experience.  
However, without such a sequence of affordances, my embodied experience of the 
motorway journey would be quite different, and, accordingly, the viewer’s experience 
would also be changed.  Here again, the imagery in the digital video has come about as a 
result of the camera being placed in a position that affords the recording of the action of 
the car and other mediating technologies as they extend my bodily limitations when 
travelling along the motorway.  Significantly, such a placement emphasises the 
mediating technology within my embodied experience. 
 
It is worth taking a closer look at some of the mediating technologies that 
function in Line and Length II.  As we have seen above, the way in which technology 
                                                 
626 Kris Malkiewicz, Cinematography (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon and 
Schuster, 2001). 2. 
627 Michael, "These Boots Are Made for Walking.: Mundane Technology, the Body and Human-
Environment Relations.". 
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mediates our association with a landscape is a significant part of an embodied 
experience.  Although Frampton has suggested that an emphasis on technological 
questions with regard to film obscures possible poetic ones,628 I propose that when 
technology is considered as part of embodied experience the understanding that is 
brought about as a consequence paves the way for thoughtful and poetic usage of the 
media.  It seems to me that there is poetry in our everyday actions and patterns of 
existence that an emphasis on mediating technology is able to reveal with devastating 
clarity.   
 
As we have seen above, the film Line has not been edited but rather relies on the 
mediating technology for its rhythmic character.  Line is comprised of a single cut from 
twelve ‘windings’ of a mechanical camera using 100 feet of 16mm film and it is this 
technological mediation that provides the rhythmic character of the film. The wind-up 
camera has a limited duration for shooting a section of film before the mechanism 
requires re-winding.  As we have also seen, the changes that occur from one shot to 
another, at regular intervals throughout the film, provide a rhythm to the artwork that 
provides evidence of an unfolding of time.  However, in Line the time aspect is 
disrupted by my action of re-winding the camera mechanism.  Whilst the camera is 
being wound, it is not, of course, recording onto the film.  The viewer thus sees a series 
of ‘takes’ that do not run into one another chronologically.  Rather than viewing my 
perceptual experience at the time of taking the film, the viewer has a different 
experience brought about by the character of the mediating technology, in this instance 
the wind-up camera. 
 
We have seen that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology starts with immediate and 
pre-reflective experience. Throughout the making of Line I have sought to retain 
phenomenological integrity in terms of immediate and pre-reflective experience.  
                                                 
628 Frampton, Filmosophy. 45. 
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Although Frampton questions whether film that has not been edited is ‘pre-reflective’,629 
the way in which the medium has been used in Line to record embodied experience 
mediated by technology places it firmly in a position that is as ‘pre-reflective’ as 
possible and does not involve me making selections in terms of image content or 
zooming shots. 
 
 The camera used to capture Line does not have an audio facility.  So, in keeping 
with phenomenological integrity, a soundtrack has not been added.  Rather, the viewer 
hears the sound of the projector and this brings their attention to the ways in which 
technology mediates their own situation within the gallery.  The audible pushing and 
pulling of the film through the claw mechanism of the projector and the sound of the 
motor within the apparatus provides evidence of the mediating technology that exists 
between the viewer and the imagery and also has some correspondence to my own 
experience when capturing the imagery.  The mobile position of the viewer within the 
gallery space, in relation to the fixed position of the projector (albeit with moving parts) 
and the moving imagery on the fixed screen, or white wall of the gallery, provides an 
interesting and complex model for analysis.  Here, the projector might be viewed in a 
similar way to the lighthouse in Dean’s film Disappearance at Sea.  The projector, like 
the lighthouse, mediates between the viewer and the work and yet the viewer is not 
physically attached to the projector just as Dean was not physically attached to the 
camera in the lighthouse.  (It is unknown whether Dean was in the lighthouse at the time 
of making Disappearance at Sea, a point that might have an impact on a 
phenomenological analysis of the work). Can the projector then, in Line, with any 
degree of integrity, be said to be extending the bodily capabilities of the viewer?  It is 
worth thinking about Sobchack’s phenomenological analysis again here.  If we consider 
Sobchack’s anthropomorphism of film then we can perhaps place the projector in a 
mediating positing whereby it extends the ‘capability’ of the body that is the film.  
                                                 
629 Ibid. 
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However, and as we have seen above, to attribute film with human qualities is 
phenomenologically problematic. At this point, Frampton’s view of film needing to be 
understood in its own terms because it fails to fit into any existing patterns of thought 
seems the most appropriate conclusion.   
 
Perhaps it is also worth reconsidering Sobchack’s translation of Ihde’s ideas 
regarding lens-based instruments.  Can a projector really take the place of spectacles or a 
microscope when we consider ways in which technology extends the limits of our 
perceptual ability?  Possibly not.  Whilst spectacles and a microscope form a physical 
bond with the body, a projector is always separate from the viewer’s body.  However, if, 
within the sequence of technologies extending the range of action between a viewer and 
the moving imagery on the screen we include the viewer’s shoes, the floor covering and 
the projector stand, then embodied experience extended by technology, that significantly 
includes the projector, is a justifiable claim. Also, a camera needs to be looked at in a 
different way to a projector. Usually, a camera is in direct physical contact with the 
body.  Whether an older style camera that is held to the eye or a more modern style held 
in the hand and viewed via an integral screen, both sorts involve a physical connection 
with the body.   
 
The 16mm projector is clearly visible to the viewer in Line and can thus be 
accounted for as a part of the work. Bearing in mind the discussion above, in this 
position, the projector can be seen to mediate between the viewer and the imagery 
reflected from the screen.  Here, aspects of movement, time and technology are pertinent 
for the experience of the viewer as well as for my own experience that is revealed by the 
imagery of the film.  As we have seen, such a conspicuous placement of a projector is an 
unconventional way of showing a film within a cinema context and although I have 
compared it to the lighthouse in Dean’s film, it contrasts with the way in which Dean’s 
film has been shown within a gallery space, discussed in chapter four. 
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In accordance with the writing of Merleau-Ponty, mediating technologies might 
also be considered as extending the limits of perception.  In chapter two we observed 
Ihde’s analysis of ways in which technology might be understood in a phenomenological 
way and in the previous chapter we have considered technology and phenomenology in 
the example of Dean’s film, Disappearance at Sea.  Although the example of Dean’s 
film provided evidence of movement within the landscape, we have seen above that 
there is some ambiguity in the idea of a lighthouse being used to extend perception when 
the structure is not connected to a human perceiver or when the inanimate structure itself 
is conceived as a human perceiver.  In Line there is no such ambiguity.  The vehicle 
clearly extends the limits and boundaries of my perceptual experience and the camera, 
by its attachment to the fixtures within the train, is part of the technology extending my 
perceptual experience. 
 
Attention will now be given to the ways in which technology mediates within 
my digital video, Length II.  This digital video has been transferred from the mini-dv 
format used by the digital camera to a DVD and is shown via an LCD screen with an 
integral DVD system.  In this way, the presentation of the digital video is in keeping 
with the capture of the imagery from a digital movie camera. As we have seen in chapter 
three, the way in which the work is shown reflects the embodied nature of the 
experience involved in the making of the artwork.630  
 
In Length II, my perception is extended by the technology of the car and the 
digital video camera. This is a complex process that also includes a multitude of other 
technologies and which, as we have seen in chapter two, accords with the writing of 
Merleau-Ponty. As I have indicated, the role of the camera as extending the boundaries 
of my perceptual experience relies on its position attached to the seat of the car.  Here, it 
                                                 
630 Brodsky, "How to "See" with the Whole Body.". 
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is strapped firmly to the passenger seat in a position that allows the lens to be directed 
through the windscreen of the car. From this position, the digital camera is able to record 
my movement through the landscape in a way that places the car as an extender of the 
limits of my perceptual awareness. 
 
Of particular interest in Length II is how the audio content of the digital video 
reveals embodied notions of the landscape. Here, an analysis of sound is more complex 
than in Line.  In Length II, sounds have been recorded via the inbuilt audio system of the 
digital movie camera.  These sounds arise from the immediate environment, such as my 
vehicle’s engine, and also from a distant source via the mediating technology of my car 
radio.  Intriguingly, and largely through methodological rigour, my car radio plays a 
significant role in artwork that set out to research an experience of the landscape.  The 
sounds emitted from the radio were part of my perceptual experience at the time of 
making the digital video and when perceived by a viewer within the gallery they form 
part of the viewer’s embodied experience of my work.  Complexities arise in connection 
with the local traffic reports from radio stations that cut in over the pre-set radio station.  
These reports provide evidence of my movement across the landscape that occurs over 
time. A perceiver of the digital video can track my progress on the motorway, via traffic 
reports, from Hertfordshire to Berkshire, where my car, held up in a traffic queue, spills 
antifreeze across the motorway and ceases to function.  Alerted to the malfunction of my 
vehicle by a fellow road user, I get out of the car to assess the damage and, using my 
mobile telephone, dial 999 to warn the police about the potential hazard I have caused.  
At this point, my embodied experience changes from one that is extended by the 
technology of my car to one that is extended by the mediating technology of my mobile 
telephone.  Here we have evidence of a world very different from that of Bruegel’s 
landscape within The Harvesters.  My car is now merely in the position of a ‘tripod’ for 
the camera which is continuing to record my activities, both visually and aurally.  My 
embodied experience is now extended by my mobile telephone that is sending out, and 
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receiving, invisible radio frequency waves across the landscape.  The digital video 
reveals that my anticipation of the arrival of the police leads me to consider the legal 
problems associated with making a film from a potentially hazardous position within my 
car.  Recent news reports contain plenty of evidence to suggest that road users in 
England are being arrested for potentially less intrusive activities to driving than my 
digital video making entails.  So, I turn off the camera and this action, of course, brings 
about the end of the digital video. The demise of the camera battery had been my 
intended method of reaching a conclusion to the digital video.  Instead, interestingly, it 
was the failure of the car and the potential legal problems of filming whilst driving on a 
motorway in twenty-first century Britain that brought about an end to Length II. Seen in 
this context, a phenomenological analysis that is illustrated by an old and static artwork 
looks rather lame. 
 
As I have already stated, wherever possible, within both Line and Length II, 
minimal intervention has been applied to the making of the artwork.  Thus, the imagery 
viewed relies primarily on pre-reflective embodied experience. However, it would be 
rather churlish to be over attentive to such technical details as the focusing ring or, in the 
case of Line, the exposure meter.  Accordingly, in Length II the digital video camera was 
set at the start of the film to ‘autofocus’ and, similarly, the light meter used in Line was 
used to pre-set an appropriate aperture and shutter setting.   
 
It is significant to note the methodology underpinning Line and Length II. 
Although pre-reflective experience has been the prime source of the imagery, both of 
these works have been made following a period of reflection based on pre-existing 
literature and artwork. Thus periods of reflection associated with this thesis can be said 
to have contributed to the making of the work.  The artwork has also been informed by 
reflection following an analysis of written accounts of landscape experience.  In 
addition, art practice made by myself and by others has also been considered prior to the 
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making of Line and Length II (see appendix 1).  A combination of embodied experience 
and reflection that relies on other sources of information has thus provided the method 
employed in these two pieces of work and might be understood as an expanded form of 
phenomenology.  This method of phenomenological enquiry has precedents, as we have 
seen, in the work of Tilley, Dean and Haworth. Here, we have examples of writers of 
embodied landscape experience, and visual artists, whose work includes notions of 
embodiment, each using a method that incorporates immediate experience with periods 
of reflection and information from other sources.  
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Summary 
 
This chapter has examined ways in which my own practice might articulate ideas of 
embodied landscape experience.  Specifically, the chapter has considered notions of 
phenomenological method and parallel understandings of embodied experience in 
relation to two artworks.  From this analysis it can be concluded that my own visual art 
practice articulates notions of embodied experience that correspond in some ways to 
ideas that inform textual accounts of landscape experience.  In particular, this chapter 
has established points of contact between my 16mm film, Line, my digital video, Length 
II, and textual accounts of landscape experience that are underpinned by 
phenomenological and parallel understandings of perception.631 
 
Firstly, using ideas about an embodied experience of the landscape that have 
arisen within this thesis, I have shown ways in which a dynamic relationship between a 
perceiver and their environment is articulated by two of my artworks, Line and Length 
II.  Specifically, I have described ways in which these two works provide evidence of 
movement and time that have been discussed as significant parts of a dynamic 
relationship between a perceiver and their environment. 
 
Following on from how Line and Length II might provide evidence of an 
embodied association with an environment, I have considered ways in which the two 
works are mediated by technology.  This is significant because, as we have seen in 
earlier chapters, technology transforms an embodied association with an environment.  
In this chapter, I have shown that simple and more complex types of technology have 
been considered in relation to the making and viewing processes involved in the film 
Line and the digital video Length II. 
                                                 
631 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. 
Tilley, The Materiality of Stone:  Explorations in Landscape Phenomenology. 
Ingold, The Perception of the Environment:  Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. 
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Finally, in this chapter, I have examined the phenomenological method used in 
the making of Line and Length II.  Using methodological principles that we have seen 
used by Tilley, Dean and Haworth, I have shown how immediate, pre-reflective 
experience and information from other literary and artistic sources has informed the 
creation of Line and Length II. Using a method that combines immediate experience 
with other sources, I have shown how Line and Length II provide a viewer with a new 
understanding, in contemporary art terms, of an embodied association with a landscape.   
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Conclusion  
By way of a conclusion, it is worth summarising the key components in the review of 
existing literature and evaluating the contribution to knowledge that is central to this 
thesis.  By way of a reflective postscript, I have assessed the communities for whom this 
investigation has potential consequences and considered areas of possible future 
research that arise as an outcome of the project.  
 
Within this thesis, I have explored ways in which contemporary art practice can 
articulate ideas about the reciprocal and dynamic relationship that forms our embodied 
experience of an environment.  Firstly, I have investigated ideas from Tilley and Ingold 
about how we might experience a landscape in a way that considers notions of 
embodiment.  I have also considered pre-existing texts relating to embodied experience 
from the disciplines of art, the environment, and philosophy.  Furthermore, I have 
analysed an existing artwork by Tacita Dean as a case study to show that ideas presented 
above might be applied to contemporary art practice.  Finally, I have shown ways in 
which my own artwork provides an original model of how contemporary art practice 
might articulate embodied landscape experience.  This new model evidences ways in 
which film and digital video articulate a dynamic relationship between a perceiver and 
their environment.  By the strategic placement of cameras and their associated 
technologies, my own artwork specifically addresses the way in which technology 
mediates an embodied experience of the landscape and provides explicit knowledge of 
the perception and expression of an environment within the twenty-first century. 
 
It is worth rehearsing the critical trajectory taken by this research project.  The 
argument began by considering the controversy that has built up around ways in which 
the landscape might be viewed in an ocularcentric way.  Here, looking is dominated by 
the eye and fails to take account of vision involving other parts of the human body.  This 
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way of viewing considers the landscape as something fixed for the purpose of 
contemplation and indicates a separation between an observer and their environment.  In 
contrast, we have seen that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology provides a way of 
understanding our surroundings that puts emphasis on an immediate and spontaneous 
whole body engagement with an environment.  Here, embodied experience relies on 
information gathered by the bodily senses in an immediate way from an environment 
and occurs over time. Thus for Merleau-Ponty, seeing is understood as lived, 
spontaneous experience. 
 
 We have seen that a fundamental part of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of 
embodied experience is the idea that what a viewer is looking at has an active role to 
play in the viewing process.  I have examined his suggestion that what we are looking at 
has the power to direct our vision and might even be considered to ‘return’ our gaze.  In 
this way, a relationship between a viewer and the viewed can be understood as 
reversible. As I have also shown, a reversible type of relationship between the seer and 
the seen, or the subject and the object, needs to be taken into account when we consider 
an embodied relationship between a perceiver and their environment and ways in which 
such an association might be articulated by art practice.  We have also seen that within 
the idea of a reversible relationship between a perceiver and their environment, the idea 
of flesh leads Merleau-Ponty to suggest a further breakdown of a separation between a 
human subject and their environment. 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s idea of embodiment has proven to be a useful tool in this 
thesis.  However, we have seen that for a full enquiry into landscape experience, 
immediate embodied experience needs to be considered in conjunction with other 
sources of information in order to provide what has been termed an expanded form of 
phenomenology.  Tilley’s cultural archaeological account of landscape provided us with 
an example where immediate embodied experience is used in conjunction with pre-
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existing written material that was pertinent to his field of enquiry. Likewise, Dean’s 
film, Disappearance at Sea, and my own research project, have both shown ways in 
which immediate experience might be complemented by other sources of information.  
 
This thesis has also examined Gibson’s ecological enquiry into an embodied 
experience of the landscape.  As I have shown, his investigation is closely aligned to 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology because both writers share the idea of a mutual 
relationship between a perceiver and their environment. Gibson explained a process 
whereby a human perceiver gathers information from their surroundings through the 
perception of the light reflected from the surfaces within an environment.  As I have 
shown, Gibson’s ideas are significant to this project as both Tilley and Ingold use his 
theory of perception within their own accounts.  However, as I have also indicated, 
problems have been identified with Gibson’s neglect of how individuals and social 
groups within diverse cultures might perceive things from reflected light in different 
ways.  This, as I have also indicated, has been the subject of enquiry in the field of 
ecological psychology, but not in the domain of the fine arts, as specifically moving 
imagery. 
 
Moreover, this thesis has also examined how Tilley and Ingold use Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology and Gibson’s ecological theory of perception to inform their 
respective accounts of landscape experience.  We have seen that Tilley uses the work of 
Merleau-Ponty to understand a reversible relationship between a perceiver and their 
environment.  We have also seen that Tilley’s account is informed by Gibson’s ideas 
about perception to describe the experience of movement within a landscape. Here, 
emphasis is given to the idea that perception is an ambient activity involving our senses 
being receptive to an environment. This thesis has taken particular note of the way in 
which Tilley uses immediate phenomenological experience together with other sources 
of information within his account of landscape experience. In such an ‘expanded’ form 
 192 
of phenomenology, Tilley considers what others have written about his topic of interest 
and uses this, in combination with immediate phenomenological experience, in order to 
reach new conclusions about the landscape.   
 
Ingold’s enquiry into ways in which an active perceiver might be situated within 
the context of an active engagement with the constituents of their surroundings has also 
been analysed within this thesis. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is used by Ingold to 
understand how immediate embodied experience can provide ideas about time. As we 
have seen, participation within an environment is temporal, because it occurs over time.  
Similarly, Gibson’s method of direct perception has been used by Ingold to understand 
how surfaces might be perceived as unfolding over time as a human subject moves 
within an environment.  An analysis of Ingold’s writing also highlighted the importance 
of sound in our perception of an environment.  In short then, Ingold describes our 
experience of a landscape as involving participation in an environment that includes 
bodily movements and sounds that occur over time.  However, Ingold’s use of Pieter 
Bruegel’s The Harvesters as a tool to describe how a landscape might be understood in a 
temporal way is highly problematic. A painting is a necessarily static medium and yet 
Ingold uses it to describe an inherently mobile relationship. Ingold’s choice of artwork 
also fails in another way.  Although it is reasonable to suggest that a painting by Bruegel 
might describe activity in a region around sixteenth century Antwerp, it cannot reveal 
how we experience an English landscape in the twenty-first century.  Many changes 
have occurred between the sixteenth and twenty-first centuries that make our experience 
of an English landscape in the current period different to the depiction of a farm worker 
in Flanders over five hundred years ago.  
 
This thesis has indicated that complex technologies, such as vehicles and 
communication systems and simple, or mundane, technologies, such as our clothing or 
footwear, have undergone a radical transformation that impacts on our relationship with 
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our environment. An investigation into Michael’s account of technological mediation 
has revealed that specifically simple technologies not only mediate between our body 
and our environment but also link together to form chains of technologies that enable us 
to afford an environment.  Whilst Michael’s account provides a useful way of 
accounting for ways in which simple technologies are significant in the mediation of 
experience, there is arguably a problem in viewing the landscape in such a simplistic 
way.   
 
I have also shown that our association with technology can be understood in a 
phenomenological way.  From an analysis of the work of Ihde it is evident that a 
perceiver can extend the limits of their perceptual boundaries with technologies.  Using 
Merleau-Ponty’s principles of embodied experience, we have seen Ihde’s interpretation 
of how a lived body might experience an environment more fully through technologies.  
 Similarly, we have seen that Ihde applies his phenomenological interpretation of how 
technology mediates experience to technologies that employ lenses, such as spectacles 
or telescopes.  This is highly significant.  Cameras and projectors are both examples of 
optical instruments that use lenses.  However, we have seen that rather than the single 
mode of mediation that Ihde describes, film experience is a model that involves both a 
camera and a projector and therefore needs to be considered as a more complex example 
when phenomenological method is applied.  
 
Using Brodsky’s account of a relationship between the whole body and the 
making and viewing of art, I have shown connections between the construction and 
perception of art and ideas of embodied experience.  Although an analysis of Brodsky’s 
enquiry provided a useful description of whole body activities in respect of painting and 
other still forms of imagery, it failed to address embodied practices in respect of moving 
imagery.  We have seen that the motion of a perceiver and a dynamic, changing 
environment are critical features of an embodied experience with a landscape.  
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Therefore, it has been crucial to analyse embodied experience in relation to moving 
imagery. 
 
Phenomenological ideas about moving imagery are central to the work of 
Sobchack.  Using ideas of embodied experience from Merleau-Ponty and notions of 
mediation by optical instruments from Ihde, Sobchack demonstrated the sequence of 
relationships that combine to bring about a phenomenological understanding of film. 
Consideration of two lens-based instruments - a camera and a projector - led Sobchack 
to consider a more complex series of bodies and technologies to bring about a 
phenomenological understanding of film experience.  Sobchack has enabled me to 
describe phenomenological experience and film.  However, an examination of her work 
primarily addressed moving imagery shown within a cinema rather than that associated 
with an art gallery.  We have seen that embodied experience within the environment of a 
cinema is different to that within an art gallery.  In the former the viewer is physically 
fixed to the spot within a seat and might be lulled into a state of disembodiment by the 
immersive space of the screen.  In contrast, the gallery makes no such demands.  Rather, 
a more active response is encouraged and the viewer is free to move around the space 
and view the artwork from diverse positions.   
 
Ideas of embodied experience have also been identified in Dean’s making of the 
film Disappearance at Sea and in the tragic event upon which the film is based.  This 
thesis has revealed that the textual component that accompanies Dean’s film also 
impacts upon the viewer’s understanding of experience and contributes to Dean’s work 
being understood in terms of an expanded form of phenomenology.  However, whilst 
Dean’s work has provided an example of artwork that critics have suggested might be 
understood in a phenomenological way, and offered a model upon which to test some of 
the ideas presented within this project, Disappearance at Sea was not made in 
accordance with the critical perspective set out in this thesis.  
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If we acknowledge the critical perspectives set out in the literature review along 
with their strengths and weaknesses, and if, in turn, we note the strengths and 
weaknesses in the wide range of forms of art practice set out in this thesis – a range that 
extended from Bruegel to Dean – it is possible to identify a set of critical and conceptual 
gaps filled by this research. 
 
And so to my own art practice that has been made in accordance with the critical 
agenda set out in this thesis. This agenda emphasised the need for attention to ideas of 
movement and to the mediation of technology when considering notions of landscape 
experience and its representation in art practice.  How does my own work support the 
research that is evidenced by this thesis into how contemporary art might articulate 
embodied landscape experience?  Firstly, by the use of moving imagery, Line and 
Length II offer examples of artwork that provide a viewer with evidence of the 
movement of a perceiver and motion within an environment.  Secondly, Line and Length 
II both offer examples of ways in which human subjects move about the landscape in the 
present day; they both reveal a contemporary articulation of an embodied experience of 
the English landscape.   
 
Broadly, a viewer of the artwork can perceive movement in Line and Length II 
as the moving imagery unfolds over time.  As we have seen, in Line the perceived 
movement is of the kind we experience when we travel by train and has been achieved 
by placing an emphasis on the mediating technology.  It is significant that by making the 
mediating technology a central concern in the work, the viewer is provided with imagery 
that reveals the dynamic relationship between a perceiver and their environment. 
Interestingly, we have seen that perceived ‘cuts’ in the film have been provided by the 
winding mechanism of the movie camera that is only able to capture approximately 
fifteen seconds of film before requiring re-winding.  Significantly, this means that the 
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temporal experience for the viewer of the film is quite different to my own experience 
when shooting the film. The need to rewind the camera means that there are temporal 
‘gaps’ in the viewer’s perception of my experience. These gaps have been determined by 
the mediating position of the camera.   
 
In Length II, a viewer of the artwork is able to determine ways in which 
attention to ideas of movement and mediating technology can be revealed in a digital 
video when phenomenological ideas of landscape experience are considered.  Here, we 
have seen that a strategically placed digital movie camera in my car captures my mobile 
experience of a motorway journey as well as the changing features of the environment 
that occur during my trip. Evidence of my embodied, mobile experience is provided by a 
sequence of interventions that includes my body extended by mediating technologies.  In 
this work, it is my perceptual experience extended by the camera and the car that is 
conveyed to the viewer.   In the viewing process of Length II, the series of relationships 
between an observer and the moving imagery includes simple technologies, such as the 
viewer’s clothes, together with more complex technologies such as an LCD screen with 
an integral DVD player.  The breakdown of my car in Length II offered the opportunity 
to see what happens to art when phenomenological rigour is applied.   Following the 
breakdown, and my subsequent move to a place of safety on the verge of the motorway, 
the car, we have seen, no longer has the role of extending my body and only plays the 
part of a ‘tripod’ for the camera.  Instead, my mobile phone takes on the role of 
technology that extends my perception.  The invisible radio frequency waves travelling 
across the landscape enable me to have a conversation with an emergency call-centre 
that would be beyond the possibility of my body alone.  
 
The sound that can be perceived in Length II has also revealed several points of 
interest in respect of a phenomenological experience of an environment.  In this work, 
the car radio has played a significant role in determining my location on the motorway 
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and providing evidence of distant activity.  Local radio stations that cut in over the pre-
set station provided evidence of my movement through the landscape, whilst news 
reports from London revealed how the mediating technology of the radio gives 
information about activities happening outside the visual field of a perceiver.  The 
impact of invisible communication links, such as radio frequency waves, is significant 
for this thesis.  As well as offering a route to further artwork, the huge increase in 
invisible types of technology serves to emphasise the inappropriate use by Ingold of an 
outdated artwork to describe contemporary landscape experience. 
 
Consideration has also been given to the idea of sound in connection with Line. 
In this artwork we can hear the sound of the projector pushing and pulling the film 
through its mechanism.  Here, the viewer’s experience is predicated not only on what 
can be seen in the film but also the technologies that make it visible.  The film has no 
audio content because the camera used to capture the film had no sound facility.  Once 
again, in keeping with my desire to minimise extra layers added to the work, no sound 
track has been added.  This is important because it stresses the phenomenological 
sequence of embodied experience involved in the spontaneous capture of the moving 
imagery. 
 
Several distinctive features of Line and Length II contribute towards the way in 
which my film and digital video extend current ideas about an embodied experience of 
the landscape and its articulation by contemporary art practice. A contribution to 
knowledge can be determined by the way in which the two works articulate the dynamic 
relationship that occurs in an embodied experience of the landscape. We are now 
familiar with the idea that by providing evidence of movement and sound of both a 
perceiver and the perceived Line and Length II articulate embodied experience of a 
landscape. The two artworks also consider a range of technologies that mediate our 
experience of an environment in the twenty-first century.  In this way, Line and Length 
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II provide examples of contemporary art practice that articulate embodied experience in 
the present era.  Technologies emphasised in the artwork, both visible and invisible, 
highlight ways in which our experience of an environment is mediated.  Our perception 
of both movement and sound within an environment is profoundly affected by their use. 
Their use also serves to emphasise Ingold’s inept use of a painting that is over five 
hundred years old to articulate embodied landscape experience.   
 
By way of a footnote, we could almost distil this thesis into an equation:  
Phenomenology is significant to ways in which we understand the landscape; 
phenomenology is by extension significant in how we understand representations of 
landscape; phenomenology has been extended by an awareness of technologies great 
and small; art has been affected by technologies great and small.  Thus an art concerned 
with phenomenology, technology and landscape prompts a significant revision in how 
we perceive space. 
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Postscript 
 
The arguments presented within this thesis provide potential insights for several 
communities into ways in which embodied landscape experience might be articulated 
within contemporary art practice. Cultural archaeologists, such as Tilley, and cultural 
anthropologists, such as Ingold, can be cited as two groups that could potentially benefit 
from this thesis by knowing ways in which contemporary art is able to reveal ideas 
about an embodied engagement with a landscape.  Likewise, the ideas presented above 
could be of value to writers of technology, such as Michael and Ihde for whom the 
critical evaluation of their ideas in relation to contemporary art practice could reveal a 
novel application of experience mediated by technology.  Art historians and theorists, 
such as Brodsky and Sobchack, might also find potential significance within this thesis.  
For Brodsky, the application of whole body experience and its application to specifically 
moving forms of art practice could be of potential interest and Sobchack’s work might 
potentially be informed by a critical appraisal of her ideas in connection with moving 
imagery used within art practice.  Writers of philosophical ideas about embodied 
experience, such as Belova and Casey, might be another community for whom this 
thesis is potentially informative because of its attention to ways in which Merleau-
Ponty’s ideas of perception might be understood within the context of a sensuous 
engagement of the landscape and its representation in art.  Members of the artistic 
community stand to gain from the new model provided by this research project and it is 
worth identifying a more restricted group that fall within this category.  Four artists 
whose practice addresses issues embraced by this thesis include installation artist Jane 
Quon; landscape artist, John Virtue; sculptural artist, Anthony Gormley and 
experimental filmmaker, Guy Sherwin.  
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Firstly, from Quon’s own writing, we know that she is concerned about the 
catastrophic consequences of human activity on the ecosystems of the earth.632  
Specifically, her ecologically-based art practice is informed by her experience of deep-
sea diving off of Tasmania’s eastern coast.  She informs us in her written text that 
unfamiliar sensations associated with the weightlessness of deep-sea diving led her to 
determine the content of her art and also her role as an artist.633 Quon’s artwork is 
informed by phenomenology and it is in this area that this thesis could be of particular 
consequence to her work.  Significantly, Quon cites the work of David Abram, a 
philosopher whose writing is informed by Merleau-Ponty.634  Using Abram’s text, Quon 
suggests that it is through our senses, and not by the reasoning processes of the brain, 
that we establish the requisite sense of belonging to a larger ecological whole.  In her 
installation: We engage in invisible tides,635we are able to see an example of how Quon 
applies Abram’s writing to her artwork. This art installation is sunk one and a half 
metres below the mid-tide surface of Sullivan’s Cove in Tasmania, and was created to 
convey a sense of the living complexity of marine ecology.  In this work, a flowing 
wave effect is created with a steel-framed grid, lengths of semi-flexible vertical rod cut 
to different heights, and aluminium discs, that signify the movement, the intangibility 
and the elusiveness of nature.  Naturally changing light conditions and the ebb and flow 
of the tide were key considerations in the making of the work and prompt a link to the 
dynamic nature of the environment discussed within this thesis.  In describing the 
artwork, Quon quotes from Abram: ‘In the untamed world of direct sensory experience 
no phenomenon presents itself as utterly passive or inert.  To the sensing body all 
phenomena are animate’.636  We can see that from her attention to a changing 
                                                 
632 Jane Quon, "Phenomenology and Artistic Praxis: An Application to Marine Ecological 
Communication," Leonardo 38, no. 3 (2005). 185. 
633 Ibid. 
634 Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World. 
635 Jane Quon, We engage in invisible tides, 2002 Mixed-media installation, Waterman’s Dock 
Hobart, Tasmania. 
636 Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World. 
81. 
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environment, and her consideration of phenomenological thought, Quon’s ideas are 
seemingly in step with the concepts presented within this thesis.  However, in Quon’s 
writing about her work, there is no mention of the role of the mediating technology 
within the phenomenological experience or in its relationship to the artwork. As we have 
seen in chapter two of this thesis, ways in which technology mediates within the 
phenomenological experience has an impact on the outcome of the experience, both in 
the environment and within its representation in art practice.  Ways in which this thesis 
addresses the mediation of technology within phenomenological experience, and within 
its representation in art practice, could therefore be of potential value to Quon’s critical 
evaluation of her work, both within her immediate sensorial experience and in the 
artwork that represents her experience.  
 
The second artist to be considered in terms of consequences of this thesis is John 
Virtue.  Virtue’s mixed-media images reference many different drawings that record his 
presence in the landscape and his immediate and pre-meditated response to that which is 
before him.637  The drawings he makes whilst out walking are referenced to recreate 
Virtue’s movement through the landscape, the passage of time, and his ever-changing 
relationship to his surroundings.638 Richard Cork suggests that when looking at Virtue’s 
work ‘we become vividly conscious of the artist’s physical motion as he wanders 
through the country, striding and then pausing when the urge to draw becomes 
paramount’.639 These drawings might then be considered as a phenomenological record 
of Virtue’s experience. However, whilst Virtue’s re-creation of movement might be seen 
by critics to reflect what we have seen in this thesis as an understanding of place through 
movement along paths, his paintings are nevertheless static objects.  (The issue of 
painting and movement was addressed in chapter one using Ingold’s example of 
                                                 
637 Tate St Ives, ed., John Virtue: New Work 1998-2000 (St Ives, Cornwall: Tate St Ives and 
Plymouth University, 2000). 14. 
638 Ibid. 
639 Richard Cork, John Virtue: Ten New Works (London: Lisson Gallery Publications, 1989). No 
page nos. 
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Bruegel’s work). For this reason, the way in which this thesis addresses the 
representation of embodied experience through movement in the landscape would be of 
potential value to Virtue.  Simon Schama has also addressed ideas of embodied 
experience within Virtue’s work.  Writing in ‘Why I love the painter John Virtue’, 
Schama discusses Virtue’s painting, Landscape No. 704.640 He proposes that rather than 
having a detached relationship with the landscape, for Virtue there is: ‘smash-mouth 
contact…it’s rain-sodden, dirt-caked, foul-tempered, beery-eyed, jack-hammered, 
traffic-jammed, nervy exhilaration’.  What Virtue provides, says Schama, is not a visual 
document of London, but rather an overwhelming embodiment of the city.  Virtue’s 
painting of London, he adds, ‘is closer to an East End knees-up than to a prospect by 
Canaletto’.641 If we set aside Schama’s tendency to rhetorical flourishes, questions arise 
as to whether his interpretation is appropriate following reflection on the significance of 
movement within ideas of embodied experience that have been raised within this thesis. 
 
Next, I shall consider the relevance of this thesis to the work of the artist 
Anthony Gormley.  In a published conversation between Gormley, Ralph Rugoff and 
Jacky Klein, Gormley reveals that as a reaction against the conceptual pastoralism of the 
artists Richard Long and Hamish Fulton, he ‘went to the body as a site of direct 
experience, trying to make something personal that while resulting in an object, was 
action-based’.642  Gormley claims that his main concerns are existential and 
anthropological.  He looks, he says, as much to anthropology and archaeology as to art 
in order to open up possibilities.643 Attention to experience and to how the disciplines of 
anthropology and archaeology might inform art practice lends Gormley’s work to an 
association with this thesis.  Specifically, within the conversation with Rugoff and Klein 
                                                 
640 Simon Schama, "Why I Love the Painter John Virtue," The Guardian, Monday, February 28 
2005. 
641 Ibid. 
642 ‘Field Activities: a coversation between Anthony Gormley, Ralph Rugoff and Jacky Klein’, 
Anthony Vidler, Anthony Gormley, Blind Light. 40. 
643 Ibid. 42. 
 203 
Gormley speaks of his work Event Horizon.  This artwork consists of twenty-seven 
fibreglass, and four cast iron figures, cited at various locations in London.  Event 
Horizon, says Gormley, involves the viewer in observation of the figures that are 
dispersed over the city.  But, he says, the reversal of the normal relationship between 
viewer and art object is a preoccupation.  The viewer of the artwork, he adds, becomes 
slowly aware that he or she is the focus of this witnessing field and as such they are 
surrounded by art that is looking at them.644  Such a concern with ways in which the 
subject/object relationship might be reversed accords with Merleau-Ponty’s writing 
about the seer and the seen, an idea has been a key issue throughout this thesis.  Thus a 
connection can be made between the ideas presented within this thesis and the concepts 
that inform Gormley’s sculptural work. 
 
Interestingly, Mitchell comments on the dynamic nature of Gormley’s artwork. 
In Event Horizon, he says, there is a paradox in that despite the (im)passivity of the 
figures, the encounter with space and place is dynamic. 645   This is interesting.  A 
dynamic encounter with the landscape has been a key issue within this project and has 
highlighted the significance of movement in artwork that seeks to represent such an 
encounter.  Speaking of his concern with the existence of the individual, Gormley states 
that he has to ‘manage to engage the whole being of the viewer’.646 Whilst the viewer of 
Gormley’s work can be considered as an ‘active perceiver’, his static figures placed in a 
dynamic environment have an ambiguous quality.  The employment of static figures in a 
dynamic environment potentially prompts the use of Gormley’s work as an opening for 
further research into what we have seen Gibson describe as variant and invariant 
features of an environment.   
 
                                                 
644 ‘Field Activities: a conversation between Anthony Gormley, Ralph Rugoff and Jacky Klein’, 
Anthony Vidler, Anthony Gormley, Blind Light. 53. 
645 W. J. T. Mitchell, ‘Architecture as sculpture as drawing: Anthony Gormley’s Paragone, 
Vidler, Stewart and Mitchell, Anthony Gormley, Blind Light. 121. 
646 Renfrew, Figuring It Out. 121. 
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The work of filmmaker, Guy Sherwin, might also benefit from the 
phenomenological principles discussed within this thesis.  Working in experimental 
cinema, Sherwin uses film to reveal phenomena that is not normally visible to the naked 
eye.647  For example, in his film Flight, Sherwin has used an optical printer to rework a 
tiny fragment of film that depicts pigeons, semi-silhouetted in trees, shot using a long 
lens.648  By slowing down, and at times stopping, the imagery, Sherwin manages to 
make the bird seemingly vanish by appearing to become part of the surrounding foliage. 
Through his manipulation of the media, Sherwin invites his audience to consider how 
the visual field may be filled with ambiguities.  By his sensitivity to media and technical 
process, and his preoccupation with notions of perception, Sherwin can be cited as 
another artist for whom this thesis would be of consequence.  
 
A literature search reveals a potential audience for this thesis from a variety of 
creative disciplines that use ideas about phenomenological experience and technology.  
A book, yet to be published, by performance artist Susan Kazel, entitled  Closer: 
Performance, technologies, phenomenology, is one such example.649  The preview of 
this book by its publishers indicates that Kazel draws on live performance, digital 
technologies and phenomenology to ask what can be discovered as we become closer to 
our computers as they become extensions of our ways of thinking, moving and 
touching.650   This book would seem to promise yet another way in which this thesis can 
be considered as potentially consequential to those working in creative practice whose 
interests include phenomenological notions of experience and technology. 
 
This thesis also provides a potential spring-board for further research, both for 
myself and for other artists.  Within my own practice, the ideas within this dissertation 
                                                 
647 Hamlyn, Film Art Phenomena.11. 
648 Guy Sherwin, Flight, 1998, 16mm, B & W, sound 4 minutes.  
649 Susan Kazel, Closer: Performance, technologies, phenomenology, The MIT Press, 2008. 
650 The Leonardo Book Series, ‘Coming soon: Susan Kazel, Closer: Performance, technologies, 
phenomenology, The MIT Press, 2007.  
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are initiating work beyond the time frame of this research project.  In particular, the idea 
of an overlap, or intertwining, on the boundaries of a perceiver and their surroundings is 
leading to new developments and exploration within my art practice.  Specifically, 
consideration of a concept that involves an overlap, or intertwining of my body and its 
surroundings, but which I am unable to detect with my bodily senses, serves to highlight 
the role of the imagination within a phenomenological enquiry.  We have already seen 
that a consideration of flesh is part of a phenomenological relationship involving 
movement and can be analysed in connection with technology.  By the use of film, 
digital video and drawing media I now propose to explore ways within contemporary art 
practice in which the imagination might be understood within an embodied experience 
of the landscape. Merleau-Ponty says that the imaginary is both further and nearer from 
the actual.  Further, because representation by art is a likeness only according to the 
body but nearer because the imaginary is in my body as a kind of diagram of the life of 
the actual, exposed for the first time.651  
 
Ideas about the role played by the imaginary within a phenomenological 
relationship has led to an examination of how the phenomenological sequence of 
relationships between my embodied actions and a viewer might change if I substitute 
photographic imagery for drawn imagery. If I replace the camera with a pen and 
writable surface, what impact does this have on the notions of embodied experience and 
its articulation by contemporary art practice that have been determined within this 
project? 
 
Currently, I am making drawings with a pen and ink directly onto 16mm film.  
Here, I can select features of the landscape, actual objects and surfaces or things from 
my imagination and draw them onto the transparent film.  Using the ideas represented 
within this thesis, the pen might be understood as part of my embodied experience as it 
                                                 
651 Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and  Mind.". 121. 
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provides an extension to my perceptual ability. Here, the notion of flesh that describes an 
overlap, or intertwining between a human subject and their surroundings can be 
examined within a new series of interventions within my proposed drawing model.  
 
Also, I am examining ways in which nineteenth century optical instruments 
might provide mediation between my drawings and a viewer of the work.  An optical 
instrument such as a zoetrope operates as a turning cylinder around which spectators 
might view simulated action, often jugglers or acrobats. First constructed by William 
Horner in the 1830s, it provided a means to explore ideas about perception.  As Jonathon 
Crary points out, although extensive documentation exists on the zoetrope, and related 
optical instruments, as an initial form of technological development leading to the 
emergence of cinema, little is written about the conceptual singularity of the device.652 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
652 Crary, Techniques of the Observer. 110. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Examples of supplementary art practice that have contributed to this research 
project 
 
 
 
 
    
Illus. 20: Bren Unwin, Unfolding vista, 2005 
Etching, carborundum, relief, collage, on Hahnemuhle paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illus. 21: Bren Unwin, Fumerolic field, 2005 
Inkjet print on Olmec paper.   
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Illus. 22: Bren Unwin, Invariant transformation, 2005 
Series of 29, 35mm slides, looped.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illus. 23: Bren Unwin, Littlejohns, 2006 
35mm slide with digital moving imagery. 
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Illus. 24: Motion capture suit and resulting digital image 2006 
Dept. of Engineering, University of Cambridge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illus. 25: Bren Unwin, Penwith Explorer, 2007 
16mm film, looped, 3 minutes, Newlyn Art Gallery. 
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Illus. 26: Bren Unwin, Moped to studio, 2007 
Digital video, 15 minutes. 
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